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EDUCATION  DEPT. 


Books  by 
PROF.  RAYMOND  MACDONALD  ALDEN 

o/  Leland  Stanford  Junior  University 

The  Art  of  Debate 

xv+279  pp.     i2mo.    $1.12  net. 

A  practical  manual  of  argumentation  and  debating,  sufficient- 
ly systematic  to  be  serviceable  as  a  text-book.  Legal  argument 
is  talcen  as  a  means  of  approach  to  the  treatment  of  such 
matters  as  burden  of  proof  and  evidence;  and  the  classification 
of  methods  of  proof  is  based  on  the  exigencies  of  actual  debate. 

Prof.  E.  N.  Scctt,  University  0/ Michigan  :  "  It  is  a  fresh 
and  interesting  treatment  of  the  subject,  packed  with  ideas 
expressed  in  a  most  delightful  and  taking  away. 

English  Verse 

With  Specimens  illustrating  its  Principles  and  History 
xiv+459  pp.    i2mo.     $1.25  net. 

Bliss  Perry ^  Editor  of  the  Atlantic  Monthly  :  "  It  is  a  skill- 
fully planned  and  admirably  compact  handbook.  I  know  of 
no  treatise  on  versification  which  is  so  well  adapted  for 
practical  use  in  the  classroom.'* 

Introduction  to  Poetry 

xvi+371  pp.     i2mo.    $1.25  *t^i' 

A  discussion  of  the  theory  of  poetry,  treating  the  various 
classes  of  poems  separately,  problems  of  the  inner  nature  of 
poetry  and  the  technical  metric  subdivisions. 

Henry  Holt  and  Company 

Nbw  York  Chicago 


THE   ART   OF   DEBATE 


■T 


RAYMOND    MACDONALD  ALDEN,    Ph.D. 

ASSOCIATE   PROFESSOR    IN    LELAND   STANFORD 
JUNIOR   UNIVERSITY 


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NEW  YORK 

HENRY   HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


Copyright,  i9oe» 

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HENRY  HOLT  &  Ca 


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BOTH 

EX-PRESIDENTS  OF  THE  "HARVARD  UNION, 
ADMIRABLE  DEBATERS, 

AND 

PEERLESS  FRIENDS. 


^2-19520 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/artofdebateOOalderich 


PREFACE. 

A  LARGE  part  of  the  contents  of  this  book  is 
based  on  material  originally  prepared  for  students 
of  argumentation  at  Harvard  College  and  the  Uni- 
versity of  Pennsylvania.  The  interest  lately  de- 
veloped in  the  practice  of  formal  debate,  together 
with  the  interest  in  general  debate  which  is  always 
found  in  democratic  communities,  has  suggested 
that  the  discussion  of  such  a  subject,  revised  so  as 
to  meet  the  needs  of  others  besides  college  stu- 
dents, may  be  of  service  to  various  kinds  of  readers. 
In  its  present  form,  then,  the  book  is  designed  to 
be  helpful  to  those  interested  in  any  form  of  de- 
bate. 

If  any  consideration  may  be  claimed  for  the 
particular  manner  in  which  the  subject  is  treated, 
at  a  time  when  of  the  making  of  many  books  of 
rhetoric  there  is  no  end,  it  is  hoped  it  may  be  for 
its  practical  character.  The  great  part  of  the  con- 
tents has  been  drawn  directly  from  the  writer's  ex- 
perience as  a  participant  in  and  an  observer  of  de- 
bates. In  the  arrangement  of  material,  where 
there  is  any  difference  between  the  order  of  theory 


VI  PREFACE, 

and  the  order  suggested  by  common  practice,  the 
latter  has  been  preferred.  The  temptation  to  be 
highly  systematic,  at  the  expense  of  every  other 
consideration,  besets  the  writer  of  anything  like  a 
text-book.  It  is  so  fascinating  to  discover  that 
figures  of  speech  may  be  classified  under  twenty- 
nine  heads,  that  methods  of  proof  may  be  reduced 
to  a  table  of  seventeen  divisions  and  sub-divisions, 
and  that  gestures- — analyzed  to  the  utmost — are 
just  forty-five  in  number,  that  no  little  self-control 
is  required  to  abstain  from  inflicting  such  classifi- 
cations on  one's  students  or  readers.  The  subject 
of  argumentation,  being  related  to  the  science  of 
logic,  is  peculiarly  susceptible  of  artificial  treat- 
ment. But  the  aim  of  the  present  writer  has  been, 
while  placing  stress  on  systematic  presentation,  tc 
look  at  the  whole  subject  less  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  theorist  than  from  that  of  the  practical  de- 
bater. 

It  is  for  just  this  reason  that  legal  argument 
has  been  largely  taken  as  the  basis  for  the 
general  subject  of  debate.  It  is  in  the  pro- 
fession of  the  law  that  the  art  of  debate  has 
for  a  long  time  achieved  a  highly  practical 
development,  and  in  that  profession  only.  Phi- 
losophers have  seldom  been  successful  debaters, 
just  as  rhetoricians  are  seldom  distinguished  writ- 
ers, and  professional  elocutionists  seldom  orators. 
But  in  the  law  public  debate  has  been  forced  to 


PREFACE,  Vll 

cut  a  straight  path  toward  success,  and  we  may 
look  to  it  for  guidance — while  not  necessarily  try- 
ing to  master  its  artificial  system — whenever  our 
object  is  to  convince  and  persuade  practical  men. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  law  has  much  to  learn  from 
logic  and  rhetoric.  Many  who  are  proficient  in  its 
subject-matter  are  quite  unfamiliar  with  the  art  of 
using  their  knowledge  effectively.  "  The  time  will 
soon  come,"  said  a  distinguished  lawyer  recently, 
"  when  our  law  schools  will  have  to  teach  their  stu- 
dents not  only  the  law,  but  also  the  art  of  selecting 
and  arranging  their  arguments,  and  of  presenting 
them  with  convincing  efifect." 

There  is  a  sense  in  which  a  hand-book  of  any 
art  is  either  inadequate  or  superfluous.  Good  de- 
baters, like  most  good  folk,  are  not  to  be  made  to 
order.  It  may  be  said  of  them  as  in  the  famous 
recipe  for  cooking  hare:  Urst  catch  your  man.  It  is 
vain  to  write  rules  for  one  who  has  neither  a  knack 
at  reasoning  or  a  gift  of  expression.  But  the  ex- 
perience of  schools  and  colleges  where  regular 
courses  in  debate  have  been  established  indicates 
that  rudimentary  endowments,  both  of  reason  and 
expression,  may  be  so  developed  under  intelligent 
training  as  to  produce  unexpectedly  happy  results. 
It  must,  however,  be  understood  that  for  every  pre- 
cept there  must  be  a  dozen,  or  a  hundred,  oppor- 
tunities for  practice. 

Readers    familiar   with    the    literature    of    this 


Vlli  PREFACE. 

subject  will  not  need  to  be  told  of  my  in- 
debtedness to  "  The  Principles  of  Argumentation," 
by  Professor  George  P.  Baker,  who  was  the 
first,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  to  develop  a  practi- 
cal system  of  instruction  in  argumentation.  Espe- 
cially in  the  treatment  of  analysis  and  allied  mat- 
ters, in  the  chapter  on  "  Preliminary  Work,"  I  have 
made  use  of  Professor  Baker's  presentation  of  the 
same  subject.  Other  books  which  have  been  found 
helpful  are  Professor  Sidgwick's  "  Process  of  Argu- 
ment," Professor  Thayer's  ''  Preliminary  Treatise 
on  Evidence  at  the  Common  Law,"  the  Rhetorics 
of  Professors  A.  S.  Hill  and  J.  F.  Genung,  and  Pro- 
fessor Wendell's  "  English  Composition."  I  may 
also  recommend  to  those  interested  in  the  subject 
Holyoake's  "  Public  Speaking  and  Debate"  (Ginn 
&:  Company),  Sheppard's  "Before  an  Audience; 
or,  the  Use  of  the  Will  in  Public  Speaking  "  (Funk 
&  Wagnalls),  and  Buckley's  "  Extemporaneous 
Oratory  for  Professional  and  Amateur  Speakers" 
(Eaton  &  Mains), — all  suggestive  and  thoroughly 
readable  books.  Thanks  are  also  to  be  recorded 
for  most  friendly  and  helpful  advice  received  from 
Dean  William  Draper  Lewis,  and  Professor  George 
Wharton  Pepper,  of  the  Law  School  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Pennsylvania. 

It  will  be  found  helpful  to  use  a  manual  like  this 
in  connection  with  a  good  collection  of  specimens 
of  argument,  such  as  Baker's  "  Specimens  of  Argu- 


PREFACE,  IX 

mentation/'  Wagner's  "  Modern  Political  Ora- 
tions "  (Henry  Holt  &  Co.),  or  Johnston's  "  Rep- 
resentative American  Orations "  (Putnam's).  But 
the  chief  point  is  constant  practice  under  com- 
petent criticism 

R.  M.  A. 

Philadelphia,  March,  1900. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHArTBR  PACK 

I.  Nature  of  Debate i 

What  Debate  is i 

The  Basis  of  Debate i 

What  Debate  Involves 3 

Conviction  and  Persuasion 4 

The  Power  of  Persuasion 5 

Danger  of  Conviction  or  Persuasion  alone 6 

Science  and  Art  Distinguished 8 

II.  Subjects  of  Debate 10 

Propositions  as  Subjects  for  Debate 10 

Subjects  to  be  Avoided 11 

Qualities  of  Good  Subjects 18 

The  Wording  of  the  Proposition 18 

Affirmative   Form 18 

Brevity  and  Exactness 19 

Fairness  and  Impartiality 21 

Formal  Debates 22 

Legal  Debate ^ 23 

Qasses  of  Legal  Arguments 26 

General   Debate 27 

Debate  Looking  toward  Action 29 

III.  Preliminary  Work 31 

Importance  of  Analysis 31 

Defining  the  Question 32 

Conditions  of  the  Question 33 

Narrowing  the  Question 34 

Analysis  of  Jury  Question 35 

Analysis  of  Copyright   Question 36 

xi 


xil  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS, 

CHAPTER  PACK 

111.  Preliminary  Work — Continued. 

Analysis  of  Silver  Question 36 

Analysis  of  Legal  Questions 38 

Analysis  of  Venezuelan  Question 40 

Results  of  Analysis 41 

Study  of  Both  Sides 42 

Gathering  of  Material 44 

Facts  and  Opinions 45 

Arguments  of  Others 47 

Tabulation  of  Material 48 

The  Outline  or  Brief 50 

Form  of  Outline 52 

Outline  on  Woman's  Suffrage 53 

Legal   Briefs 58 

IV  Burden  of  Proof 61 

Burden  of  Proof  Defined 61 

Legal   Definition 62 

Burden  of  Proof  and  Presumption 63 

Term  used  in  Two  Senses 65 

Burden  of  Proof  in  Formal  Debate 66 

How  the  Burden  may  Shift 67 

Burden  of  Proof  in  General  Debate ,.  68 

Methods  of  Shifting  the  Burden 69 

Presumption  in  Expansion  Question 71 

Presumption  in  Suffrage   Question 72 

Relation  of  Affirmative  and  Negative 74 

V  Methods  of  Proof -^y 

All  Proof  Inference  from  Experience yy 

Establishing  of  Facts 79 

Credibility  of  Witnesses 80 

Use  of  Testimony  in  Debate 82 

Expert  Testimony  and  Authority 83 

Limitations  of  Authority 84 

Use  of  Argument  from  Authority ,..  85 

Processes  of  Reasoning 86 

A  priori  Evidence 87 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS,  xiil 

CHAPTER  PAGB 

V.  Methods  of  Proof — Coniiimed. 

Value  of  Proof  of  Antecedent  Probability 88 

Antecedent  Probability  in  General  Debate 90 

Analogy   or   Example 90 

Abuse  of  Analogy 92 

A  posteriori  Evidence 94 

Limitations  of  Circumstantial   Evidence 95 

Processes  of  Reasoning 97 

Proof  in  Questions  of  Policy 98 

Typical   Schemes   of  Proof iod 

Honesty    105 

VI.  Methods  of  Refutation 106 

What  is  to  be  done  with  the  Opposite  Side? 106 

Questionmg  of  Facts 107 

Attacking  Testimony 108 

Refutation  of  Authority no 

Refutation  of  a  priori  Evidence ill 

Refutation  of  Example 113 

Refutation  of  a  posteriori  Evidence „ 114 

Causes   and    Effects 115 

Fallacies  or  Gaps 117 

Begging  the   Question 118 

Ignoring  the  Question 120 

Reductio  ad  Absurdum 122 

The   Dilemma 126 

Facts  in  Refutation 127 

Methods  of  Refutation  Summarized 128 

The  Principle  of  Refutation 130 

Distinction  between  Opposing  Arguments 131 

Knowledge  of  the  Other  Side 133 

Attitude  toward  Opponent 134 

Persuasive   Refutation 136 

VII.  Structure  and  Style 137 

Matter  and  Form 137 

The  OutHne  the  Basis  of  Structure 137 

The  Introduction 138 


xiv  TABLE  Of  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  tAOB 

VII.  Structure  and  Style — Continued. 

Two  Methods  of  Approach 139 

Order  of  Proof ^ , 141 

Exigencies  of  Debate 142 

Inverted   Refutation 143 

The  Conclusion 145 

Summaries  146 

Persuasiveness  in  the  Conclusion 147 

Different   Kinds  of  Conclusions 148 

Relation  of  Structure  and  Style 151 

Paragraph  Structure 152 

Transitions    154 

Development  of  Finished  Argument  Illustrated..  155 

The  Compact  Style 156 

The  Diffuse  Style 158 

The  Compromise i6o 

The  Laws  of  Style  in  Argument 164 

Clearness  165 

Economy  of  Time 166 

Art  of  Condensation 167 

Citation  of  Authorities 168 

Time  Required  for  Condensation 172 

Force  173 

Sources  of  Force 174 

Concreteness   174 

Figures  of  Speech 176 

Use  of  Illustrations 177 

Legitimate  and  Illegitimate  Illustrations 180 

Elegance  182 

Persuasiveness    ; 182 

Artistic  Qualities 184 

Great  Ideas 184 

VIII.  The  Spoken  Debate 187 

Relation  of  Written  and  Spoken  Speech 187 

Advantages  of  Writing 188 

Preparation  fo^  Delivery , 189 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  xv 

CMArrBB  PACK 

VIII.  The  Spoken  Debate— Cow/imk^c/. 

Use  of  Notes 192 

Degree  of  Extemporization 192 

Danger  of  Memorization 194 

Fluency 195 

Expansion   of   Speech 197 

Preparation  for  Rebuttal 197 

Armed  with  Material 198 

Extemporaneous  Refutation 199 

Rapidity    of   Thought 202 

Place  of  Delivery 203 

Qualities  of  Delivery 205 

Clearness    205 

Enunciation  206 

Purity  of  Tone 207 

Force  209 

Vigor  and  Variety 210 

Pitch  211 

Elegance  212 

Posture   213 

Gesture   213 

Training  for  Delivery 214 

Relation  of  Speaker  to  Audience 215 

Appendix  217 

Arguments. 221 

Expansion  in  the  Eastern  Hemisphere 221 

The  Retirement  of  the  Greenbacks 230 

The  Venezuelan   Message 2:ilS 

Briefs 243 

Brief  of  a  Legal  Argument 243 

Brief  of  Macaulay's  Speech  on  Copyright 249 

Brief  on  the  Retirement  of  the  Greenbacks 253 

Brief  on  the  Restriction  of  Trusts 257 

Propositions  for  Debate... 267 


THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 
I. 

NATURE    OF   DEBATE. 

If  argumentation  is  the  art  of  convincing  others 
of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  a  disputed  matter,  debate 
may  be  said  to  be  the  art  of  doing  this  what 
under  conditions  such  that  both  sides  of  ^«^»*«i«' 
the  case  can  be  heard  and  that  the  advocates  of 
each  side  can  reply  directly  to  those  of  the  other. 
It  is  clear  that,  while  such  debate  can  be  carried  on 
through  written  arguments,  it  is  best  adapted  to 
the  conditions  of  public  speech;  and  it  is  to  such 
conditions  that  the  word  is  commonly  applied. 

In  its  simplest  form  debate  is  universally  prac- 
ticed; for  its  use  depends  only  on  the  fact  that  dif- 
ferent men  look  at  many  matters  from  The  Basis 
different  points  of  view,  while  neverthe-  °^^®^**8' 
less  it  is  always  assumed  that  they  can  reach  the 
truth  by  precisely  similar  processes.  If  I  should 
differ  with  a  friend  on  a  point  the  truth  of  which 
is  beyond  human  attainment,  it  would  be  useless 
for  us  to  debate  it;    and  in  the  same  way  if  the 


^     •         *     „  .   L.  .   ^j  ;_  u    Jh  «> 

a  r//£  /^/?r  Of  DEBATE, 

truth  were  believed  to  be  attainable,  and  yet  if  my 
friend  and  I  were  so  differently  constituted  that  we 
could  never  arrive  at  truth  by  the  same  path,  ar- 
gument would  be  equally  out  of  place.  But  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  experience  shows  that,  while  from  a 
superficial  point  of  view  there  are  a  thousand  dif- 
ferent methods  of  forming  opinions,  yet  all  men 
reason  by  what  are  fundamentally  the  same  pro- 
cesses. If,  then,  I  have  discovered  the  truth  for 
myself,  I  may  with  confidence  undertake  to  lead 
my  friend  along  the  path  which  I  followed  in 
search  of  it.  Once  granted  that  the  path  is  a  clear 
one,  and  that  we  are  both  perfectly  reasonable  be- 
ings, and  we  cannot  fail  to  arrive  at  the  same  point 
in  the  end. 

But  while,  from  this  point  of  view,  argumenta- 
tion is  so  simple  and  so  universal  a  process,  from 
another  it  is  an  art  of  some  difficulty  and  complica- 
tion. Real  men  are  never  perfectly  reasonable  be- 
ings: their  reasoning  processes  are  modified  by  in- 
heritance, education,  or  personal  interest.  And  few 
disputed  matters  are  so  easily  determinable  that 
one  who  does  not  understand  something  of  the 
laws  of  argument  will  be  able  to  convince  another 
who  sees  them  in  a  different  light  from  himself. 
When  we  add  to  this  the  problem  of  convincing 
whole  groups  of  men,  and  the  further  problem  of 
meeting  attacks  on  one's  opinion  at  the  very  mo- 
ment when  they  are  made,  the  matter  becomes  a 


NATURE  OF  DEBATE.  3 

large  one.  So  it  happens  that  in  every  period  and 
in  every  community  there  are  but  a  few  skillful  de- 
baters, and  that  they  are  likely  to  be  among  the 
most  useful  and  the  most  prominent  members  of 
society.  They  are  especially  notable  in  self-gov- 
erning communities,  where  large  bodies  of  people 
have  not  only  to  decide  questions  but  to  act  as  a 
unit  upon  their  decision;  here  the  orator  and  the 
debater  become  leaders  of  men. 

The  mental  habits  which  go  to  make  a  good  de- 
bater are  of  the  highest  type,  and  are  usually  de- 
veloped only  by  considerable  training.  ^^■•* 
They  involve:  the  ability  to  find  out  as  involves, 
well  as  to  defend  the  truth,  the  ability  to  analyze 
keenly  and  sift  the  essential  from  the  trivial,  the 
willingness  to  consider  questions  apart  from  the 
prejudices  with  which  one  is  tempted  to  view  them, 
and  finally,  the  power  of  expression.  To  these  must 
be  added,  for  one  who  will  be  successful  in  active 
debate,  the  ability  to  decide  quickly  which  of  two 
or  three  possible  lines  of  attack  shall  be  chosen, 
and  the  power  of  rapidly  arranging  one's  thoughts 
in  a  way  to  make  them  seem  reasonable  to  others. 
These  are  not  every-day  qualities.  It  is  sometimes 
distressing  to  reflect  how  few  of  one's  acquaint- 
ances are  in  the  habit  of  forming  their  opinions 
apart  from  personal  interests,  inherited  tastes, 
popular  opinion,  or  other  forms  of  prejudice.  Not 
one  man  in  ten  or  twenty  does  anything  of  the 


4  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

kind.  It  is  one  of  the  highest  aims  of  education 
to  bring  about  conditions  under  which  opinions 
will  be  held  because  they  have  been  legitimately 
earned,  not  lazily  inherited  or  borrowed.  This 
judicial  habit  of  mind  is  the  deadliest  foe  to  popular 
fallacy,  eloquent  sophistry,  and  the  like — to  all 
doctrines  which,  on  analysis,  prove  to  be  logical 
tramps,  without  visible  means  of  support.  Again, 
the  judicial  habit  of  mind  is  frequently  found  with-  \ 
out  the  accompanying  gift  of  expression.  We  are 
all  acquainted  with  people  who  can  reason  fairly 
well  but  are  perfectly  incapable  of  imparting  their 
reasons  to  any  one  else.  They  cannot  so  much  as 
give  clear  directions  for  finding  a  given  street  and 
number,  without  resorting  to  diagrams  or  gestures 
to  atone  for  inadequate  statement.  Clever  people 
make  up  for  deficiency  in  this  respect  by  various 
devices, — by  wit  and  humor,  it  may  be,  pr  perhaps 
by  bluster  and  bravado;  in  such  ways  they  may 
make  a  good  impression,  but  without  the  ability  to 
express  processes  of  reasoning  they  cannot  produce 
permanent  results.  The  good  debater,  then,  must 
be  able  both  to  find  reasons  and  to  give  them. 

When  we  look  a  little  more  closely  at  the  work 
of  the  debater,  we  see  that  it  consists  in  something 
Oonwjtdon     more  than  the  expression  of  a  train  of 

and  Persua-  .  ^ 

sion.  reasoning,  or  even  the  ability  to  make 

others  admit  that  one's  reasoning  is  correct.    One 
may  wish  to  induce  his  hearers  not  only  to  agree 


N/lfURE  OF  DEBATE,  5 

to  his  doctrine  but  to  act  upon  it;  and  experience 
shows  that  action  does  not  by  any  means  always 
follow  conviction.  But  further,  even  when  no 
action  is  desired,  it  is  not  enough  merely  to  force 
admissions;  for,  as  the  familiar  saying  has  it,  one 
who  is  convinced  against  his  will  is  (fundamentally) 
"  of  the  same  opinion  still."  From  these  consid- 
erations it  has  become  common  to  say  that  the  two 
great  divisions  of  argument  are  Conviction  and 
Persuasion.  The  first  has  to  do  with  the  ability  to 
show  that  one's  reasoning  is  right;  the  second  with 
tlie  power  to  dispose  one's  hearers  to  accept  the 
reasoning  as  their  own,  and — if  need  be — to  act 
u^n  it.  It  may  be  that  this  conquest  of  the  dispo- 
sition will  come  after  the  conquest  of  the  intellect, 
ov  it  may  be  that  it  must  come  first  in  order  to  make 
the  conquest  of  an  obstinate  intellect  possible. 

Let  us. take  an  example.    A  citizen  of  a  western 
State,  we  will  suppose,  who  has  been  educated  to 
believe  in  a  silver  basis  for  our  national  ^he  Power 
finance,  goes  to  hear  a  speaker  defend  the  of  Persua- 
gold  standard.    The  arguments  advanced 
are  so  powerful,  standing  by  themselves  at  least, 
that  it  is  impossible  for  the  listener  to  avoid  the 
conviction  that  his  position  has  been  overthrown. 
This,  however,  is  not  enough.    If  the  speaker  treats 
the  advocates  of  silver  with  such  scorn  that  the 
man  in  the  audience  feels  himself  personally  ill- 
treated,  or  if  the  interests  of  the  class  or  section 


6  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

which  he  represents  are  entirely  neglected  in  the 
argument,  our  hearer  will  go  away  with  much  the 
same  feeling  that  he  would  have  if  he  had  been 
knocked  down  by  a  stronger  man  in  a  controversy. 
He  will  feel  incapable,  perhaps,  of  self-defense,  but 
will  still  be  utterly  without  sympathy  for  the  posi- 
tion of  his  opponent.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
speaker  should  exhibit  such  sympathy  with  his 
opponents  as  to  create  the  impression  that  all 
classes  of  citizens  are  equally  his  friends,  and  if  he 
should  show  a  conciliating  appreciation  of  the  way 
in  which  the  advocates  of  a  silver  standard  come  to 
take  the  position  that  they  do,  his  hearer  might  not 
only  be  forced  to  admit  himself  in  the  wrong,  but: 
actually  be  well  disposed  to  submit  himself  to  th>« 
guidance  of  the  other's  mind.  It  should  never  bn 
forgotten  that  such  weapons  as  scorn  and  sarcasm, 
while  they  may  relieve  the  feelings  of  one  who 
knows  himself  beaten,  or  serve  to  entertain  the 
friends  of  one  who  is  certain  of  victory,  cannot  be 
safely  used  against  those  whom  one  wishes  to  win 
over  to  his  own  side. 

These  two  elements,  then,  the  power  of  reaching 
the  reason,  and  the  power  of  winning  the  disposi- 
Dangerof  tiou  and  moviug  the  will,  belong  side  by 
wPwsul^  side  in  all  successful  debate.  It  is  not 
sion  alone,  that  ouc  part  of  a  speech  is  to  be  given  up 
to  the  one,  and  another  part  to  the  other;  but  that 
the  whole,  both  in  matter  and  manner,  is  to  be 


NATURE  OF  DEBATE.  >  7 

made  to  serve  the  ends  of  each.  With  either  neg- 
lected the  full  effect  cannot  be  secured.  What  has 
already  been  said  has  perhaps  indicated  sufificiently 
the  danger  of  mere  conviction  without  persuasion. 
The  opposite  fault  is  even  more  serious.  Many  de- 
baters who  feel  forcibly  the  necessity  of  winning 
the  sympathy  of  their  audience,  depend  too  en- 
tirely— especially  if  they  are  gifted  in  promoting 
good-nature  or  arousing  passion — upon  this  side  of 
their  work.  Debate  that  is  purely  persuasive  will 
leave  results  uncertain,  temporary,  and  unjust: 
uncertain,  because  emotions  are  of  themselves 
much  more  variable  than  the  processes  of  reason; 
temporary,  because  when  the  emotion  aroused  by 
eloquence  has  passed  away,  if  there  be  no  deposit 
of  rational  conviction,  no  reliance  can  be  placed 
upon  the  future  attitude  of  those  addressed;  and 
unjust,  because  a  gifted  speaker  can  make  appeals 
both  alluring  and  deluding,  on  behalf  of  the  most 
unrighteous  cause,  and  lead  the  careless  hearer, 
who  fails  to  perceive  the  absence  of  real  argument, 
into  humiliatingly  untenable  positions.  The  temp- 
tation to  substitute  the  mere  auxiliaries  of  debate 
for  its  solid  matter — the  great  temptation  of  the 
campaign  orator  and  the  demagogue  of  every 
class — will  be  carefully  shunned  by  the  keen  and 
honest  thinker.  In  the  case  of  popular  audiences 
it  may  win  temporary  success;  but  before  trained 
hearers,  such  as  judges  in  courts  of  law  or  any 


B  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

highly  intelligent  bodies,  it  is  perilous  from  iirst  to 
last.     Individuals  differ  greatly  among  themselves 
as  to  the  element  of  debate  on  which  they  are  likely 
to  lay  most  stress.    One  v^ill  be  disposed  to  pursue  j 
the  rigid  'essentials  of  a  discussion,  v^ithout  appre- ' 
ciating  the  chance  of  making  it  attractive.  Another 
will  seize  upon  the  elements  susceptible  of  emo- 
tional or  rhetorical  treatment,  and  slight  the  essen-- 
tials.    Each  should   guard   against   his  particular  ^ 
temptation,  and  strive  after  a  finished  whole. 

It  must  be  evident  from  all  this  why  we  speak  of 
the  art,  not  the  science,  of  debate.  It  is  true  that 
o  .         ,     reasoninsr  must  proceed  on  scientifically 

Science  and  ox-  j 

ArtDis-  accurate  lines,  and  that  there  is  a  science 
ngnis  e  .  (^gg^ling  with  the  laws  of  its  procedure, 
called  Logic.  But  to  state  and  classify  these  laws 
is  an  after-thought.  Logic  looks  back  over  the 
paths  which  every  one's  mind  has  trod,  and  de- 
scribes them,  not  so  much  to  furnish  guides  for 
future  travelers  as  from  scientific  curiosity.  Its 
processes  must  be  rigidly  followed,  but  they  can 
usually  be  assumed  to  be  familiar,  without  regard 
to  knowledge  of  their  Latin  names.  The  mediaeval 
theologians  and  philosophers  believed  that  they 
could  demonstrate  all  truth  by  the  processes  of  for- 
mal logic,  but  their  works  are  read  to-day  only  for 
historical  reasons.  Their  formal  processes  have 
never  proved  practically  fruitful.  In  every  age  men 
are  obliged  to  attack  freshly  the  doubtful  matters 


NATURE  OF  DEBATE.  9 

that  arise  before  their  minds,  and  to  reason  them 
out  according  to  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
find  themselves.  In  every  age  those  v^ho  would 
change  and  direct  the  opinions  of  others  have  to 
go  about  it  from  the  human  point  of  view;  that  is  to 
say,  they  have  to  apply  the  universal  processes  of 
reasoning  to  the  particular  people  with  whom  they 
have  to  deal,  and  adapt  them  to  constantly  chang- 
ing conditions.  So  it  is  that  debate  is  an  art,  and 
cannot  be  mastered  by  the  aid  of  mere  rules,  but 
admits  of  almost  infinite  variation  and  develop- 
ment. In  this  respect  it  is  like  music  and  poetry 
and  painting;  but  on  the  other  hand,  just  as  any  ot 
these  can  be  studied  and  analyzed  and  practiced,  so 
in  debate  it  will  not  be  useless  to  take  up  the  sub- 
ject in  a  systematic  way. 

These,  then,  are  the  problems  we  have  to  con- 
sider:— the  use  of  the  universal  laws  of  reasoning, 
the  development  of  the  habit  of  analysis  and  of  un- 
prejudiced methods  of  investigation,  the  secret  of 
clear  and  rapid  expression  of  intellectual  processes, 
and  the  art  of  adapting  one's  material  to  his  hearers 
so  as  to  win  their  favor  and  affect  their  conduct. 
Clearly  the  art  that  involves  all  this  is  of  no  mean 
order.  It  goes  further  than  those  which  reach  only 
the  intellect  or  the  emotions,  and  aims  to  move  the 
will.  Its  masters  have  the  power  that  makes  leaders 
of  men. 


II. 

SUBJECTS    OF   DEBATE. 

Debate  differs  from  other  forms  of  discourse  in 

presupposing  two  sides  for  the  subject  discussed, 

both  of  them  capable  of  fair  presentation. 

Propositions  ^    .  .  .      - 

as  Subjects  It  has  an  antagonist  constantly  m  mmd. 
for  Debate.  ^^^  subjcct  fof  debate,  then,  must  be 
such  that  it  can  be  reduced  to  the  form  of  a  propo- 
sition; for  a  proposition  is  the  only  form  of  words 
which  has  two  distinct  sides,  an  affirmative  and  a 
negative.  All  matters  which  men  discuss  argu- 
mentatively,  whether  in  courts  of  law,  deliberative 
bodies,  or  private  life,  can  in  fact  be  reduced  to 
such  a  proposition;  and  to  so  reduce  them  often 
clears  the  ground  of  discussion  very  serviceably. 
The  principal  verb  of  the  proposition  will  state  the 
affirmative;  if  a  negative  word  is  added,  it  will  state 
the  negative.  If  the  question  is  one  of  pure  fact, 
the  verb  will  commonly  be  the  verb  to^^_be;  if  it  is 
one  of  theory  or  policy,  the  verb  will  frequently  be 
ought  or  some  similar  auxiliary.  It  is  clear  that  if 
there  is  to  be  rational  debate  on  the  proposition, 
it  must  state  something  sufficiently  distinct  and 
reasonable  to  be  capable  of  fair  presentation, 
whether  it  be  read  affirmatively  or  reversed  so  as  to 

10 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE.  II 

State  the  matter  negatively.  This  is  of  course  a 
very  different  thing  from  saying  that  both  sides 
must  be  capable  of  positive  proof. 

Much  debate  is  carried  on,  even  in  matters  of 
public  importance,  with  no  form  of  words  in  mind 
as  a  proposition,  to  which  disputants  are  rigidly 
held.  Yet  where  accuracy  is  demanded,  or  where 
a  decision  of  any  sort  is  to  be  rendered  for  one 
side  or  the  other,  such  a  form  of  words  is  almost 
necessary.  So  in  courts  of  law  we  find  indictments, 
motions,  pleas,  and  the  like,  the  wording  of  which 
is  scrutinized  with  the  utmost  care,  and  to  the 
exact  discussion  of  which  the  disputants  are  re- 
stricted. In  like  manner  we  have  motions,  bills, 
and  resolutions  in  deliberative  bodies,  which  are 
intended  to  represent  accurately  the  real  question 
to  be  discussed.  In  all  these  cases  the  quality  of 
debate  is  at  its  best,  it  need  hardly  be  observed, 
when  the  form  of  words  discussed  represents  most 
perfectly  the  real  question  at  issue. 

In  real  life  questions  at  issue  arise  from  circum- 
stances  usually   beyond   the    control   of   the   dis- 
putants, and  the  only  problem  is  to  state 
them  and  analyze  them  as  clearly  as  may  ^g^^^^oiJ'e^. 
be.     But  where  debate  is  engaged  in  for 
practice,  as  in  literary  organizations,  intercollegiate 
contests,  and  the  like,   the  subjects  debated  are 
chosen,  broadly  speaking,  by  those  who  are  to  dis- 
cuss them.    With  such  cases  in  mind,  a  few  sugges- 


It  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

y..  4 

tions  may  be  made  regarding  debatable  subjects. 
Let  us  put  these  in  the  form  of  warnings  against 
certain  sorts  of  topics  which  are  to  be  avoided  for 
formal  debate. 

1.  Obvious  propositions.  As  a  matter  of  practice 
it  may  sometimes  be  instructive  to  demonstrate  a 
generally  accepted  truth,  as  in  the  case  of  a  geo- 
metrical theorem.  But  it  is  clear  that  an  intelli- 
gent debate  cannot  be  held  on  the  question,  ''Re- 
solved, That  the  sum  of  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle 
is  always  equal  to  two  right  angles."  Neither  can 
one  debate  successfully  the  statement  that  tem- 
perance is  a  useful  virtue,  or  that  the  cruelties  of 
the  Turks  are  reprehensible,  or  that  Shakespere 
was  a  great  poet.  Yet  it  is  not  uncommon  to  hear 
debates  on  propositions  whose  obviousness  is  con- 
cealed only  by  verbal  ingenuity.  It  is  not  incon- 
sistent with  this  to  say  that  an  obvious  truth  may 
be  the  foundation  for  the  argument  on  one  side  or 
another  of  a  disputed  matter,  so  that  it  may  be  nec- 
essary to  give  some  time  to  its  exposition  at  the 
outset.  But  this  is  only  preliminary  to  the  argu- 
ment proper. 

2.  Propositions  the  truth  of  which  depends  wholly 
on  the  meaning  of  some  ambiguous  word  or  zvords.  In 
such  cases  the  meaning  of  the  word  may  be  a  legit- 
imate subject  for  discussion,  but  the  proposition 
involving  the  word  cannot  really  be  debated  until 
the  doubtful  meaning  has  been  settled;  and  the 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE.  X3 

proposition  will  then  have  been  shown  to  be  true 
or  false  by  the  very  act  of  definition.  There  is 
nothing  more  unprofitable  than  a  debate  in  which 
much  time  is  spent  in  wrangling  over  the  inter- 
pretation of  some  ambiguous  term.  Thus  the  ques- 
tion, ^^ Resolved,  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  should 
receive  the  support  of  every  American,"  would  de- 
pend wholly  on  the  interpretation  of  the  phrase 
"  Monroe  Doctrine,"  upon  which  there  is  by  no 
means  general  agreement.  In  a  debate  the  two 
sides  would  be  likely  to  disagree  utterly  in  their  ex- 
pHDsition  of  the  question;  while  they  might  find 
themselves  without  cause  for  dispute  if  they  could 
agree  on  a  definition.  The  question,  "Resolved, 
That  Mr.  Cleveland's  interpretation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  the  Venezuelan  boundary  question 
should  receive  the  support  of  every  American," 
would  be  more  easily  handled. 

3.  Propositions  the  truth  or  error  of  which  is  prac- 
tically incapable  of  demonstration.  By  this  it  is  not 
meant  to  include  questions  dealing  with  matters 
where  evidence  is  difficult  to  obtain  and  final  proof 
usually  admitted  to  be  only  approximate,  such,  for 
example,  as  the  question  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul.  Such  matters  need  to  be  discussed  with  great 
caution,  their  limitations  being  frankly  admitted, 
but  there  is  no  reason  why  they  may  not  be  well 
argued  on  both  sides.  On  the  other  hand,  ques- 
tions whose  wording  is  such  as  to  give  neither  side 


X4  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

reasonable  hope  of  refuting  the  position  of  the 
other,  are  unsuitable  for  debate.  /  An  example  is 
the  old  question,  ''Resolved,  That  the  pulpit  affords 
more  opportunity  for  eloquence  than  the  bar." 
The  natural  course  of  events  in  a  debate  on  such  a 
proposition  would  be  for  the  afBrmative  to  heap 
up  examples  of  ecclesiastical  eloquence,  and  the 
negative  to  rejoin  with  accounts  of  forensic  oratory. 
Each  side  might  also  adduce  certain  disadvantages 
in  the  opposing  profession;  but  there  could  be  no 
adequate  proof  or  adequate  refutation.  The  prop- 
osition makes  a  comparison,  but  no  standard  of 
comparison  could  be  found  by  which  to  make  any 
definite  demonstration;  and  the  only  consolation 
for  the  audience  would  be  that  the  question  is  one 
of  no  real  moment  to  any  human  being.  In  like 
manner,  vague  questions  of  taste,  such  as  the  com- 
parative value  of  the  work  of  certain  poets,  and  the 
like,  while  they  may  be  interesting  topics  for  gen- 
eral discussion,  are  unsuited  to  formal  debate. 

4.  Propositions  involving  more  than  one  main 
issue.  Such  questions  cannot  always  be  avoided  in 
real  life,  but  when  one  has  a  choice  of  subjects  they 
are  to  be  shunned.  The  difficulty  is  sufficiently 
obvious.  They  need  to  be  treated  as  motions  are 
frequently  treated  in  deliberative  bodies, — ^that  is, 
divided  on  the  demand  of  some  member  who  per- 
ceives the  difficulty  of  debating  more  than  one 
thing  at  a  time.     A  proposition  for  debate,  then. 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE,  i5 

should  not  be  a  compound  sentence,  nor  a  complex 
sentence  whose  subordinate  clause  contains  any- 
thing not  necessary  for  the  explanation  of  the  prin- 
cipal clause.  An  example  of  the  first  sort  of  error 
would  be:  ''Resolved,  That  the  United  States  should 
annex  Cuba  and  establish  therein  a  colonial  form 
of  government."  Of  the  second  sort:  ''Resolved, 
That  the  supporters  of  the  Populist  party  have  sub- 
stantial grievances  which  their  movement  is  likely 
to  relieve."  Questions  of  this  kind  are  not  impos- 
sible for  debate,  but  they  become  dangerously  con- 
fusing, especially  when  it  is  desired  to  win  a  deci- 
sion on  the  merits  of  the  argument.  A  question 
may  even  be,  on  its  face,  a  simple  statement,  and 
yet  involve  more  than  can  well  be  treated  in  one 
discussion;  nay,  it  may  include  matters  incon- 
sistent with  one  another  from  the  point  of  view  of 
argument.  An  interesting  example  of  this  occurred 
in  1895,  when  two  college  societies  agreed  to  hold 
a  joint  debate  on  the  question:  "Resolved,  That  the 
foreign  policy  of  President  Cleveland  should  be  ap- 
proved." The  debaters  chosen  felt  some  diffi- 
culty, from  the  first,  owing  to  the  fact  that  a  for- 
eign policy  Is  not  a  single,  concrete  affair,  but  must 
be  judged  from  a  number  of  isolated  acts.  In  this 
case  there  were  involved  the  matter  of  our  rela- 
tions with  the  provisional  government  of  Hawaii, 
the  Behring  Sea  difficulties,  the  non-recognition  of 
the  Cuban  republic,  the  dispute  between   Great 


l6  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

Britain  and  Nicaragua,  and  the  attitude  of  our  g-ov- 
ernment  toward  the  disorders  in  Turkey.  If  all  of 
these  things  could  be  unified  by  showing  them  to 
be  consistent  elements  of  a  single  line  of  con- 
duct, the  question  might  be  intelligently  discussed 
in  a  single  debate.  It  seemed  that  most  of  them 
could  be  so  unified.  In  most,  if  not  all,  of  these 
cases,  the  attitude  of  the  administration  had  been 
essentially  conservative,  avoiding  all  interference 
or  international  entanglements.  The  affirmative 
therefore  made  preparations  to  defend  such  conser- 
vatism, and  the  negative  to  demand  a  more  vigor- 
ous and  aggressive  policy.  Even  then  the  ques- 
tion was  a  large  one.  But  a  few  weeks  before  the 
debate  .was  to  take  place.  President  Cleveland  is- 
sued his  Venezuelan  message,  and  confusion  was 
worse  confounded.  This  was  an  act  hard  to  recon- 
cile with  the  generally  conservative  administration 
of  our  foreign  relations,  and  if  the  debaters  were 
to  pursue  their  original  plans  they  must  either 
ignore  this  event  which  had  aroused  universal  in- 
terest, or  must  pass  lightly  over  the  previous  acts 
of  the  administration.  The  dilemma  was  so  serious 
that  the  debate  was  abandoned  altogether.  It  is 
clear,  then,  that  if  it  is  necessary  to  debate  a  propo- 
sition involving  more  than  one  essential  issue,  it 
must  first  be  determined  whether  the  different  mat- 
ters involved  are  capable  of  being  grouped  under 
one  general  principle;  and,  if  they  are  not,  it  must 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE,  17 

be  determined  which  is  to  have  precedence  in  de- 
ciding the  issue. 

5.  Propositions  devoid  of  interest  to  the  audience 
addressed.  Ta  warn  against  such  themes  may  seem 
superfluous,  but  experience  shows  that  the  warn- 
ing is  not  needless.  The  root  of  the  difficulty  is  in 
thinking  of  debate  as  an  ingenious  exercise  rather 
than  a  practical  means  to  an  end.  Any  trace  of  the 
former  feeling  will  result  in  formality  and  arti- 
ficiality, the  great  enemies  of  good  speaking.  No 
question  is  fitted  for  public  discussion  which  is 
merely  theoretical.  The  proposition  should  have 
arisen  in  reality,  and  the  debaters  should  be  able  to 
make  clear  how  it  arose  and  why  it  should  claim  at- 
tention. Not  long  ago  two  societies  held  a  joint 
debate  on  the  question,  ^^  Resolved,  That  Ambition 
is  productive  of  more  good  than  evil."  The 
speakers  were  eloquent  and  ingenious,  but  there 
hung  a  dead  weight  on  the  whole  proceeding  from 
the  fact  that  no  one  in  the  world  was  seriously  dis- 
cussing such  a  problem,  or  would  care  how  it  might 
be  decided.  Observe,  too,  that  the  question  vio- 
lated two  of  our  previous  rules.  Its  solution  de- 
pended absolutely  on  the  meaning  of  the  vague 
word  "  ambition,"  and  it  was  incapable  of  demon- 
stration for  lack  of  any  practical  measure  of  com- 
parison. Both  sides  fired  harmless  shots  past  their 
enemy's  lines,  and  made  little  effort  to  hit  each 
other. 


i8  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

Subjects  for  debate,  then,  wjren  they  are  matter 
0  fliiti  f  ^^^  choice,  should  be  single,  unambigu- 
goodSub-  ous  propositions,  capable  of  approximate 
^*^*''  proof  or  disproof,  and  of  some  genuine  in- 

terest to  those  concerned. 

Let  us  now  briefly  consider  the  wording  of  the 
proposition,  when  its  general  nature  has  already 
The  Word-  ^^^^  determined.  A  few  suggestions 
ingofthe  may  be  added  to  those  implied  in  what 
roposi  ion.  ^^^  already  been  said.  The  subject  for  de- 
bate should  usually  be  stated  affirmatively,  except 
in  a  case  where  the  negative  bears  the  burden  of 
proof, — 'that  is,  where  the  negative  has,  on  the  face 
of  it,  the  duty  of  presenting  proof  before  the  affir- 
Affirmative  i^^tive  is  bound  to  reply.  Reasonable 
Form.  economy  of  time  demands  that  the  first 

speaker  should  not  be  obliged  to  defend  what  is 
assumed  to  be  true  until  proved  otherwise.  For 
this  reason  the  resolution  discussed  a  moment  ago 
might  better  have  been  worded:  ''Resolved,  That 
Mr.  Cleveland's  foreign  policy  should  be  con- 
demned." It  was  embarrassing  for  the  affirmative 
to  defend  that  which  had  not  yet  been  attacked. 
A  college  debate  on  the  question,  "Resolved,  That 
it  is  inexpedient  for  the  United  States  to  enter  into 
a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Great  Britain,"  was  a  fail- 
ure because  neither  side — owing  to  the  negative 
wording  of  the  proposition — felt  obliged  to  open 
up  the  question  and  propose  some  particular  sort  of 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE.  19 

treaty  for  adoption.  On  the  other  hand,  a  success- 
ful intercollegiate  debate  was  held  on  the  question: 
''Resolved,  That  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
are  opposed  to  the  permanent  control  of  any  por- 
tion of  the  Eastern  Hemisphere."  Although  the 
proposition  seemed  to  be  phrased  negatively,  yet 
the  affirmative  had  something, definite  to  prove, 
and  accepted  the  responsibility.  It  was  not  simply 
the  negative  of  the  statement,  "  Interests  favor  per- 
manent control; "  it  was  a  declaration  of  a  policy. 
Propositions,  then,  should  be  so  stated  that  definite 
progress  will  have  been  made  at  the  end  of  the  first 
speech. 

Beyond  this,  the  most  important  rule  for  -the 
wording  of  the  question  is  that  it  shall  be  as  brief 
as  exactness  will  permit.  There  is  always  Bre^ty  and 
a  struggle  between  the  requirement  that  Exactness, 
everything  essential  shall  be  included,  and  the  re- 
quirement that  the  phrasing  shall  not  be  so  over- 
loaded as  to  fail  of  conveying  a  distinct  idea  at  a 
single  stroke.  It  is  surprising  what  difificulty  is  fre- 
quently found  in  expressing  what  seems  to  be  a 
perfectly  clear  idea.  The  chief  danger  is  that,  all 
unexpectedly  to  those  who  state  the  question,  the 
main  emphasis  of  the  discussion  may  fall  upon  what 
was  intended  to  be  no  part  of  the  subject,  or  at 
most  a  minor  one.  Every  one  has  heard  debates 
that  have  taken  this  unforeseen  and  embarrassing 
turn.    Sometimes  much  time  is  wasted  in  quibbling 


20  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

over  the  meaning  of  an  important  word  in  the 
proposition.  Whenever  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  de- 
baters on  both  sides  should  come  to  a  preliminary 
agreement  as  to  the  real  meaning  of  the  question; 
for,  while  different  interpretations  may  give  rise  to 
ingenious  fencing,  they  will  only  hinder  genuine 
argument.  Reasonable  persons  do  not  debate 
words,  but  ideas.  When  a  debate  is  to  be  held  for 
purposes  of  practice,  or  whenever  it  is  possible  to 
limit  the  terms  of  the  question  under  discussion,  it 
is  well  to  exclude  side  issues  from  consideration, 
and  fix  the  argument  upon  what  seems  the  central 
issue.  Thus,  when  an  intercollegiate  debate  was  to 
be  held  on  the  question  of  the  annexation  of  Ha- 
waii, it  was  feared  that  the  discussion  might  be 
made  scattering  by  the  introduction  of  such  mat- 
ters as  the  benevolent  attitude  of  our  people  toward 
the  Hawaiians,  or  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  the 
real  wishes  of  the  Hawaiians  on  the  subject.  These 
matters  were  therefore  ruled  out  by  the  addition  of 
certain  words  to  the  proposition,  so  that  it  read, 
not,  "  The  United  States  should  annex  the  Ha- 
waiian Islands,"  but,  "  It  would  be  for  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  United  States  to  annex  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  granted  the  free  consent  of  their  inhabit- 
ants." Obviously  the  question  before  the  people 
of  the  country  was  the  original  and  wider  one,  and 
could  not  be  limited  in  any  such  way;  but  for  a 
brief  and  formal  debate  it  was  wise  to  limit  discus- 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE,  21 

»ion  to  the  most  important  phase.  In  such  cases 
the  wording  of  the  proposition  should  make  clear 
whether  the  question  is  one  of  fact  or  of  policy;  if 
of  policy,  whether  abstract  grounds  of  justice  or 
grounds  of  expediency  are  chiefly  to  be  considered; 
and  if  expediency,  whose  interests  are  to  have  pre- 
cedence. Otherwise  the  debaters  on  respective 
sides  may  argue  what  are  really  different  proposi- 
tions. 

The  last  rule  to  be  laid  down  relative  to  the 
wording  of  the  proposition  is  that  all  "  begging  of 
the  question  "  is  to  be  avoided.     In  its  ^  , 

^  ^  Fairness 

narrowest  sense  this  means  that  no  word  andimpar- 
must  be  admitted  into  the  proposition  *  ^' 
which  of  itself  constitutes  an  argument  for  or 
against  the  proposition.  Such  a  question  would 
be:  *^ Resolved,  That  the  inhuman  treatment  of  the 
Armenians  by  Turkey  is  reprehensible."  Here  the 
word  "  inhuman  "  renders  all  argument  superflu- 
ous. In  a  wider  sense  the  rule  means  that  every- 
thing should  be  avoided  in  the  statement  of  the 
question  which  indicates  the  attitude  of  the  per- 
son stating  it,  by  throwing  the  slightest  commen- 
dation or  slur  upon  either  side.  The  necessity  for 
this  rule  is  perfectly  obvious  in  a  formal  debate: 
no  question  can  be  tolerated  which  gives  either  side 
an  evident  advantage.  But  it  should  also  be  ob- 
served in  arguments  where  any  speaker  has  the 
right   to   state   the   question   for   himself.     If  he 


22  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

wishes  to  be  fair  he  should  assume  that  there  is  a 
real  question  of  difference  to  be  considered,  and 
that  it  will  be  to  the  advantage  of  every  one  to  have 
that  difference  stated  in  terms  acceptable  to  both 
sides.  If,  in  his  statement  of  it,  he  betrays  either 
enthusiasm  or  contempt,  he  will  be  suspected  of 
inabihty  to  do  it  full  justice.  Appearance  of  preju- 
dice always  discounts  argument. 

Briefly  to  summarize  the  foregoing  suggestions: 
propositions  for  debate  should  be  worded  so  that 
the  affirmative  will  be  under  the  first  responsibility 
of  proof,  should  be  as  brief  as  may  be  consistent 
with  exactness,  should  make  the  issues  involved  as 
distinct  as  possible,  and  should  avoid  every  appear- 
ance of  partiality. 

All  this,  while  not  without  significance  for  de- 
bate of  a  general  character,  has  had  chief  reference 
Formal  ^^  formal  debates  where  a  chosen  ques- 
Debates.  tion  is  discusscd  and  a  decision  is  ren- 
dered on  the  merits  of  the  argument.  It  has  al- 
ready been  suggested  that  (with  the  exception 
that  the  subject  of  debate  may  well  be  sim- 
plified for  the  sake  of  brevity  and  clearness)  such 
debates  will  be  most  satisfactory  when  so  con- 
ducted as  to  approach  most  closely  the  discussions 
of  real  Hfe.  In  all  contests  of  this  character  there 
is  an  artificial  element — especially  when  a  strong 
desire  for  victory  is  involved — which  is  in  danger 
of  detracting  from  their  usefulness.     In  real  life 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE,  23 

questions  arise  out  of  practical  emergencies;  they 
cannot  always  be  reduced  to  exact  forms  of  words; 
and  they  are  not  decided  by  a  discussion  between 
three  men  on  one  side  and  three  on  another,  in 
which  the  issues  are  closely  watched  to  see  which 
has  the  best  of  it.  If,  then,  in  formal  debating, 
stress  is  laid  on  those  matters  which  are  peculiar 
to  formal  debating, — quibbling  over  the  wording 
of  the  question,  rapid  repartee,  and  the  mere  tri- 
umph of  one  speech  over  another, — the  practice 
will  be  a  questionable  preparation  for  real  life  and 
its  contests.  If,  however,  under  these  artificial  con- 
ditions, the  stress  is  still  laid  on  the  merits  of  the 
question,  so  presented  as  to  convince — if  possible 
— persons  really  interested  in  its  settlement,  the 
value  of  the  practice  is  very  great.  The  difference 
may  be  compared  to  that  between  the  gymnastics 
which  are  studied  under  professional  training  for 
purposes  of  exhibition,  and  the  exercise  which  goes 
to  make  muscle  for  every-day  use. 

In  legal  debate,  while  the  conditions  are  not  so 
artificial  as  in  formal  debating  contests,  they  are 
still  much  more  artificial  than  in  the  gen-  ^  j 
eral  discussion  of  public  affairs.  The  law  Debate. 
of  English-speaking  countries  is  a  growth  of  long 
development,  and  its  practice  is  hedged  in  by  what 
seem  at  first  sight  to  be  merely  traditional  rules 
and  regulations.  These  rules  had  their  origin  in 
attempts  to  serve  the  practical  ends  of  justice,  and 


24  ^THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

most  of  them  are  still  useful  to  the  same  end;  but 
to  common  observers  they  frequently  seem  to  offer 
hindrances  to  the  simple  search  for  truth.  Thus 
many  things  which  are  good  evidence  for  the  ordi- 
nary man  as  he  investigates  an  alleged  crime,  are 
ruled  out  absolutely  from  the  consideration  of 
juries.  Lawyers  are  forbidden  to  make  statements 
in  court  which  the  newspapers  make,  and  by  which 
public  opinion  is  greatly  influenced.  Legal  '*  pre- 
sumptions," so  called,  are  established,  which  de- 
clare the  age  at  which  a  person  may  be  presumed 
capable  of  crime,  the  length  of  time  which  he  may 
be  presumed  to  remain  alive  after  disappearing 
from  common  knowledge,  and  so  on,  with  small 
respect  for  the  means  which  private  citizens  use  in 
forming  judgments  on  the  same  points.  In  courts 
of  law  such  grave  interests  are  at  stake  that  it  is 
necessary  to  lay  down  these  rigid  rules  and  apply 
them — sometimes — even  in  the  face  of  common 
sense.  This  has  a  marked  effect  on  legal  argument. 
A  lawyer  in  striving  to  win  his  case  will  make  use 
— and,  according  to  common  opinion,  will  be  jus- 
tified in  making  use — of  all  possible  technicalities 
in  his  favor.  If  he  can  find  a  flaw  in  the  indictment 
brought  against  his  client,  he  will  not  trouble  to 
prove  him  innocent.  If  he  can  overthrow  the  point 
on  which  his  opponent  has  based  his  plea  to  the 
court,  he  will  be  content  not  to  go  into  the  real 
issue  back  of  it;  and  the  court,  in  deciding  the  plea. 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE.  25 

will  often  expressly  ignore  what  seems  to  the  lay- 
man the  important  point  of  the  case.  Such  cir- 
cumstances as  these  seem  to  be  unavoidable  in  legal 
procedure,  where  uniform  rules  of  practice  have  to 
be  adopted  for  all  possible  cases,  even  if  the  inter- 
ests of  justice  are  thereby  sometimes  jeopardized. 
But  in  spite  of  all  this,  those  lawyers  appear  to  be 
most  largely  successful  who  are  not  given  to  fight- 
ing on  technicalities,  but  who  give  the  impression 
that  the  fundamental  merits  of  the  case  are  their 
chief  concern.  A  jury  will  listen  with  suspicion  to 
an  argument  which  seems  to  shirk  the  real  issue; 
and  even  a  judge,  educated  to  weigh  the  very  dust 
in  the  balance,  will  give  more  consideration  to  a 
motion  made  by  an  attorney  known  to  be  careful 
of  the  interests  of  justice,  than  to  one  made  by  a 
lover  of  technicalities.  The  great  arguments  of 
great  lawyers — like  Mr.  Carter  and  Mr.  Choate, 
for  example,  in  our  own  time — are  marked  by  an 
appearance  of  enthusiasm  for  justice,  of  considera- 
tion for  the  important  issues  at  stake,  which  affect 
not  only  the  courts  addressed,  but  all  within  hear- 
ing. The  most  important  elements  of  legal  debate, 
then,  are  not  different  from  those  of  general  de- 
bate.* 

*  In  support  of  this  I  am  very  glad  to  be  able  to  cite  a  dis- 
tinguished legal  authority,  Professor  James  B.  Thayer,  who 
in  his  "  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence  at  the  Common 
Law  "  observes: 

"  Let  it  be  distinctly  set  down,  then,  that  the  whole  process^ 


26  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

Legal  argument  is  roughly  divisible  into  three 

great  classes.     The  first  class  is  that  dealing  with 

the  proving  of  facts,  and  is  chiefly  prac- 

Ui&SSBS  01  •<<<•  1  ' 

Legal  ticed  in  the  calling  and  cross-examina- 

Aiguments.  ^j^^  ^£  witnesses.  The  handling  of  testi- 
mony, as  well  as  of  other  sorts  of  evidence,  is  gen- 
erally recognized  as  one  of  the  most  important 
tasks  of  the  lawyer.  The  second  class  is  that  deal- 
ing with  the  establishment  of  legal  principles  by 
the  citation  of  authority.  Since  law  is  in  itself  so 
much  a  matter  of  tradition  and  precedent,  and  since 
it  is  desired  to  maintain  the  utmost  uniformity  in 
the  administration  of  justice,  our  courts  give  the 
greatest  possible  weight  to  the  opinions  of  other 
courts  having  a  bearing  on  questions  brought  be^ 
fore  them.  This  indicates  the  second  great  task  of 
the  lawyer, — the  finding  and  applying  of  authorita- 
tive precedents.  The  third  class  of  legal  arguments 
is  harder  to  define;  it  consists  in  the  application  of 
processes  of  reasoning  to  the  facts  and  the  authority 
presented,  so  that  jury  or  court  may  be  convinced 
of  the  inference  which  the  lawyer  wishes  to  draw 
from  his  material.  All  these  forms  of  argument 
are  familiar  even  to  those  knowing  little  of  courts 
and  law.    In  criminal  cases,  for  example,  every  one 

of  legal  argumentation,  and  the  rules  for  it,  essential  as  these 
are,  and  forever  pressing  upon  the  attention,  are  mainly  an 
affair  of  logic  and  general  experience,  not  of  legal  precept." 
(p.  271.) 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE.  27 

knows  that  the  chief  matter  is  commonly  the  prov- 
ing of  facts  by  evidence.  In  cases  brought  before 
higher  courts  on  appeal,  it  is  not  usually  disputed 
facts,  but  questions  of  legal  principle,  which  are 
discussed;  the  only  witnesses  cited,  therefore,  are 
the  records  of  other  courts  and  the  mental  proc- 
esses of  the  judges. 

When  we  turn  from  both  formal  debating  con- 
tests and  legal  argument  to  the  debate  of  delibera- 
tive bodies  and  of  the  people  as  they  dis-  (General 
cuss  public  affairs,  what  sort  of  questions  Debate. 
do  we  find?  The  difference  is  almost  entirely  one 
of  proportion.  We  find  people  disputing  questions 
of  fact,  as  is  done  in  the  courts;  but  they  commonly 
investigate  these  questions  with  less  accuracy  and 
thoroughness  than  the  courts,  and  they  use  all  pos- 
isible  sorts  of  evidence, — hearsay,  newspaper  re- 
ports, and  the  opinions  of  their  friends, — in  ascer- 
taining the  facts.  The  matters  of  precedent  and 
authority,  which  we  found  looming  so  large  in  the 
courts,  take  small  space  in  the  public  mind.  The 
opinions  of  private  citizens,  and  of  deliberative 
bodies  for  that  matter,  are  little  bound  by  prece- 
dent; and  the  private  citizen  is  likely  to  think 
that  no  authority  on  earth  can  greatly  affect  him 
in  a  matter  of  opinion.  Nevertheless,  the  argu- 
ment from  authority,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter,  has 
^  place  in  ordinary  debate.  And  of  course  the 
sort  of  argunient  that  is  based  on  processes  of  rea- 


2B  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

soning  is  found  in  all  debate.  In  deliberative  bodies 
men  debate  questions  of  parliamentary  law,  argu- 
ment on  which  closely  resembles,  in  its  general  na- 
ture,  the  discussions  of  courts  on  constitutional  law. 
Debate  on  all  manner  of  public  questions, — the 
tariff,  finance,  foreign  policy,  and  the  like, — in- 
volves delicate  reasoning  on  cause  and  effect, 
human  nature  and  natural  law,  as  well  as  on  prin- 
ciples of  abstract  justice.  It  is  questions  requir- 
ing action,  and  dependent  upon  disputed  points 
either  of  moral  principle  or  of  self-interest,  that 
assume  in  general  argument  a  place  altogether  out 
of  proportion  to  that  which  they  occupy  in  legal 
debate.  These  questions  of  policy  or  expediency 
may  be  said  to  take  the  place,  with  the  people  at 
large,  of  the  legal  arguments  based  on  authority. 
The  public  debater  in  a  moral  community  appeals 
to  the  conscience  of  his  hearers  as  the  highest  au- 
thority. He  also  appeals  to  their  self-interest,  as 
a  matter  having  great  weight,  though  not  to  be 
so  loudly  spoken  of.  If  the  two  are  agreed,  and  he 
can  say,  ''  First,  this  is  right;  and  secondly,  it  is  to 
your  advantage,"  he  has  a  very  strong  case.  But 
neither  the  one  argument  nor  the  other  would  be 
safe  in  a  court  of  law.  Thus  a  Mormon  might  argue 
in  favor  of  polygamy  on  the  ground  that  it  is  theo- 
retically justifiable,  and  that  it  would  be  beneficial 
to  the  community.  If  he  were  on  trial  in  a  court 
neither  argument  would  be  admissible;  however 


SUBJECTS  OF  DEBATE.  29 

much  the  judge  might  agree  with  them,  he  must 
say,  "  To  the  law  and  the  testimony."  Before  a 
popular  audience,  however,  the  Mormon  might 
present  his  case  from  the  side  of  abstract  justice,  he 
might  give  facts  drawn  from  polygamous  com- 
munities, and  he  might  argue  from  those  facts  that 
polygamy  is  beneficial  to  society;  if  the  audi- 
ence were  of  his  own  people,  he  might  also  cite  the 
authority  of  religious  books.  So  through  all  sorts 
of  questions  these  different  types  of  argument  ap- 
pear. 

A  final  difference  between  legal  argument  and 
that  of  a  more  general  character,  which  has  already 
been  sucfeested  by  the  mention  of  ques- 

.        ,.         .    \  ,  ,  ,.       ,    ,  Debate  look- 

tions  of  policy,  is  that  the  public  debater  ing  toward 
discusses  questions  which  appeal  to  the  ^^^^°"' 
will.  A  judge  or  jury  has  only  to  decide  the  ab- 
stract merits  of  the  case  presented,  and  to  record 
the  decision;  no  further  action  is  expected  on  the 
part  of  either,  and  the  rendering  of  the  decision 
does  not  usually  affect  the  interests  of  either.  But 
when  one  seeks  to  move  his  hearers  to  vote  for  a 
pending  bill  or  resolution,  to  support  a  certain  can- 
didate, to  pursue  a  particular  line  of  conduct  in 
business,  or  to  give  money  to  a  favorite  cause,  his 
arguments  must  strike  at  deeper  springs  than  those 
of  pure  reason.  Such  questions  demand  the  best 
powers   of   the   orator, — powers    which    may    be 


30  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

almost  out  of  place  in  a  court-room,  but  which  will 
shake  the  will  of  the  crowd. 

It  has  been  impossible  to  classify  debatable 
questions  in  any  thoroughly  systematic  way.  What- 
ever classification  one  chooses,  one  group  will  in- 
determinately melt  into  another.  But  it  is  hoped 
that  this  examination  of  some  of  the  elements  of 
legal  as  contrasted  with  general  argument,  may 
serve  to  make  clear  the  points  of  likeness  and  of 
difference  in  all  forms  of  debate.  It  may  have 
shown  why  one  must  adapt  himself  to  the  particu- 
lar question  under  discussion,  as  well  as  to  the  par- 
ticular audience  addressed,  and  why  some  debaters 
will  always  be  at  their  best  on  certain  topics,  and 
others  successful  along  different  lines.  The  prob- 
lem, however,  is  always  the  same  at  bottom:  given 
a  real  difference  of  opinion,  caused  either  by  dif- 
ferent beliefs  as  to  the  facts,  or  by  different  infer- 
ences from  the  facts,  to  produce  agreement  of 
opinion  by  making  your  hearer  believe  the  facts 
that  you  believe,  and  draw  the  same  inferences  from 
them. 


III. 

PRELIMINARY   WORK. 

Thus  far  we  have  reached  the  point  where  the 
subject  for  debate  has  been  stated  as  accurately  as 
possible.  We  turn  now  to  look  at  it  from  the  op- 
posite direction,  and  ask  such  questions  as:  Just 
what  does  the  proposition  maintain  ?  and  Just 
what  lines  of  proof  are  necessary  to  its  demonstra- 
tion? 

The  importance  of  this  preliminary  analysis  of 
the  question  cannot  be  emphasized  too  strongly.  It 
would  not  be  too  much  to  say  that  if  one 
has  but  an  hour  to  spend  in  preparation  J^l^^jyX 
for  debate,  half  of  it  should  be  spent  in 
considering  just  what  the  question  means  and  what 
are  the  essential  points  to  be  proved.  Much  of  the 
difference  between  poor  debaters  and  those  who  are 
successful  is  found  just  here.  Too  often  one  can 
see  that  a  speaker  has  seized  thoughtlessly  upon 
one  or  two  points  connected  with  the  question, 
either  because  he  has  been  most  familiar  with  them 
or  because  they  afiford  best  opportunity  for  elo- 
quence; while  his  opponent  may  be  able  to  show 
that,  however  true  all  that  the  first  speaker  has  said, 
it  is  not  of  first-rate  importance  for  the  purpose  in 

31 


3*  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

hand.  No  hearer  will  listen  with  patience  when  it 
appears  that  the  speaker  has  not  grasped  the  essen- 
tials of  his  question.  And  it  is  not  uncommon, 
when  the  facts  in  the  case  are  undisputed,  to  find  a 
debate  resting  largely  upon  the  ability  of  one  side 
or  the  other  to  analyze  it  keenly. 

The  first  element,  then,  is  to  make  clear  the  pre- 
cise meaning  of  the  question.  This,  as  was  sug- 
Definingthe  gested  in  the  preceding  chapter,  may  go 
Queation.  very  far  toward  clearing  up  the  argument. 
It  was  there  said  that  no  subject  should  be  debated, 
when  it  can  well  be  avoided,  whose  significance 
depends  largely  upon  the  meaning  of  certain  am- 
biguous words.  It  may  happen,  however,  that  one 
side  will  find  it  necessary  to  show  at  some  length 
that  the  fallacy  of  the  opposition  rests  on  some  false 
definition.  This  might  be  the  case,  for  example, 
where  such  phrases  as  "  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment," "  Monroe  Doctrine,"  "  personal  liberty," 
and  the  like,  were  involved.  One  would  then  have 
to  turn  his  introductory  line  of  argument  into  an 
exposition  of  the  doubtful  phrase. 

With  reference  to  debates  where  particular  words 
or  phrases  play  an  important  part  in  the  statement 
of  the  question,  a  word  of  caution  must  be  spoken 
as  to  the  use  of  dictionary  definitions.  Without 
disrespect  to  dictionaries,  it  may  be  said  that  they 
seldom  furnish  definitions  likely  to  be  serviceable 
for  argumentative  purposes.      Dictionaries  admit 


PRELIMINARY  IVORK.  33 

all  meanings  of  words  which  are  sanctioned  by  any 
reputable  usage, — many  of  them  quite  divergent 
in  character.  In  other  words,  the  dictionary  can- 
not answer  what  is  usually  the  important  question: 
Which,  of  two  or  more  possible  meanings,  is  the 
reasonable  one  for  present  purposes?  It  is  of  no 
use,  then,  for  a  speaker  to  flourish  a  dictionary, 
exulting  because  it  gives  the  definition  he  desires 
to  use;  his  opponent  can  doubtless  do  the  same. 

If,  then,  we  are  not  to  seek  definite  authority  for 
our  interpretation  of  the  question,  how  shall  it 
be  determined?  Generally  in  the  sources.  Conditions  of 
surroundings,  and  present  conditions  of  tion.  ^*"' 
the  subject  discussed.  The  interpretation  must 
above  all  be  reasonable  if  it  is  to  be  a  basis  of  argu- 
ment. It  must  seem  to  the  persons  addressed  to 
be  a  fair  statement  of  what  the  question  means  to 
them.  It  must  exhibit  no  appearance  of  having 
been  laboriously  searched  for  in  order  to  conform 
to  the  point  that  the  speaker  wishes  to  prove. 
The  etymology  or  history  of  any  word  involved 
in  the  question  is  a  minor  matter;  the  pres- 
ent meaning  of  the  word  is  the  important  thing. 
All  really  debatable  questions  arise,  as  has 
been  said,  from  real  differences  of  opinion.  It  is 
these  real  differences,  and  not  questions  of  phras- 
ing, which  should  be  discussed.  A  recent  inter- 
collegiate debate  was  lost  because  the  side  defeated 
declined  to  accept  the  meaning  of  the  question  as 


34  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

interpreted  by  their  opponents,  and  spent  practi- 
cally their  whole  time  in  defending  a  different  one. 
Similarly,  when  the  question  of  an  arbitration 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
was  being  discussed,  much  time  was  consumed  in 
theoretical  interpretations  of  the  words  "  per- 
manent court  of  arbitration,"  although  it  was  one 
particular  plan  that  was  before  the  people  of  the 
country  for  consideration.  All  this  does  not  ignore 
the  fact  that  in  discussions  where  particular  forms 
of  words  are  involved,  as  in  set  debates  and  in 
legal  controversies  dependent  on  the  interpretation 
of  certain  documents,  it  is  an  essential  duty  of  the 
debater  to  interpret  the  form  of  words  and  be  ready 
to  defend  his  interpretation  if  it  be  questioned. 
The  point  is  simply  that  a  form  of  words  should 
never  be  allowed  to  obscure  the  real  question,  and 
that  definitions  should  have  reference  not  to  theo- 
retical meanings,  but  to  the  meaning  of  the  words 
under  the  circumstances.  Words  are  to  be  the 
servants  of  the  debate,  not  the  debate  a  slave  to 
words. 

When  the  meaning  of  the  question  has  been  deter- 
mined, the  next  step  is  to  inquire  what  is  the  essen- 
Hwpowing  tial  thing  to  be  proved.  Very  few  propo- 
th^QuMtion.  gitions  are  so  simple  that  they  can  be 
proved  by  applying  the  evidence  directly  to  the 
whole  question,  without  the  use  of  intermediate 
steps;  and  very  few  are  so  clearly  understood  that 


PRELIMINARY  WORK.  ^5 

popular  talk  about  them  does  not  include  number- 
less matters  not  essential  to  their  proof.  There  will 
usually  be  one  point,  or  at  most  two  or  three,  which 
analysis  will  show  to  be  of  supreme  importance. 
Such  a  point  may  be  called  the  main  issue.  The 
main  issue  is  that  which  it  is  chiefly  necessary  to 
prove,  in  order  to  prove  the  whole  proposition.  It 
is  found  by  discarding  all  minor  matters  connected 
with  the  question,  and  fixing  the  attention  upon 
that  which  properly  forms  the  central  portion  of 
the  argument. 

Some  examples  will  make  this  more  clear.  Take 
the  question :  "  Resolved,  That  three- fourths  of  a 
jury  should  be  competent  to  render  a  verdict  in 
all  criminal  cases."  It  will  appear  on  analysis  that 
both  sides  admit  that  absolute  justice  AMiyrisof 
cannot  be  expected  in  jury  trials;  the  aim,  JuryOTieB- 
therefore,  is  to  secure  the  most  perfect 
justice  consistent  with  a  uniform  system.  There 
arc  two  sorts  of  interests  involved:  the  interest  of 
every  accused  person,  that  he  shall  suffer  the  least 
possible  chance  of  conviction  if  innocent,  and  the 
interest  of  the  people  as  a  whole,  that  accused  per- 
sons shall  have  the  least  chance  of  escape  when 
guilty.  The  existing  law  seems  to  express  largely 
the  first  sort  of  interest,  which  has  always  received 
great  stress  among  Anglo-Saxon  races.  The  main 
issue  may  then  be  said  to  be:  Will  the  proposed 
change  increase  the  chances  that  public  justice  will 


36  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

be  done,  witliout  disproportionately  lessening  the 
chances  that  innocent  individuals  will  escape  un- 
just conviction? 

A  similar  sort  of  analysis,  in  a  different  kind  of 

question,  occurs  in  Macaulay's  speech  on  the  pro- 

posed  Copyright  law  of  1841.     Macaulay 

Copyright      showed  that  a  copyright  law  of  any  kind 

QneBtion.       -^  ^  ^^^  ^^  ^^^  public  in  the  interest  of 

authors.  Since,  however,  the  interests  of  authors 
are  those  of  literature,  the  public  should  be  willing 
to  pay  the  tax.  The  main  issue,  then,  in  the  pend- 
ing discussion  was  this:  Would  the  proposed  exten- 
sion of  the  copyright  period  result  in  advantages 
to  authors  sufficiently  great  to  compensate  for  the 
disadvantages  to  readers?  Macaulay  showed  that 
the  disadvantages  to  readers  would  be  greatly  in- 
creased, while  the  advantages  to  authors  would  be 
but  little  greater  than  under  the  existing  law. 

Many  questions  depend  for  their  analysis  upon 
proposed  remedies  for  admitted  evils.  Thus  the 
proposition  to  establish  the  free  coinage  of  silver 
.    ,  ^    ,    in  the  United  States  is  larg^ely  based  on 

Analyslfl  of  .      .  .  . 

Silver  QnoB-    certam  inconveniences  which  certain  por- 
°"'  tions  of  the  people  are  said  to  feel  as 

grievances.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  these  incon- 
veniences are  admitted  on  all  sides.  While  the 
question  could  be  analyzed  from  a  number  of  dif- 
ferent points  of  view,  perhaps  the  main  issue  might 
best  be  stated  as  a  double  one,  after  this  fashion: 


PRELIMINARY  IVORK.  37 

Would  the  free  coinage  of  silver  relieve  (i)  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  and  (2)  the 
people  at  large,  from  present  financial  incon- 
veniences? Another  method  of  analysis  might  be 
drawn  from  the  position  of  those  opposing  the 
proposition.  It  is  claimed  that  the  proposed  policy 
would  result  in  disaster  to  the  business  interests 
of  the  country,  because  gold  would  be  driven  out 
to  such  an  extent  as  to  interfere  with  its  use  in  in- 
ternational exchange,  while  the  monetary  value  of 
silver  would  tend  to  fall  to  its  commercial  ratio  of 
something  like  32  to  i.  The  main  issue,  then, 
might  again  be  stated  as  a  double  one:  Would  the 
estabhshment  of  free  coinage  result  in  (i)  the  ex- 
portation of  gold  to  a  degree  that  would  interfere 
with  its  use  in  international  trade,  and  (2)  in  the 
fall  of  the  exchange  value  of  coined  silver  to  a 
ratio  of  32  to  i?  This  is  a  subject  whose  compli- 
cations make  it  peculiarly  difficult  to  analyze  satis- 
factorily. One  may  hear  a  dozen  speeches  devoted 
to  it,  in  political  campaigns,  and  be  unable  to  re- 
duce the  various  arguments  to  any  clear  system. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  most  of  the  debates  on  the 
silver  question  would  be  more  satisfactory  if  the 
participants  held  themselves  rigidly  to  some  such 
method  of  analysis  as  has  just  been  suggested. 

Let  us  now  take  an  example  from  the  analysis  of 
a  legal  question.  In  cases  depending  upon  ques- 
tions of  fact  the  process  of  analysis  is  comparatively 


33  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

simple.     Thus  in  a  criminal  case  the  main  issue 
may  be  simply  the  question  of  the  credi- 
Legai  QueB-   bility  of  one  of  the  witnesses,  upon  whose 
*^°"*'  testimony    the    prosecution    chiefly    re- 

lies. Or  the  main  issue  may  be  a  matter  of  infer- 
ence from  testimony; — such  a  question,  for  ex- 
ample, as  whether  the  presence  of  the  accused  per- 
son at  the  time  and  place  where  the  crime  was 
committed  warrants  the  belief  that  he  was  con- 
cerned in  the  committing  of  it.  In  all  such  cases, 
then,  as  in  general  debate,  there  is  usually  one  main 
issue  upon  which  the  decision  must  chiefly  rest. 
But  it  is  in  more  complicated  matters  than  ques- 
tions of  fact  that  such  analysis  is  most  necessary. 
Of  these  the  celebrated  Income  Tax  cases  of 
1894-95  form  a  good  example.  Congress  passed 
a  law  levying  a  tax  of  two  per  cent,  upon  all  in- 
comes of  citizens  or  residents  of  the  United  States 
exceeding  $4000.  The  question  arose  whether  this 
law  was  constitutional.  The  process  of  analysis  was 
briefly  as  follows.  The  Constitution  requires  that  di- 
rect taxes  be  apportioned  among  the  States  accord- 
ing to  population,  whereas  duties,  imposts,  and  ex- 
cises must  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States. 
Taxes  on  land  have  always  been  understood  to  be 
direct  taxes,  but  there  has  never  been  an  adequate 
decision  as  to  just  what  other  taxes  might  also  be 
regarded  as  direct.  Economists  usually  regard  any 
tax  as  direct  which  is  collected  from  the  very  per- 


^      •     ,       .         PRELIMINARY  IVORK,  S9 

sons  who  are  expected  to  bear  the  burden  of  it, — 
as  distinguished,  for  example,  from  duties  on  im- 
ported goods,  which  are  intended  to  fall  not  upon 
the  importers  but  upon  buyers.  The  courts,  on  the 
other  hand,  have  shown  a  disposition  to  limit  the 
term  "  direct  tax ''  to  capitation  taxes  and  (as  has 
been  said)  taxes  on  land.  The  questions  in  dispute, 
therefore,  were  chiefly  these:  First,  is  a  tax  on  the 
income  of  personal  property  direct,  and  so  required 
to  be  apportioned  among  the  States?  If  so,  the  tax 
of  1894  is  unconstitutional.  Second,  since  it  is  ad- 
mitted that  a  tax  on  real  estate  is  direct,  is  a  tax  on 
the  income  derived  from  real  estate,  by  rents  or 
otherwise,  also  direct,  and  so  required  to  be  ap- 
portioned among  the  States  ?  If  so,  again,  the  tax 
of  1894  is  unconstitutional.  Third,  if  any  part  of 
the  tax  is  held  not  to  be  direct,  but  of  the  nature  of 
an  impost,  is  the  exemption  of  incomes  under 
$4000,  and  of  certain  specified  kinds  of  business, 
in  violation  of  the  requirement  that  duties,  im- 
posts, and  excises  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the 
United  States?  In  this  case  also  the  tax  of  1894 
is  unconstitutional.  On  these  three  questions  the 
complicated  Income  Tax  cases  largely  rested.* 

*  It  was  that  part  of  the  tax  covered  by  the  second  of  the 
three  questions  which  was  declared  void  by  the  Supreme 
Court  (in  the  case  of  Pollock  v.  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co., 
157  U.  S.,  p.  429),  the  Justices  who  heard  argument  in  the 
case  being  equally  divided  on  the  other  two.  For  the  sake 
of  simplifying  the  analysis  I  have  omitted  mention  of  that 


40  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

One  more  illustration.  In  the  winter  of  1895-6 
many  debates  were  held  on  the  question:  ''Resolved, 
.    ,   .    ,    That    President    Cleveland's   Venezuelan 

Analysis  of  ,        ,  ,  •  ,  r    i 

Venezuelan  message  should  receive  the  support  of  the 
Question.  people."  The  circumstances  will  be  easily 
recalled.  A  long-standing  dispute  between  Vene- 
zuela and  Great  Britain  had  reached  a  critical  point, 
at  which  arbitration  was  desired  by  Venezuela  but 
declined  by  England.  President  Cleveland  ad- 
dressed a  message  to  Congress,  expressing  fear  lest 
Venezuela  was  being  unjustly  pressed  into  submis- 
sion, and  arguing  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  investigate  the  matter,  and  to  insist  on 
justice  being  done.  The  message  aroused  vigorous 
and  protracted  debate.  Historians  and  geog- 
raphers took  up  the  matter  of  the  boundary-line, 
and  discussed  its  proper  survey.  Certain  portions 
of  the  President's  message  were  based  on  argu- 
ments drawn  from  the  historic  "  Monroe  Doc- 
trine," and  there  was  much  discussion  as  to  whether 
that  Doctrine  had  any  proper  bearing  on  the  Vene- 
zuelan controversy.  Above  all,  certain  expres- 
sions in  the  message  had  suggested  the  possibility 
of  serious  differences  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain,  and  those  who  looked  upon  a 
war  with  England  either  with  complacency  or  with 
horror   entered   into   clamorous   debate   over   the 

part  of  the  tax  levied  on  incomes  derived  from  municipal 
bonds,  which  was  also  declared  void. 


PRELIMINARY  IVORK.  '  4i 

prospect.  Yet  for  the  purposes  of  definite  argu- 
ment all  these  matters  were  of  minor  importance, 
and  had  even  to  be  set  aside  as  tending  to  obscure 
the  main  issue.  Mr.  Cleveland  had  not  attempted 
to  decide  the  merits  of  the  boundary  dispute,  but 
only  to  ask  for  a  commission  which  might  do  so. 
He  had  not  based  his  entire  message  upon  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  but  had  used  it  as  an  auxiliary 
argument.  And  clearly  the  matter  of  a  war  with 
England  was  not  the  main  issue,  for  if  the  position 
of  the  administration  was  right,  every  one  would 
agree  to  support  it  whatever  might  happen, 
whereas  if  it  was  wrong  it  should  be  condemned 
even  if  there  were  no  danger  of  war.  This  was  the 
line  of  analysis  by  which  minor  matters  might  be 
set  aside.  The  main  issue  would  seem  to  have  been : 
Is  the  Venezuelan  controversy  sufficiently  connecte^l 
■with  (i)  the  interests  or  (2)  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  warrant  our  government  in  intervening? 

These  illustrations  have  been  given  in  such  num- 
ber and  detail,  because  of  the  great  importance  of 
indicating  what  is  meant  by  analysis,  and  Eeeuitsof 
of  showing  how  questions  of  various  sorts  -^a^y^S' 
can  be  reduced  to  one  or  two  issues  upon  which 
their  settlement  largely  depends.  This  preliminary 
analysis  ought,  of  course,  as  far  as  possible,  to  be 
acceptable  to  debaters  on  both  sides.  If  both  sides 
are  agreed  as  to  what  constitutes  the  main  issue, 
the  debate  will  already  have  made  substantial  prog- 


ip^  THE  j4RT  of  debate. 

ress.  It  Is,  however,  impossible  to  expect  the  dis- 
putants always  to  agree  thus  far.  In  such  cases 
the  one  who  speaks  first  should  present  an  analysis 
which  will  appear  just  and  impartial  even  to  those 
of  the  audience  who  are  disposed  to  favor  the  op- 
posite side;  and  the  opponent  speaking  next  will 
have  to  begin  by  attacking  the  analysis.  It  will 
never  be  safe  to  decline  altogether  to  discuss  any 
issue  raised  by  an  opponent,  as  though  one  were 
afraid  of  it;  but  it  will  be  perfectly  reasonable  to 
try  to  show  that  it  is  not  an  essential  issue. 

The  work  of  analysis  clearly  presupposes  a  full 
understanding  of  the  question  on  both  sides.  The 
study  of  one's  opponent's  case  is  too  often 
Both^Sides  neglected.  Its  importance  cannot  be 
stated  too  emphatically.  It  is  told  of  a 
great  lawyer  that  he  remarked:  "  If  I  have  time 
to  study  only  one  side  of  a  question,  I  study  that  of 
my  adversary."  He  must  have  had  in  mind  the  fact 
that  one  does  not  really  understand  his  own  side 
until  he  knows  what  is  to  be  said  against  it.  Some 
questions  cannot  even  be  subjected  to  preliminary 
analysis  until  this  has  been  accomplished.  Take 
for  example  this  proposition:  The  surplus  silver 
bullion  in  the  United  States  Treasury  should  be 
coined  and  used  to  defray  the  current  expenses  of 
the  government.  The  outline  of  obvious  direct 
proof  is  simple  enough:  the  bullion  is  lying'  idle, 
the  receipts  of  the  government  arc  falling  behind 


PRELIMINARY  ^ORK.  43 

the  expenditures;  why  not  apply  the  supply  to  the 
need?  The  trouble  is  that  any  one  listening  to  such 
a  line  of  argument  says  instantly  to  himself:  '*  If 
this  bullion  is  not  being  coined  in  the  manner  pro- 
posed, there  must  be  some  reason  in  the  minds  of 
the  authorities  why  it  is  better  as  it  is;  I  can 
therefore  form  no  opinion  on  the  question  until  I 
know  what  that  reason  is,  and  what  is  alleged  in  its 
favor.  If  the  advocate  of  the  change  does  not  know 
why  it  is  opposed,  he  knows  very  little  about  his 
subject;  if  he  knows,  and  yet  keeps  still  about  it, 
he  is  not  honest/'  So  a  question  may  be  dangerous 
from  the  very  fact  of  appearing  to  be  all  on  one's 
own  side;  and  even  the  opening  speaker  in  a  debate 
cannot  afford  to  be  ignorant,  or  to  seem  to  be  igno- 
rant, of  the  attitude  of  his  opponent. 

Analysis,  then,  may  be  said  more  broadly  to 
include  not  only  the  questions,  Just  what  does  the 
proposition  maintain?  and.  What  must  chiefly  be 
shown  in  order  to  prove  the  truth  of  it?  but  also. 
What  objections  are  made  to  it?  and,  How  far 
are  the  objections  significant?  One  can  then  de- 
termine what  objections  can  easily  be  thrown  aside 
and  shown  to  be  of  small  importance,  and  which 
ones  must  be  set  up  to  be  disproved  as  thoroughly 
as  one's  positive  position  is  to  be  proved.  If  there 
are  any  objections  whose  relation  to  the  question 
does  not  at  first  seem  clear,  there  should  be  no  rest 
until  that  relation  has  been  settled  satisfactorily. 


44  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

If  there  are  any  which  cannot  either  be  shown  to 
be  unimportant  or  be  directly  disproved,  something 
is  wrong  with  one's  case.  To  sum  up,  one  never 
knows  what  must  be  proved  until  he  knows  what  is 
to  be  disproved. 

The  preliminary  study  of  the  question  will  in- 
volve, in  most  cases,  a  good  deal  of  search  for 
fathering  of  i^iatcrial;  and  something  is  to  be  said  as 
Material.  to  the  method  of  such  search.  The 
amount  of  reading  necessary  will  of  course  depend 
on  the  nature  of  the  subject  in  hand.  In  any  case 
care  should  be  taken  that  the  reading  is  not  made 
a  substitute  for  thinking.  It  is  well  to  make  a 
temporary  analysis  of  the  question  as  it  presents 
itself  to  one's  mind,  before  looking  up  any  material 
in  books;  then,  as  one  reads,  the  material  will  ar- 
range itself  according  to  what  seemed  at  first  to 
be  the  principal  heads  and  sub-heads,  at  the  same 
time  very  likely  suggesting  an  improved  method 
of  analysis.  It  is  as  though  one  should  divide  a 
box  into  a  number  of  pigeon-holes,  with  a  view  to 
assorting  all  his  papers.  As  the  papers  were  ex- 
amined they  would  fall  into  one  or  another  of  the 
groups  for  which  places  had  been  prepared,  but 
at  the  same  time  they  would  be  likely  to  suggest 
that  either  more  or  fewer  pigeon-holes  would  give 
a  better  classification;  so  the  partitions  could  be 
moved  about  to  suit  the  change.  In  like  manner 
one's  reading  on  any  subject  should  fit  into  a  pror 


PRELIMINARY  IVORK.  45 

visional  scheme  of  analysis,  while  the  scheme  should 
be  allowed  to  grow  and  change  as  new  ideas  may 
indicate. 

In  reading  that  is  intended  as  a  preparation  for 
debate,  three  classes  of  material  will  ordinarily  be 
found.  The  first  is  that  of  simple  facts.  Here  are 
included  such  matters  as  undisputed  statistics,  his- 
torical statements,  and  scientific  truths,  which  are 
of  such  indubitable  validity  that  no  special  author- 
ity need  be  cited  in  support  of  them.  The  second 
class  includes  facts  not  to  be  accepted  on  their  face, 
but  depending  for  their  value  upon  their  source; — 
such  as  the  testimony  of  a  traveler  as  to  things  seen 
in  a  foreign  land,  or  the  decision  of  a  judge  on  a 
doubtful  point  of  law.  Here  the  source  of  the  fact 
constitutes  a  part  of  the  argument  itself.  The 
third  class  of  material  includes  the  arguments  of 
others,  the  worth  of  which  has  nothing  to  do  with 
their  source.  If  the  source  of  material  is  named 
in  this  case,  it  will  be  as  a  matter  of  courtesy  or 
simple  honesty,  not  as  an  element  in  the  proof. 

The  distinction  between  these  classes  of  material 
is  not  an  artificial  one,  but  has  practical  bearings. 
The  three  sorts  of  material  should  be  very  p^^^g  ^^^ 
differently  used.  The  class  of  undisputed  Opinions, 
facts  is  the  most  simple;  to  discover  them  is  the 
first  object  of  the  preliminary  reading,  and  to  set 
them  forth  distinctly  will  be  the  first  duty  of  the 
debater.    They  are  introductory  to  the  arguments 


46  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

based  upon  them.  The  material  of  the  second  class 
we  shall  have  to  consider  later  under  the  head  of 
Testimony  and  the  argument  from  Authority.  It 
may  be  said  here,  however,  that  material  of  this 
class  should  be  selected  with  great  care.  Since  its 
value  depends  wholly  upon  its  source,  the  value  of 
the  source  will  determine  its  use.  Debaters  some- 
times exhibit  a  ludicrous  lack  of  appreciation  of 
the  relative  value  of  sources.  If  they  have  lighted 
upon  any  quotation  favoring  their  side  of  the  case, 
they  will  bring  it  with  them  into  the  debate,  wave 
it  triumphantly  in  the  face  of  their  opponents,  and 
exclaim:  "  Does  not  the  morning  paper  make  the 
following  statement? "  or,  "  I  came  across  this 
paragraph  to-day,  in  some  magazine  whose  name 
I  have  forgotten,  which  is  in  itself  a  sufficient  ref- 
utation of  the  position  of  my  opponents.''  One 
cannot  too  carefully  remember  that  no  hearer  is 
bound  to  accept  a  quoted  statement  as  of  any  more 
value  than  his  own  opinion,  unless  the  high  char- 
acter of  the  source  be  distinctly  shown.  More  than 
this,  even  if  the  character  of  the  source  be  very 
high,  it  is  of  small  value  in  a  case  of  mere  opinion 
on  a  disputed  matter.  If  the  question  is  really  de- 
batable it  is  to  be  presumed  that  wise  men  will  be 
found  on  each  side;  so  that  to  quote  even  the  Presi- 
dent or  the  Chief  Justice  in  such  a  case  will  show 
that  there  is  something  on  one's  side  worth  con- 


PRELIMINARY  tVORK.  47 

sidering,  but  nothing  more.    Quotation-marks  are 
no  sign  of  plenary  inspiration. 

The  material  of  the  third  class  includes  actual 
arguments  on  both  sides  of  the  question.  Briefly 
stated,  the  proper  use  of  this  material  is  to  Arguments 
enable  the  reader  to  set  in  order  all  the  o^^*^®"- 
opposing  arguments  as  matter  to  be  refuted,  and 
to  make  the  favorable  arguments  his  own.  What 
is  it  to  make  the  argument  of  another  one's  own? 
It  is  so  to  appreciate  its  value  that  it  will  take  its 
place  in  one's  mind  as  a  part  of  one's  own  view  of 
truth,  apart  from  everything  peculiar  in  the  way 
it  was  first  expressed.  It  can  then  be  re-expressed 
in  one's  own  fashion.  There  is  no  copyright  on  a 
process  of  reasoning.  It  is  only  the  method  of  ex- 
pression that  can  be  said  to  be  borrowed  or  stolen; 
and  cases  will  be  very  rare  in  which  it  will  not  be 
more  effective  to  use  an  original  method  of  expres- 
sion, than  to  quote  the  words  of  another.  Every 
one  who  reads  knows  how  the  ideas  discovered  are 
assimilated  in  his  own  mind,  so  that  he  forgets  the 
source  while  keeping  the  substance.  In  this  way 
the  Congressional  Record  and  the  North  American 
Review  may  reappear  in  debate  under  a  new  form, 
just  as  last  week's  meat  and  vegetables  reappear 
this  week  in  bone  and  blood  and  muscle.  This  is 
the  fruitful  method  of  reading  for  all  purposes,  and 
particularly  for  debate. 

Some  system  will  be  found  necessary  for  the 


48  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

orderly  tabulation  of. the  material  found  in  prelimi- 
nary reading  and  study.  If  the  question  is  one  of 
Tabulation  Ordinary  interest,  the  investigator  will  at 
of  Material,  first  be  appalled  by  the  amount  of  material 
which  will  come  to  hand.  The  daily  press,  Poole's 
Index,  and  the  Congressional  Record  will  frighten 
him  by  the  abundance  of  their  stores.  In  all  this 
matter  there  will  be  some  more  authoritative  and 
more  concisely  stated  than  the  rest,  and  this  should 
be  selected  as  soon  as  possible.  This  being  done, 
it  will  very  soon  appear  that  the  contents  of  other 
articles  will  group  themselves  easily  under  heads 
already  set  down,  and  the  great  body  of  useful 
material  will  soon  have  been  gathered  in.  But  how 
shall  the  heads  be  tabulated  and  grouped?  Most 
of  us  have  found  that  it  is  never  prudent  to  do 
serious  reading  without  a  pencil  at  hand.  The  best 
sort  of  note-book  for  such  purposes  as  we  are  con- 
sidering is  simply  an  abundant  collection  of  cards 
or  slips  of  paper,  on  which  separate  points  may  be 
jotted  down  as  they  present  themselves.  These  can 
then  be  easily  assorted  and  reduced  to  a  small  num- 
ber of  groups.  Repetition  will  in  this  way  be  read- 
ily discovered;  the  main  headings  of  the  argu- 
ment will  loom  up  after  a  little;  and  by  judicious 
shuffling  one  may  be  sure  that  he  has  included 
everything  he  has  gathered  together,  and  has  got 
it  into  intelligible  shape.  I  have  seen  a  friend  who 
is  a  zealous  and  successful  debater  literally  sur- 


PRELIMINARY  fVORK.  49 

rounded  by  piles  of  these  little  slips  or  cards,  em- 
bracing all  the  facts  of  the  case  to  be  debated,  the 
main  lines  of  proof,  and  the  possible  points  of  the 
opposition.  It  was  little  wonder,  after  this  had 
been  done,  that  in  his  finished  argument  every 
separate  bit  of  material  fell  into  its  place  as  neatly 
as  though  he  had  been  able  to  think  out  everything 
in  the  first  place  in  its  logical  order. 

A  plan  practically  identical  with  what  has  just 
been  suggested  is  described  by  Professor  Wendell, 
in  his  "  English  Composition,"  *  as  a  means  for 
securing  the  best  order  in  any  composition. 

"  On  separate  bits  of  paper  "  (he  says)  "  I  write 
down  the  separate  headings  that  occur  to  me,  in  what 
seems  to  me  the  natural  order.  Then,  when  my  little 
pack  of  cards  is  complete, — in  other  words,  when  I 
have  a  card  for  every  heading  I  think  of, — I  study 
them  and  sort  them  almost  as  deliberately  as  I  should 
sort  a  hand  at  whist;  and  it  has  very  rarely  been  my 
experience  to  find  that  a  shift  of  arrangement  will  not 
decidedly  improve  the  original  order.  Ideas  that  really 
stand  in  the  relation  of  proof  to  proposition,  frequently 
present  themselves  as  co-ordinate.  The  same  idea  will 
sometimes  phrase  itself  in  two  or  three  distinct  ways, 
whose  superficial  diflferences  for  the  moment  conceal 
their  identity;  and  more  frequendy  still,  the  compar- 
ative strength  and  importance,  and  the  mutual  rela- 
tions, of  really  distinct  idjpas  will  in  the  first  act  of  com- 
position curiously  conceal  themselves  from  the  writer. 

*  Page  165. 


50  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

A  few  minutes*  shuffling  of  these  little  cards  has  often 
revealed  to  me  more  than  I  should  have  learned  by 
hours  of  unaided  pondering." 

Obviously  all  that  is  here  said  of  the  suggested 
method,  v^ith  general  composition  in  view,  is 
doubly  applicable  to  preparation  for  debate. 

The  analysis  of  the  subject  and  the  tabulation  of 
material  ought  to  combine  to  produce  an  outline 
The  Outline  ^^  ^^^  argument  which  is  to  be  made, 
or  Brief.  Such  an  Outline  really  completes  the  con- 
structive work  of  debate,  up  to  the  point  where 
such  matters  as  illustration,  persuasion,  and  rhetori- 
cal form  come  in;  and  it  is  the  almost  indispensa- 
ble prerequisite  to  orderly  debate.  There  are  at 
least  three  reasons  why  a  careful  outline  is  so  im- 
portant. In  the  first  place,  no  ordinary  person  can 
carry  in  his  mind  a  complete  view  of  the  material 
for  an  argument,  if  he  has  it  only  in  the  large  form 
in  which  it  has  come  to  him  and  in  which  he  wishes 
to  present  it  to  others.  The  ground  covered  must 
be  viewed,  as  it  were,  in  miniature,  in  order  to  be 
understood  in  its  structure  and  relations,  just  as 
a  thousand  miles  of  territory  cannot  be  understood 
as  a  whole,  even  by  one  who  has  traveled  over  them, 
without  the  aid  of  a  small  map  which  will  show  the 
shape  of  the  country  at  a  glance.  The  reason  why 
so  many  speakers  seem  to  go  a  great  distance  with- 
out coming  to  any  destination,  is  because  they  start 
out  seeing  the  road  only  from  one  hill  to  another. 


PRELIMINARY  IVORK.  51 

and  have  obtained  no  map  for  the  entire  trip.  An 
outline  for  a  speech,  then,  may  be  said  to  be  a  map, 
on  a  large  scale,  of  the  country  to  be  covered. 

Again,  such  an  outline  is  important  because  when 
the  time  comes  for  putting  the  argument  into  its 
final  form,  whether  it  is  to  be  first  written  or  spoken 
directly  from  the  outline,  the  author  should  have 
all  his  faculties  free  for  the  perfecting  of  phrase- 
ology*— the  attainment  of  perfect  clearness,  ele- 
gance, and  force.  The  work  of  construction  should 
have  been  completed  in  advance.  Any  one  accus- 
tomed to  public  speaking  can  rise  and  speak  ex- 
temporaneously, if  he  has  had  sufficient  time  to 
determine  the  outline  of  what  he  wishes  to  say; 
the  fluency  and  force  gained  by  experience  will  do 
the  rest.  But  without  a  plan  in  mind  he  will  be 
Hkely  to  say  very  little,  though  he  may  be  a  good 
while  in  doing  it. 

Finally,  an  outline  is  necessary  in  order  that  the 
structure  of  the  argument  may  be  made  clear  to  the 
audience.  The  speaker's  mind  may  be  so  soundly 
logical  that  one  point  will  develop  from  another  in 
the  best  order,  without  preliminary  care  being 
taken  to  secure  this  end;  but  it  is  not  likely  that 
many  minds  in  the  audience  will  be  as  able.  They 
must  be  helped  by  being  let  into  the  secret  of  the 
structure, — by  an  occasional  "  first,"  "  secondly," 
and  "  thirdly,"  as  the  circumstances  may  require, 
or  by  less  formal  hints;    and  the  speaker  cannot 


52  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

give  this  help  if  he  has  not  prepared  an  outline  for 
himself. 

The  outline,  then,  will  put  into  visible  form  the 
results  of  analysis.  Analysis  will  have  determined 
Form  of  ^^^  ^^^  ^^  ^^^  principal  points  to  be 
Outline.  proved;  these  points  will  form  the  main 
headings  of  the  outline.  The  material  gathered 
will  have  grouped  itself  under  a  number  of  dif- 
ferent methods  of  proof;  these  groups  will  be  put 
under  the  appropriate  headings.  Certain  matter 
will  have  been  found  to  be  not  so  much  actual  proof 
as  matter  for  introductory  or  concluding  comment; 
it  will  be  given  its  place  before  or  after  the  body 
of  the  argument.  The  outline,  moreover,  should 
make  clear  not  only  the  order  of  the  parts,  but 
their  relation  one  to  another.  Every  statement 
should  be  so  set  down  that  it  will  be  evident 
whether  it  is  a  main  heading, — that  is,  something 
which  goes  to  prove  the  proposition  directly,— or 
a  subordinate  heading,  removed  by  one  or  more 
steps  from  the  main  question.  To  put  the  matter 
in  a  slightly  different  way:  any  two  parts  of  an 
outline  for  argument  are  either  co-ordinate, — that 
is,  intended  to  perform  precisely  similar  functions, 
— or  of  different  orders, — that  is,  intended  for  dif- 
ferent purposes.  The  problem  is  to  show  at  a 
glance  which  are  co-ordinate,  main  headings,  prov- 
ing the  proposition  directly,  and  which  are  sub- 
ordinate, leading  to  the  proposition  indirectly.  The 


'       '  PREUMINARY  IVORK,  53 

simplest  solution  is  merely  to  have  all  co-ordinate 
parts  of  the  outline  occupy  the  same  position  on 
the  page.  The  main  headings  may  begin  at  the 
extreme  left  of  the  paper;  headings  of  the  next 
order  a  half  inch  to  the  right  of  the  main  headings ; 
and  so  on,  as  far  as  may  be  necessary.  Such  an  ar- 
rangement presents  to  the  eye,  at  a  glance,  the 
relations  of  the  different  parts  of  the  argument.  It 
is  of  course  merely  an  extension  of  the  paragraph 
idea,  upon  which  we  depend  in  all  reading  to  in- 
dicate the  places  where  the  structure  of  the  com- 
position changes.  In  an  extended  composition  it 
would  be  confusing  to  have  paragraph  indentations 
of  different  degrees,  because  the  eye  could  not  fol- 
low them  at  a  glance;  but  in  a  miniature  outline 
it  is  quite  practicable  to  use  a  separate  degree  of 
indentation  for  every  sort  of  subdivision  of  the 
thought. 

Let  us  take  an  example  illustrating  the  growth 
and  arrangement  of  an  outline  for  debate.     Sup- 
pose that  a  speaker  is  to  argue  in  favor 
of  woman's  suffrage  in  the  United  States.  Woman's 
After  doing  some  reading  and  thinking    '^  ^®' 
on  the  subject,  and  jotting  down  the  points  dis- 
covered in  the  order  in  which  they  have  occurred 
to  him,  his  notes  run  somewhat  as  follows: 

1.  Importance  of  the  question. 

2.  Idea  of  woman's  suffrage  has  made  rapid  prog- 
ress. 


54  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

3.  Suffrage  is  a  natural  right. 

4.  Americans  believe  that  taxation  implies  repre- 
sentation. 

5.  Woman  is  more  moral  than  man. 

6.  The  only  other  disfranchised  classes  are  idiots, 
criminals  and  children. 

7.  Women  would  produce  a  good  effect  on  politics. 

8.  Objection:    Women  cannot  do  military  service. 

9.  Women  interested  in  education  of  children. 

10.  Objection:    Home  interests  would  be  injured. 

11.  Disfranchisement  of  woman  a  mere  tradition. 

12.  In  America  practically  all  citizens  vote. 

13.  Objection:    Women  are  represented  by  men. 

14.  Experience  in  Colorado,  Wyoming,  etc. 

15.  Very  many  women  now  in  business. 

16.  Women  much  interested  in  reforms. 

17.  The  present  a  favorable  time  for  trying  the  ex- 
periment. 

18.  Laws  still  exist  unfavorable  to  the  interests  of 
women. 

19.  Unmarried  women  have  not  even  partial  repre- 
sentation. 

20.  Women  need  the  ballot  to  protect  their  real  in- 
terests. 

21.  According  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
all  persons  are  born  free  and  equal. 

Here,  clearly,  is  a  good  deal  of  useful  material, 
but  in  a  quite  unserviceable  form.  The  different 
statements  bear  very  different  relations  to  one  an- 
other.   Numbers  i,  2,  11,  and  17  are  of  slight  value 


PRELIMINARY   IVORK.  55 

as  proof,  but  are  interesting  for  preliminary  con- 
sideration or  concluding  appeal.  Numbers  4,  6, 
and  12  seem  to  belong  together,  under  some  head- 
ing having  to  do  with  the  theory  of  the  franchise  in 
the  United  States.  In  the  same  way  3,  9,  15,  18, 
and  20  have  to  do  with  the  question  of  the  interests 
of  women;  while  5,  7,  and  16  have  to  do  with  the 
interests  of  the  country  at  large.  Aside  from  the 
matter  of  arrangement,  the  headings  are  seen  not 
to  be  co-ordinate  in  their  functions  as  proof.  Thus 
5  and  16  are  proofs  of  7,  if  they  have  any  value,  and 
should  evidently  come  together  under  7.  21  seems 
to  be  an  attempt  at  proof  of  3.  Numbers  9,  15,  and 
18  are  proofs  of  20;  under  this  head,  also,  belongs 
the  objection  stated  in  13,  to  which  19  is  a  partial 
answer.  In  the  same  way  14  may  well  be  used  as 
an  answer  to  the  objection  stated  in  10;  while  6  is 
really  a  form  of  answer  to  an  objection  not  stated, 
coming  under  the  idea  expressed  in  12. 

Arranging  the  headings  according  to  this  anal- 
ysis, and  filling  in  certain  gaps  in  order  to  indi- 
cate the  full  connection  of  the  various  ideas,  we 
have  an  outline  something  like  this: 

Women  should  have  the  right  of  suffrage  in  the 
United  States. 

Introductory. 

The  problem  of  suffrage  of  grave  importance  in 
America. 


$6  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

Originally  the  right  to  take  part  in  government  was 
based  on  physical  force. 

In  the  United  States,  however,  it  is  supposed  to  be 
based  on  principle,  not  tradition. 

I.  To  deny  women  this  right  is  unreasonable  according 
to  the  principles  of  government  in  America. 
Here  suffrage  is  called  "  universal." 

(It  is  no  objection  to  say  that  suffrage  is  denied 
to  certain  classes  by  law,  for 

This  denial  is  largely  based  on  assumed 
incapacity,  as  in  the  case  of  idiots,  crim- 
inals, and  minors.) 
(Neither  is  it  sufficient  to  say  that  women  are 
excepted  because  of  incapacity  for  military 
service,  for 

Men  are  not  disfranchised  when  incapaci- 
tated by  age  or  infirmity.) 
Here  the  principle  is  accepted  that  taxation  im- 
plies representation;  and  women  are  taxed. 
II.  To  deny  it  is  unjust. 

Suffrage  is   a  natural  right  of  citizens,  for 
It  is  the  means  by  which  they  are  to  protect 
and    exercise    the    freedom    and    equality 
guaranteed  them  by  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence. 
Women  need  the  suffrage  to  protect  their  inter- 
ests. 

Many  of  them  have  business  interests. 
Many  are  interested  in  the  education  of  chil- 
dren. 


PRELIMINARY  IVORK,  57 

Many  still  suffer  from  laws  unfavorable  to 
their  personal  rights  (as  in  the  case  of  hold- 
ing property,  guardianship  of  children, 
etc.) 

(It  cannot  be  said  that  they  are  represented 
in  these  matters  by  men,  for 
In  the  nature  of  the  case  a  man  cannot 
represent  the  interests  of  a  woman ;  and 
Unmarried   women    are    not    even   pro- 
fessedly represented.) 
III.  To  deny  it  is  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the 
nation. 

The  influence  of  women  in  politics  would  be 
beneficial. 

Women  are,  broadly  speaking,  more  moral 

than  men. 
Women  are  more  interested  in  reforms. 
(It  cannot  be  urged  that  the  interests  of  the 
home  would  be  injured,  for 
This  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  women; 

and 
Experience  in  Colorado,  Wyoming,  and 
elsewhere,  proves  the  contrary.) 
Conclusion. 

This  movement  has  grown  beyond  all  expectation, 

and  has  been  successful  in  many  localities. 
The  present  is  an  opportune  plan  for  trying  it  in  the 
United  States. 

This  outline  is  of  course  by  no  means  complete; 
detailed  evidence  is  not  indicated,  and  only  a  few 


58  •  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

of  many  objections  are  refuted;  but  it  is  at  least 
arranged  in  an  orderly  manner,  so  that  the  argu- 
ment based  on  it  should  have  a  structure  easily  ap- 
preciable, and  one  using  it  should  be  able  to  tell 
at  any  particular  point  just  how  much  had  been 
proved.  It  will  have  been  noticed  how  the  system 
of  marginal  indentation  makes  clear  the  relations 
of  the  various  statements  in  the  outhne.  Those  be- 
ginning at  the  extreme  left  (numbered  I.,  II.,  and 
III.)  are  the  main  headings  which  go  directly  to 
prove  the  proposition.  Those  beginning  an  em 
to  the  right  are  proofs  of  the  main  headings  under 
which  they  stand;  and  those  still  further  indented 
are  proofs  one  step  further  removed.  Objections 
are  stated  and  refuted  under  the  headings  to  which 
objection  is  supposed  to  be  made.  Thus  an  outline 
map  is  formed  for  the  entire  process  of  argument.* 
It  is  such  an  outline  as  this,  adapted  to  legal 
argument  and  developed  so  as  to  indicate  not  only 
the  plan  but  the  substance  of  proof,  that 
ega      e  s.  j^^^y^j.^  ^g^j|  ^  a  i^i-j^f  "    Legal  bricfs,  then, 

are  much  fuller  than  would  be  found  useful  for 
general  debate,  since  their  purpose  is  not  so  much 

*  This,  as  was  suggested,  is  the  simplest  form  of  outline 
or  brief.  Where  the  outline  is  to  be  subjected  to  criticism 
or  discussion,  or  where  it  is  to  serve  any  other  purpose  than 
that  of  a  preliminary  sketch  for  the  use  of  the  individual 
speaker,  it  will  be  found  useful  to  employ  a  more  elaborate 
system  of  correlation.  The  best  system  of  this  kind  is  ex- 
plained in  Baker's  "  Specimens  of  Argumentation  "  (Holt  & 


PRELIMINARY  fVORfC.  59 

to  aid  the  speaker  in  his  argument  as  to  give  the 
court,  and  the  attorney  for  the  other  side,  the  sub- 
stance of  the  writer's  case.  Not  infrequently,  in- 
deed, cases  are  submitted  to  court  on  the  briefs 
alone,  without  oral  argument.  This  requires  a  full 
written  statement  of  the  facts  in  the  case,  and  a 
definite  record  of  all  the  evidence  necessary  to  give 
ground  for  a  decision.  Yet  the  best  legal  briefs  are 
as  clear  in  structure  as  though  they  were  mere 
skeleton  plans.  By  conciseness  of  statement,  the 
numbering  of  the  main  divisions  of  the  proof,  and 
careful  paragraphing,  they  still  serve,  in  a  sense,  as 
maps  of  the  country  to  be  traversed.  Those  who 
have  had  much  to  do  with  the  briefs  of  inexperi- 
enced lawyers  complain  that  they  are  often  lament- 
ably deficient  in  clearness  and  order.  The  secret  of 
the  defect  has  already  been  indicated:  it  Hes  chiefly 
in  careless  analysis  of  the  question  and  the  proof. 
Too  much  stress  cannot  be  laid  on  the  fact  that, 
whether  in  a  court  of  law  or  in  a  general  assem- 
bly, the  debater  who  has  constructed  a  strong  plan 
for  his  argument  has  gone  a  good  way  toward  win- 
ning his  case. 

The  preliminary  work  of  the  debater  may  now 
be  assumed  to  be  complete.  We  have  of  course 
passed  over,  for  the  time  being,  the  consideration 

Co.),  and  "Principles  of  Argumentation"  (Ginn  &  Co.); 
and  is  illustrated  by  the  brief  on  the  Trust  question,  in  the 
Appendix. 


6o  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

of  the  particular  kinds  of  proof  which  will  have  been 
determined  and  brought  together  before  even  the 
outline  of  debate  was  prepared.  But  we  have  ex- 
amined in  detail  the  process  of  analysis,  the  prob- 
lem of  preliminary  reading  and  study,  and  the 
method  of  constructing  an  outline.  Another  use- 
ful preliminary  process,  it  may  be  observed,  is  that 
of  conversation.  A  prospective  debater  should 
have  no  hesitation  in  becoming  a  bore  to  his  friends, 
in  order  to  make  sure  that  no  ideas  relating  to  his 
subject  shall  escape  him.  Those  friends  are  most 
useful  who  take  the  opposite  side  from  his  own, 
and  who  will  attack  every  position  he  occupies. 
After  some  hours'  friendly  discussion  of  this  sort, 
it  is  not  likely  that  either  participant  will  have  con- 
vinced the  other  of  error,  but  that  will  not  matter; 
new  light  will  certainly  have  been  struck  out  by 
the  clash  of  opposing  minds. 

When  all  this  has  been  done,  the  debater  should 
go  before  his  audience  so  full  of  his  subject,  so 
ready  for  whatever  may  be  said  about  it,  that  his 
only  thought — the  sole  thing  about  which  he  will 
have  any  doubt  or  fear — will  be  to  crowd  what  he 
has  to  say  into  the  appointed  time,  and  to  drive 
it  home  with  the  utmost  possible  effectiveness. 


IV. 

BURDEN    OF    PROOF. 

We  now  approach  the  central  problem  of  argu- 
mentation, the  nature  and  use  of  proof.  Through 
all  the  preliminary  work  this  has  been  the  object 
in  view,  and  the  point  has  been  to  ascertain  just 
what  sort  of  proof  was  needed  and  where  it  might 
be  found.  In  the  consideration  of  the  "  outline  " 
we  assumed  for  the  time  being  that  the  proof  had 
already  been  collected.  We  now  turn  to  examine 
its  nature  more  closely. 

At  the  outset  of  this  subject  we  meet  the  ques- 
tion of  the  so-called  "  Burden  of  Proof,"  a  topic 
of  great  importance  for  all  sorts  of  debate,  yet  one 
concerning  which  few  persons  seem  to  be  clearly 
informed.  The  principle  is  in  reality  a  very  simple 
one;  the  confusion  is  simply  in  the  use  of  terms. 

The  Burden  of  Proof  is  defined  most  .simply  as 
"  the  obligation  resting  upon  one  or  other  of  the 
parties  to  a  controversy  to  establish  by 
proofs  a  given  proposition,  before  being  Proof  de- 
entitled  to  receive  an  answer  from  the  ^^®^' 
other  side."    To  put  it  in  another  way,  the  burden 
of  proof  is  the  chief  responsibility  in  the  argument; 
or,  in  still  another  way,  it  rests  upon  the  side  which 

61 


6a  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

would  be  assumed  to  be  defeated  if  no  progress  at 
all  were  made  in  the  consideration  of  the  case. 

Let  us  look  first  at  this  matter  from  the  legal 
point  of  view.  Here  are  the  words  of  Lord  Jus- 
tice Bowen: 

"In  every  lawsuit  somebody  must  go  on  with  it; 
the  plaintiff  is  the  first  to  begin,  and  if  he  does  nothing 
Legal  he  fails.    If  he  makes  a  prima  facie  case,  and 

Definition.  nothing  is  done  by  the  other  side  to  answer 
it,  the  defendant  fails.  The  test,  therefore,  as  to  the 
burden  of  proof  is  simply  to  consider  which  party 
would  be  successful  if  no  evidence  at  all  was  given,  or 
if  no  more  evidence  was  given  than  is  given  at  this 
particular  point  of  the  case."  * 

"The  plaintiff  is  the  first  to  begin,"  or — in  a 
criminal  case — the  prosecutor,  because  it  is  he  that 
brings  the  charge  or  complaint.  He  creates  the 
case  by  making  a  statement,  and  "  he  who  affirms 
must  prove."  The. question  then  arises:  does  the 
burden  of  proof  rest  on  this  same  party  through- 
out the  argument,  or  may  it  be  shifted  upon  his 
opponent?  In  one  sense,  it  may  certainly  be 
shifted.  To  continue  the  quotation  from  Lord  Jus- 
tice Bowen: 

"  It  is  not  a  burden  which  rests  forever  on  the  per- 
son on  whom  it  is  first  cast,  but  as  soon  as  he,  in  his 
turn,  finds  evidence  which,  prima  facie,  rebuts  the 
evidence  against  which  he  is  contending,  the  burden 

•  Case  of  Ahrath  v.  No.E.  Ry.  Co. 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  63 

shifts  until  again  there  is  evidence  which  satisfies  the 
demand.  Now,  that  being  so,  the  question  as  to  onus 
of  proof  is  only  a  rule  for  deciding  on  whom  the  obli- 
gation rests  of  going  further,  if  he  wishes  to  win." 

To  the  same  effect  is  the  language  of  Stephen  in 
his  work  on  Evidence: 

"  The  burden  of  proof  in  any  proceeding  lies  at  first 
on  that  party  against  whom  the  judgtnent  of  the  court 
would  be  given  if  no  evidence  at  all  were  produced  on 
either  side.  ...  As  the  proceeding  goes  on,  the 
burden  of  proof  may  be  shifted  from  the  party  on 
whom  it  rested  at  first  by  proving  facts  which  raise  a 
presumption  in  his  favor." 

We  can  now  see  the  relation  of  this  term  "  bur- 
den of  proof "  to  the  closely  related  term  "  pre- 
sumption." A  presumption  is  "  that 
which  may  be  logically  assumed  to  be  Proof  and 
true  until  disproved."  So  if  the  burden  ^^««^°^p*^°^' 
of  proof  is  on  the  plaintiff,  the  presumption  favors 
the  defendant;  but  if  the  plaintiff  makes  what  the 
jurists  call  a  "  prima  facie  case,"  he  raises  a  pre- 
sumption against  the  defendant.  Examples  of  this 
are  perfectly  familiar.  Thus  every  man  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  innocent  until  he  is  proved  guilty; 
but  if,  in  a  trial  for  murder,  the  accused  person 
were  shown  to  have  been  alone  with  the  murdered 
man  at  the  time  when  the  crime  was  known  to 
have  been  committed,  the  prosecution  would  have 


64  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

made  a  prima  facie  case,  and  the  burden  would  be 
upon  the  accused  to  overthrow  the  presumptive 
evidence  against  him.  Or,  in  a  civil  case,  a  man 
is  presumed  to  have  a  right  to  occupy  the  house  he 
Hves  in;  but  if  his  landlord  attempts  to  evict  him, 
and  shows  a  document  purporting  to  give  him  the 
right  to  do  so,  signed  by  the  tenant,  then  the  bur- 
den shifts  upon  the  defendant,  and  he  must  either 
show  that  the  signature  to  the  document  is  not  his, 
or  that  the  document  is  invalid  for  some  other  rea- 
son. 

"The  rules  on  the  doctrine  of  legal  presumptions 
.  .  .  may,  in  many  cases,  be  referred  to  the  four  fol- 
lowing maxims:  ist.  That  no  one  shall,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, be  called  on  to  prove  a  negative,  or  be  put  on 
his  defence,  without  sufficient  evidence  against  him 
having  been  offered,  which,  if  not  contradicted  or  ex- 
plained, would  be  conclusive.  2d.  That  the  affirmative 
of  the  issue  must  be  proved;  otherwise  men  might  be 
called  upon  by  a  stranger  to  prove  the  title  to  their 
property,  which  they  might  often  be  unable  to  do, 
though  the  title  was  in  fact  good.  3d.  That  possession 
is  prima  facie  evidence  of  property.  .  .  .  4th.  What- 
ever any  thing  or  person  appears  or  professes  to  be,  is 
considered  to  be  the  fact,  until  the  contrary  is  proved." 
(From  an  article  on  "  Presumptions  of  Law  "  in  the 
Law  Magazine,  reprinted  in  Prof.  Thayer's  "  Prelimi- 
nary Treatise  on  Evidence.") 

From  one  point  of  view,  then,  the  burden  of 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF,  65 

proof  may  be  shifted  from  one  side  to  the  other  by 
the  raising  of  presumptions.  But  from 
another  point  of  view  it  ahvays  rests  on  in  Two 
the  side  whose  duty  it  is  to  prove  the  ^^^' 
main  proposition.  Thus  Chief  Justice  Church  said, 
in  deciding  the  case  of  Caldwell  vs.  N.  J.  Co.: 
"  The  burden  of  maintaining  the  affirmative  of  the 
issue,  and,  properly  speaking,  the  burden  of  proof, 
remained  upon  the  plaintiff  throughout  the  trial." 
And,  broadly  speaking,  in  a  trial  for  murder  the 
duty  is  upon  the  prosecution,  from  the  beginning 
of  the  trial  to  the  end,  to  prove  its  whole  case;  or, 
in  a  case  dealing  with  the  seizure  of  property,  the 
party  laying  claim  against  the  apparent  owner  can- 
not get  rid  of  the  responsibility  of  proving  the  claim 
laid  down  at  the  outset.  From  this  point  of  view 
"  the  burden  of  proof "  really  means  something 
different  from  what  it  meant  in  the  cases  previously 
cited.  Professor  Thayer  states  the  distinction 
clearly: 

"  In  legal  discussion,  this  phrase,  *  the  burden  of 
proof,*  is  used  in  several  ways.  It  marks  (i)  The  pe- 
culiar duty  of  him  who  has  the  risk  of  any  given 
proposition  on  which  parties  are  at  issue, — who  will 
lose  the  case  if  he  does  not  make  that  proposition  out, 
when  all  has  been  said  and  done.  ...  (2)  It  stands 
for  the  duty  .  .  of  going  forward  in  argument  or  in 
producing  evidence;  whether  at  the  beginning  of  a 
case  or  at  any  later  moment  throughout  the  trial  or  the 


66  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

discussion.  (3)  There  is  an  undiscriminated  use  of  the 
phrase,  perhaps  more  common  than  either  of  the  other 
two,  in  which  it  may  mean  either  or  both  of  the 
others."  * 

It  would  not  have  been  reasonable  to  spend  so 
much  time  in  the  exposition  of  these  legal  ques- 
Burden  of  tions,  if  they  were  technical  matters  pecul- 
Fomi^  iar  to  the  practice  of  courts.  As  a  matter 
Debate.  of  fact,  the  principles  just  considered  are 
perfectly  applicable,  from  beginning  to  end,  to  the 
question  of  the  "  burden  of  proof "  in  the  debate 
of  ordinary  life;  and  if  they  were  understood  with 
precision  many  absurd  arguments,  or  interruptions 
of  arguments,  would  be  avoided.  In  ordinary  de- 
bate, then,  a  proposition  is  laid  down,  and  the  dis- 
putant having  the  duty  of  proving  it  is  said  to  bear 
the  burden  of  proof.  One  may,  of  course,  lay  down 
a  statement  of  such  a  character  that  reason  requires 
us  to  believe  it  until  someone  else  has  taken  the  re- 
sponsibility of  proving  it  untrue;  but  such  a  state- 
ment is  hardly  suitable  for  debate.  We  have  seen 
that  in  formal  debates  it  is  always  unfortunate  to 
have  the  question  so  worded  that  the  first  speaker 
must  spend  his  time  in  supporting  a  proposition 
presumptively  true.  The  first  speaker,  like  the  at- 
torney for  plaintiff  or  for  prosecution  in  court, 
should  have  the  presumption  against  him:  he 
should  oppose  existing  conditions,  propose  some 
new  or  untried  policy,  or  at  least  lay  down  a  state- 
*  Law  of  Evidence,  p.  355. 


^    ^  BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  67 

ment  which  a  portion  of  his  audience  is  not  pre- 
pared to  accept.  He  will  have  to  make  definite 
progress  in  his  proof;  he  will  be  under  the  obliga- 
tion, from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  debate, 
of  making  good  his  proposition;  and  it  will  be 
enough  for  his  opponent,  who  has  the  negative, 
ftierely  to  prevent  him  from  doing  so  successfully. 
If  he  makes  no  positive  case,  or  if  the  negative  does 
nothing  more  than  destroy  what  he  builds  up,  he 
must  be  judged  to  have  lost  the  debate.  If  he 
proves  any  single  point  which  establishes  his  case, 
and  the  negative  cannot  overthrow  it,  he  must  be 
judged  to  have  won. 

Thus,  in  one  sense  of  the  term,  the  disputant  on 
whom  rests  the  burden  of  proof  must  cheerfully  ac- 
cept it,  and  never  forget  or  attempt  to 
evade  the  responsibility.  On  the  other  Burden 
hand,  as  in  law,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  °^*^  ^^^' 
the  burden  of  proof  may  shift  back  and  forth.  The 
first  speaker  may  show  in  his  first  speech  that,  al- 
though he  has  the  burden  of  opposing  existing 
conditions,  yet  the  real  presumption  is  against  ex- 
isting conditions.  If  he  has  to  defend  a  new  and 
untried  measure,  he  may  yet  show  that  experience 
90  leads  up  to  this  measure  as  to  shift  the  presump- 
tion in  its  favor.  At  the  close  of  his  argument, 
then,  a  prima  facie  case  will  have  been  made  for 
his  side,  and  the  burden  will  be  upon  the  negative 
to  show  why  his  claim  cannot  be  maintained.  If 
they  do  not  attack  his  argument  directly,  but  set 


6B  THE  y4RT  OF  DEBATE, 

Up  a  counter-case  of  their  own,  the  burden  Is  still 
on  them  to  establish  that  counter-case  and  to  show 
that  it  evades  the  points  made  by  the  affirmative. 
If  they  do  so  successfully,  the  presumption  is  again 
in  their  favor,  and  the  affirmative  must  go  on  to 
further  proof  or  meet  defeat. 

Thus  far  we  have  looked  at  this  matter  from  a 
somewhat  rigidly  technical  point  of  view, — ^the 
Bm-denof  point  of  vicw  of  the  judge,  whether  in  a 
Genwd  court  or  in  a  matched  debate.  The  same 
Debate.  principle,  as  has  been  said,  applies  to  ar- 
gument in  general,  but  it  must  be  applied  in  a 
broader  way.  It  is  not  enough,  when  addressing 
a  general  audience,  to  try  to  win  one's  case  on 
technicalities.  A  debater  who  does  so  always 
runs  the  risk  of  finding  his  victory  a  sort  of  defeat 
in  disguise.  A  lawyer  may  save  his  client  from 
punishment  by  discovering  a  flaw  in  the  indict- 
ment, or  by  merely  throwing  such  doubt  over  the 
evidence  that  the  jury  feels  the  guilt  has  not  been 
proved  "  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt."  But  if  the 
accused  is  to  free  himself  from  suspicion  in  the  eyes 
of  the  community,  much  more  than  this  must  be 
done.  He  must  show  that  the  ground  of  accusa- 
tion was  absolutely  mistaken;  he  must,  if  he  can, 
not  only  prove  himself  not  had,  but  prove  himself 
good.  This  is  the  sort  of  proof  that  is  demanded 
for  general  debate.  One  may  be  defending  some 
President,  or  Senator,  or  Mayor;  one  may  be  seek- 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  69 

ing  support  for  some  law,  or  taking  the  part  of 
some  society  or  party  against  which  wrong  mo- 
tives have  been  charged.  In  all  such  cases  there 
will  be  a  technical  presumption  of  innocence,  but 
this  will  count  for  comparatively  little  in  the  pubUc 
mind.  It  is  not  a  question  of  whether  the  Senator 
has  done  anything  which  might  send  him  to  prison, 
but  whether  he  is  a  good  Senator.  It  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  whether  the  proposed  law  can  be  shown  to 
meet  the  particular  points  where  its  opponents  at- 
tctck  it,  but  whether  on  the  whole  it  will  be  a  good 
law.  So  the, general  debater  must  win  his  case  in 
a  broader  fashion  than  would  be  required  of  him 
in  a  court  of  law.  And  the  burden  of  proof  which 
he  will  try  to  shift  will  not  be  the  technical  burden 
of  proof,  but  the  real  burden  of  doubt  upon  the 
minds  of  his  hearers.  He  will  not  strive  after  in- 
genuity in  juggHng  with  presumptions  that  depend 
upon  forms  of  words,  but  after  success  in  dealing 
with  the  question:  Where,  according  to  the  feel- 
ing of  my  hearers,  does  the  true  presumption  He  at 
this  point  in  the  argument? 

In  a  sense,  of  course,  any  proof  offered  by  the 
affirmative  at  the  opening  of  debate,  is  a  means  of 
shifting:  the  burden  of  proof:    but  very 

Metnods  of 

commonly  the  most  convenient  method  Shifting 
of  doing  so  is  to  establish  a  presumption  ^^^^^^e^- 
in  favor  of  the  proposition  by  showing  that  it  is 
more  reasonable,  on  the  face  of  it,  than  its  oppo- 


TO  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

nents  have  supposed.  Some  illustrations  may  make 
this  clear.  In  a  criminal  trial  the  attempt  of  the 
prosecution  to  show  the  general  bad  character  of 
the  accused,  in  order  to  establish  the  antecedent 
reasonableness  of  his  guilt,  is  a  case  in  point.  Some 
time  ago  a  debating  society  discussed  the  question: 
*' Resolved,  That  in  the  United  States  the  strength 
of  the  Federal  government  should  be  gradually  in- 
creased, as  compared  with  that  of  the  separate 
States."  The  first  speaker  on  the  affirmative  spent 
most  of  his  time  in  showing  that  the  resolution  fa- 
vored just  such  a  process  as  had  in  fact  been  going 
on  from  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  up  to  the 
present  time.  Having  done  this,  he  explained  his 
object  somewhat  as  follows: 

"  Why  have  we  taken  so  much  time  in  a  mere  review 
of  a  past  tendency,  when  we  are  to  consider  the  pres- 
ent and  future?  In  order  to  show  that  it  is  really  our 
opponents,  and  not  we,  who  have  the  heaviest  re- 
sponsibility of  proof,  since  it  is  their  business  to  argue 
against  an  established  course  of  events,  and  ours  to 
defend  it.  A  second  reason  for  doing  so  is  because  we 
have  thus  answered  in  advance  the  chief  possible  ob- 
jections to  this  tendency.  They  cannot  tell  us  that  it 
threatens  individual  liberty;  for  we  all  know  that  free- 
dom is  now  more  fully  developed  than  when  Wash- 
ington laid  the  corner-stone  of  the  Capitol.  They  can- 
not urge  that  such  a  tendency  will  tend  toward  an  im- 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF,  7^ 

proper  increase  in  the  functions  of  government,  for  we 
know  that  to-day  we  let  our  citizens  mind  their  own 
business  in  a  way  that  has  scarcely  been  seen  before. 
They  cannot  say  that  such  growth  is  a  violation  of  the 
contract  made  at  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
unless  they  would  show  that  we  have  steadily  violated 
that  contract  for  more  than  one  hundred  years,  and 
have  never  discovered  it.  They  must  not  complain  of 
the  possible  destruction  of  the  individual  State,  or  the 
loss  of  its  local  authority,  for  in  the  face  of  all  this  his- 
tory there  is  no  single  State  to-day  that  fears  for  one 
moment  its  dissolution  or  absorption.  In  short,  the 
nation  has  not  by  this  tendency  moved  away  from  any 
of  the  great  ideas  of  the  Constitution,  but  has  by  means 
of  it  crowded  through  all  difficulties,  and  breathes  very 
freely  to-day." 

A  similar  example  is  to  be  found  in  the  case  of 
debates  on  "  expansion,"  or  various  proposed  an- 
nexations of  territory.    In  these  cases  the  _        ^ 

•^  rresnmption 

affirmative  has  borne  a  heavy  burden  of  in  Expansion 
proof,  and  the  negative  has  made  the  ^^^^^^^' 
most  of  the  fact  by  emphasizing  the  novelty  of  such 
propositions,  the  extent  to  which  they  form  de- 
partures from  the  usual  policy  of  the  country,  and 
the  new  dangers  likely  to  be  involved.  The  affir- 
mative has  met  this  by  the  claim  that  the  proposed 
expansion  of  interests  is  in  line  with  certain  natural 
developments,  that  it  has  been  anticipated  and  ex- 


72  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

pected  by  many  of  our  public  men,  and  that  it 
would  not,  therefore,  properly  interpreted,  be  a 
departure  from  an  historic  policy.  This  line  of  ar- 
gument was  used  in  connection  with  the  annexa- 
tion of  Hawaii,  and  again,  more  recently,  in  con- 
nection with  the  territories  won  from  Spain.  "  We 
have  in  fact  annexed  attractive  territory,"  it  has 
been  said,  "  whenever  we  have  had  opportunity; 
and  our  economic  and  political  development  has 
been  such  as  to  lead  logically  to  what  is  now  pro- 
posed. Nay,  we  may  even  claim  that  it  is  for  us  to 
demand,  when  an  attractive  opportunity  for  expan- 
sion is  offered,  that  those  opposing  it  should  show 
why  it  is  not  to  be  used."  In  other  words,  the 
affirmative  has  sought  to  relieve  itself  of  the  real 
burden  of  proof,  and  to  establish  a  preliminary  pre- 
sumption in  its  own  favor. 

One  additional  example  will  suffice.    A  debater 

had  to  argue  in  behalf  of  woman's  suffrage.     He 

had  what  mieht  be  called  a  triple  burden 

Presnmption  .  .  ^ 

in  Snffi-age  resting  on  him :  that  belonging  naturally 
Qnestion.  ^^  ^^^  affirmative,  the  fact  that  he  favored 
a  change  from  familiar  conditions,  and  the  strong 
popular  opinion  against  him.  He  tried  to  relieve 
him.self  of  this  in  an  interesting  way.  He  showed 
how  the  idea  of  popular  government,  as  held  in 
America,  is  that  all  citizens  having  an  interest  in 
the  operations  of  government,  and  capable  of  ex- 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  73' 

pressing  an  intelligent  opinion  on  its  operations, 
should  have  the  right  to  do  so  through  the  fran- 
chise. He  pointed  out  the  several  reasons  why, 
under  this  rule,  minors,  idiots,  and  criminals  are 
disfranchised.  Women,  he  said,  constitute  a  fourth 
class,  but  evidently  not  from  a  similar  reason.  They 
are  excluded,  in  fact,  from  causes  now  obsolete  and 
merely  traditional;  the  custom  goes  back  to  the 
period  when  physical  force  was  the  basis  of  gov- 
ernment, and  when  woman  had  no  public  interests 
such  as  have  arisen  in  the  evolution  of  society.  Her 
social,  intellectual,  and  business  privileges  have 
changed;  her  political  privileges  still  lag  behind. 
If  an  intelligent  traveler  from  another  planet  could 
be  imagined  as  coming  to  visit  our  country  and 
study  its  institutions,  he  would  be  likely  to  say: 
"  One  thing  I  do  not  understand.  You  have  one 
large  class  of  persons,  possessing  those  qualities 
which  you  say  are  the  prerequisites  of  citizenship, 
and  involved  in  nearly  all  the  interests  which  citi- 
zenship seems  intended  to  protect;  and  yet  they 
are  excluded  from  the  chief  function  of  citizen- 
ship." It  is  for  those  who  are  able  to  do  so  (the  ar- 
gument concluded)  to  show  why  such  an  inconsis- 
tent condition  of  things  should  persist.  In  other 
words,  the  attempt  was  to  throw  back  the  logical 
burden  of  proof  upon  the  negative,  and  establish  a 
presumption  for  the  proposed  change. 


74  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

Opinions  will  of  course  differ  as  to  the  value  of 
these  different  lines  of  argument;  but  the  point  of 
Relation  of  illustration  is  simply  the  general  method 
aad™ega^*  pursued,  which  was  essentially  the  same 
tive-  in  all  of  them.    In  the  first  case  the  affir- 

mative tried  to  establish  the  presumption  by  show- 
ing that  its  own  side  was  really  that  of  existing 
conditions.  In  the  second  case  the  attempt  was 
to  do  the  same  thing  by  establishing  a  line  of 
tendency  made  up  of  analogous  conditions.  In 
the  third  case  the  attempt  was  to  show  the  in- 
trinsic reasonableness  of  the  proposition.  In  all 
the  cases  the  object  was  to  secure  a  favorable  atti- 
tude, on  the  part  of  those  addressed,  toward  the 
side  which  technically  had  the  presumption  against 
it.  Such  methods  are  of  no  little  value  in  the  hands 
of  those  who  find  themselves  called  upon  to  defend 
radical  or  unpopular  measures.  They  should  never, 
however,  be  used  to  the  exclusion  of  direct  proof, 
nor  be  made  an  excuse  for  shirking  that  permanent 
burden  of  proof  which  we  have  seen  always  remains 
on  one  side  of  the  controversy.  When  the  propo- 
sition laid  down  is  a  general  one,  the  afBrmative 
must  be  ready  to  show  particular  cases  in  which  it 
is  true,  and  explain  any  particular  cases  cited  in 
opposition.  When  a  plan  is  proposed  in  somewhat 
vague  terms,  they  must  accept  the  responsibility  of 
showing  particular  ways  in  which  it  could  be  car- 
ried  out.     Thus   if   the   question    favor   a   court 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF.  75 

of  arbitration,  they  must  describe  at  least  one  sort 
of  court  which  they  will  prove  practicable.  On 
the  other  hand,  they  have  their  choice  of  the  par- 
ticular instance  best  suited  to  their  purpose, — be 
it  one  out  of  a  hundred;  and  when  that  instance 
has  been  set  up,  the  burden  is  upon  the  negative 
to  attack  that.  If  we  reverse  the  question,  and  find 
the  affirmative  laying  down  the  proposition  that 
a  court  of  arbitration  is  inadvisable,  then  the  bur- 
den rests  upon  them  to  prove  this  true  for  all  pos- 
sible courts  of  arbitration;  they  are  under  no  obli- 
gation to  bring  instances,  but  upon  the  negative 
rests  the  responsibility  of  adducing  at  least  one  in- 
stance which  WiW  overthrow  che  general  presumption 
established  by  the  affirmative.  Thus  in  every  case 
the  affirmative  has  always  its  original  proposition 
to  prove.  No  jugglery  of  words,  as  has  already  been 
sai4,  should  be  allowed  to  enter  into  this  matter. 
A  good  debater  will  rarely  need  to  use  the  words 
"  burden  of  proof "  in  his  argument,  or  to  tell  his 
audience  that  he  has  been  trying  to  shift  the  bur- 
den upon  his  opponent;  he  will  shift  not  the  name 
but  the  reality,  by  making  his  case  so  clear  and 
strong  that  the  audience  will  be  carried  with  him. 
Then  his  opponent  will  see  for  himself  that  he  is 
under  the  obligation  to  recapture  his  ground. 

Briefly  to  recapitulate:  The  burden  of  proof  is, 
in  the  first  place,  the  obligation  resting  upon  the 
affirmative  to  prove  the  proposition  it  lays  down  at 


7^  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

the  outset, — an  obligation  which  it  never  escapeu; 
and,  in  the  second  place,  the  obligation  of  either 
disputant  to  produce  proof  at  any  moment  when, 
in  the  absence  of  such  proof,  the  other  side  would 
be  judged  to  be  in  the  right.  In  a  word,  it  is  simply 
the  demand  of  the  audience:  Show  your  proof,  if  we 
are  to  believe! 


METHODS    OF    PROOF. 

The  attempt  to  classify  processes  of  proof  has 
always  been  the  bugbear  of  students  of  argumen- 
tation. A  dozen  different  systems  of  classification 
have  been  thought  out  by  those  who  have  analyzed 
the  operations  of  the  reasoning  faculties  from  dif- 
ferent points  of  view.  Too  often  the  matter  has 
been  approached  merely  from  the  standpoint  of 
theory,  or  of  the  principles  of  logic,  rather  than 
from  that  of  the  practical  debater. 

It  is  natural  for  one  with  an  orderly  mind  to 
seek  to  analyze  and  classify  all  the  processes  that 
he  makes  use  of,  and  to  be  disturbed  if  he  cannot 
make  this  analysis  consistent  and  inclu-  au  Proof 
sive.       As  soon,  however,  as  one  makes  &^"^°*  _ 
the  attempt  with  methods  of  proof,  and  rience. 
begins  to  apply  his  system  to  the  various  examples 
that  occur  to  him,  a  hundred  difficulties  arise.   One 
sort  of  proof  seems  to  run  into  another;  a  piece  of 
reasoning  seems  to  be  inductive  from  one  point  of 
view,  and  deductive  from  another;   and  the  use  of 
the  simplest  sort  of  evidence  appears,  when  one 
considers  it  closely,  to  involve  processes  of  reason- 
ing which  are  commonly  thought  of  as  belonging 
to  complicated  arguments. 

77 


7S  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

The  difficulty  is  a  real  one.  The  various  names 
and  systems  which  have  been  invented  for 
these  things  are  in  fact  only  superficial,  and 
often  obscure  the  inner  likeness  of  all  meth- 
ods of  proof.  Reduced  to  its  lowest  terms,  all 
our  processes  of  reasoning,  great  and  small,  are 
simply  inferences  based  on  experience.  Sometimes 
the  inferences  are  so  rapid  that  we  do  not  realize 
that  the  process  has  taken  place,  as  when  we  hear 
a  voice  and  infer  that  a  man  speaking  is  the  cause 
of  the  sound;  whereas  sometimes  they  are  labored 
and  prolonged.  Sometimes,  again,  the  experience 
on  which  the  inference  is  based  is  limited,  and  the 
inference  therefore  uncertain,  as  when  we  infer  that 
a  man  will  tell  a  lie  because  we  knew  him  to  tell  one 
before;  while  at  other  times  the  experience  is  broad 
and  prolonged,  as  when  we  infer  from  innumerable 
instances  that  all  men  are  mortal.  All  testimony, 
when  used  as  proof,  is  based  on  the  inference,  from 
experience  of  greater  or  less  value,  that  the  witness 
is  able  and  willing  to  tell  the  truth;  all  argument 
from  authority  is  based  on  inference  of  a  similar 
kind;  while  of  course  such  argument  as  is  called 
"  proof  by  Example  "  or  "  by  Analogy  "  is  infer- 
ence from  experience  of  past  instances  similar  to 
the  one  in  question.  Even  the  distinction  between 
inductive  and  deductive  reasoning,  which  forms 
a  basis  for  the  study  of  logic,  is  only  a  matter  of 
the  point  of  view  taken,  and  cannot  be  applied  thor- 


METHODS  OF  PROOR  79 

oughly  in  comparing  various  practical  processes  of 
proof.  In  making  inductions  we  are  constantly 
using  deductions,  and  in  making  deductions  are 
using  inductions.  Indeed  the  great  fallacy  of  in- 
ductive argument  (mistaking  an  accompanying  or 
preceding  fact  for  a  cause)  is  a  form  of  the  so-called 
fallacy  of  "  post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc,''  which  is 
treated  in  deductive  logic  as  closely  connected  with 
the  fallacy  of  "  Begging  the  Question."  * 

Let  us,  then,  put  aside  for  our  present  purpose 
any  attempt  to  arrange  our  methods  of  proof  ac- 
cording to  a  perfectly  consistent  system,  by  which 
they  may  be  pigeon-holed  in  mutually  exclusive 
groups.  On  the  other  hand,  we  will  examine  all 
these  methods  from  the  standpoint  of  their  use  in 
practical  debate. 

We  have  already  seen  something  of  the  classes 
into  which  various  arguments  naturally  fall,  in  the 
discussion  of  debatable  subjects  in  courts  Establishing 
of  law  as  compared  with  general  debate  o^i'aots. 
(see  Chapter  II).  The  first  of  the  classes  was  that 
of  the  simple  establishing  of  facts.  This  is  what  the 
lawyer  does  at  the  opening  of  his  case,  and  he  does 
it  largely  by  the  calling  of  witnesses.  So  the  hand- 
ling of  testimony  is  in  a  sense  the  first  problem  of 
all  debate  where  the  facts  are  disputed,  or  where 
they  need  to  be  clearly  brought  out  as  a  basis  for 

•  For  a  clear  discussian  of  this  whole  question,  see  the  ad- 
mirable little  book  by  Sidgwick,  "  The  Process  of  Argument." 


So  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

argument.  The  witnesses  in  general  debate  may 
be  called  from  all  quarters  of  the  globe,  and  may  be 
private  citizens,  public  men,  newspapers,  or  merely 
common  rumor.  They  may,  of  course,  differ  very 
greatly  in  the  degree  to  which  their  testimony  can 
be  relied  upon,  and  the  great  point  in  the  use  of 
their  testimony  will  be  to  make  its  credibility  clear. 

This  credibility  will  depend,  first,  upon  the  abil- 
ity, and  secondly,  upon  the  wilHngness  of  the  wit- 
Oredibiuty  ^^^s  to  give  an  accurate  account  of  the 
of  Witnesses,  matter  under  consideration.  It  will  make 
no  little  difference  whether  the  matter  is  one  con- 
cerning which  any  reasonable  person  could  speak 
with  certainty,  or  whether  it  is  one  requiring  the 
skill  of  a  trained  observer;  whether — to  put  the 
same  thought  in  other  words — it  involves  one  of 
those  rapid  inferences  which  we  are  always  making 
in  commonplace  matters,  or  one  of  those  more  com- 
plicated inferences  (such  as  a  chemist  or  a  physician 
makes  in  analysis  or  diagnosis)  where  a  mistake  is 
easily  possible. 

Again,  it  will  make  a  difference  whether  the  wit- 
ness has  any  imaginable  interest  in  the  establish- 
ment of  the  fact  to  which  he  testifies.  Experience 
shows  that  the  most  honest  of  men  are  likely  to  see 
events  through  glasses  colored  by  their  prejudices 
and  interests,  and  that  one  who  investigates  a  mat- 
ter in  the  hope  of  finding  certain  facts  which  he 
wishes  to  make  known,  is  altogether  likely  to  see 


METHODS  OF  PROOF,  Si 

what  he  went  to  see.  So  if  an  admirer  of  the 
Cubans  goes  to  Cuba  on  a  trip,  and  is  followed  by 
one  who  has  no  liking  for  the  island  or  its  inhabi- 
tants, we  may  expect  that  on  their  return  they  will 
present  quite  different  reports,  even  on  matters  of 
fact.  Even  if  they  have  seen  just  the  same  things 
(and  it  is  not  probable  that  they  have,  not  having 
been  looking  for  them),  their  inferences  have  been 
different.  The  conflicting  reports  of  the  two  com- 
missions— the  Spanish  and  the  American — that 
investigated  the  destruction  of  the  battleship  Maine, 
both  having  the  same  facts  before  them,  present 
a  striking  example  of  this  tendency.  So  it  hap- 
pens that  if  a  witness  is  known  to  be  wholly  with- 
out interest  in  the  matter  to  which  he  testifies, — as 
when  a  scientist,  traveling  with  his  eyes  open  only 
to  scientific  truth,  describes  what  he  sees  in  Cuba 
or  the  Philippine  Islands, — the  testimony  has 
special  value.  And  further,  if  a  witness  gives 
merely  incidental  testimony,  with  no  thought  as 
to  its  bearing  on  any  disputed  matter,  or  if  he  gives 
merely  negative  testimony, — not  mentioning  a 
matter  which  he  would  naturally  mention  if  it  were 
known  to  him,  or  if  he  testifies  to  a  fact  which  is 
opposed  to  his  prejudice  or  his  interests,  the  testi- 
mony has  double  value  from  such  circumstances. 
The  principle  is  simply  that  testimony  is  strength- 
ened by  whatever  gives  us  reason  to  infer  that  the 


«a  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

fact  as  stated  is  an  accurate  representation  of  the 
fact  as  existent. 

These  are  some  of  the  rules  governing  the  value 
of  testimony,  which  are  the  result  simply  of  our 
--     ,  common  experience  with  witnesses  of  all 

Testimony  kinds.  In  the  procedure  of  courts  of 
^  ®  "■  *'  law  these,  and  many  others,  have  been  re- 
duced to  a  great  system  of  rules — rules  which,  like 
all  rules  of  law,  have  their  basis  in  common  judg- 
ment but  have  been  crystallized  into  an  artificial 
code  of  practice.  In  speaking  of  the  use  of  evi- 
dence in  general  debate,  the  only  point  requiring 
emphasis  is  that  the  value  of  testimony,  as  deter- 
mined by  means  of  common  judgment,  shall  be 
clearly  brought  out  in  the  course  of  argument.  A 
lawyer  has  ample  opportunity  to  do  this  in  con- 
nection with  the  giving  of  the  testimony;  by  ex- 
amination and  cross-examination  he  brings  out  all 
the  points  necessary  to  the  establishing  of  the  credi- 
bility of  his  witness.  But  a  debater  in  general  argu- 
ment has  no  such  opportunity;  he  cannot  summon 
witnesses  in  person,  but  must  quote  from  their  pub- 
lished utterances,  and  he  usually  has  much  less  time 
than  the  attorney  in  which  to  present  his  evidence. 
He  must  seek,  then,  in  the  very  moment  of  giving 
his  testimony,  to  show  in  a  dozen  words  why  it 
is  to  be  believed,  to  point  out  the  difference  be- 
tween testimony  of  a  flimsy  character,  based  on 
mere  rumor  or  newspaper  gossip,  and  that  derived 


METHODS  OF  PROOF,  83 

from  witnesses  of  capable  judgment  and  disinter- 
ested state  of  mind.  If  the  facts  of  the  case  are  in 
dispute,  or  if  their  presentation  is  essential  to  the 
proving  of  one's  proposition,  this  clear  setting  forth 
of  one's  testimony  may  be  the  critical  point  in  the 
argument.  Some  debaters  make  the  grave  error 
of  falling  back  upon  general  assertions,  instead  of 
being  prepared  to  mass  their  witnesses  when  a 
statement  is  questioned  by  the  other  side.  But 
mere  assertion  will  count  for  very  little  when  a 
fact  is  really  in  dispute. 

Expert  testimony,  so-called,  and  argument  from 
authority,  are  clearly  distinguished  in  legal  proof; 
the  one  dealing  with  matters  concerning  j,  ^»pg,_ 
which  testimony  is  being  taken,  the  other  timony  and 
with  matters  of  legal  interpretation  which  ^  °  y* 
have  been  judicially  decided.  In  general  debate, 
however,  the  two  are  very  similar.  We  have  al- 
ready seen  something,  in  Chapter  II.,  of  the  nature 
of  the  argument  from  authority.  In  this  case  the 
proof  consists  in  the  inference  that  the  authority 
cited  is  competent  to  speak  decisively  on  the  point 
in  question.  Such  authority  is,  then,  a  kind  of 
testimony.  We  are  more  likely,  however,  to  call 
it  "  expert  testimony  "  when  it  concerns  a  disputed 
fact, — as  when  we  give  the  opinion  of  a  scientist  or 
a  business  man  concerning  events  which  he  is  sup- 
posed from  his  position  to  understand  with  accuracy, 
^-and  "  authority "  when  it  concerns  inferences 


84  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

of  a  more  abstruse  character,  or  principles  on  whicH 
only  certain  authorities  have  the  rig-ht  to  speak.  A 
court,  then,  constitutes  an  authority  on  points  of 
law;  a  church  constitutes  an  authority  on  ecclesi- 
astical matters;  a  book  universally  accepted  as  the 
source  of  information  on  matters  within  its  province 
constitutes  an  authority  within  that  province — like 
the  United  States  Pharmacopeia,  for  example,  in 
matters  of  drugs.  All  such  authorities,  evidently, 
to  be  useful  for  purposes  of  proof,  must  be  recog- 
nized as  authoritative  by  those  for  whom  the  dis- 
puted point  is  to  be  proved.  A  Spanish  court  will 
exercise  no  authority  over  the  judgments  of 
American  lawyers;  a  Roman  Catholic  prelate  can- 
not affect  the  judgments  of  Protestants  on  points  of 
religion.  The  authority  must  be  respected,  or  its 
authority,  in  matters  of  opinion,  does  not  exist. 

It  was  remarked  in  an  earlier  chapter  that  the  use 
of  the  argument  from  authority  is  much  slighter 

in  general  debate  than  in  legal  discus- 
?f AntSy.  s^o^s-     There  are,  in  fact,  few  disputed 

matters  on  which  an  authority  can  be 
found,  recognized  by  all  whom  one  wishes  to  con- 
vince. In  the  matter  of  religion  and  theology,  for 
example,  there  is  no  general  authority  recognized 
as  existing  on  earth,  outside  the  particular  organs 
and  ofBcers  of  particular  churches.  The  right  of 
private  judgment  in  religion,  and  the  right  of  indi- 
vidual application  of  the  principles  of  religion  to 


METHODS  OF  PROOF.  85 

practical  conduct,  has  become  triumphant  in 
modern  civiHzation.  If,  then,  one  is  debating  a 
moral  question,  he  is  forced — except  for  a  general 
appeal  to  certain  fundamental  principles  of  Christi- 
anity or  ethics,  such  as  he  believes  his  audience 
accepts — -to  bring  proofs  bearing  on  the  particular 
case  in  dispute  and  appealing  to  the  private  judg- 
ments of  those  addressed.  He  not  only  can  no 
longer  appeal  to  the  church  to  declare  that  the  sun 
goes  round  the  earth,  but  he  cannof  appeal  to  it 
to  tell  certainly  what  is  right  and  wrong.  Men 
will  decide  according  to  their  own  consciences. 
And  this  is  only  one  illustration  of  the  decay  of  the 
argument  from  authority  in  modern  debate. 

On  the  other  hand,  wherever  the  question  in  dis- 
pute concerns  matters  in  a  particular  sphere  or 
organization,  and  there  is  in  that  sphere  „     ^, 

^  ,  ^  Use  of  Argxi- 

or  organization  an  authority  which  those  mentfrom 
engaged  in  the  dispute  are  bound  to  ^*  °"  ^' 
recognize,  the  argument  from  authority  still  has 
an  important  place.  Examples  are  to  be  found 
in  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  on  points  relating  to  our  constitu- 
tional law  (though  even  here  the  private  citizen 
does  not  hesitate  to  take  issue  with  the  court,  if 
he  is  sufficiently  venturesome);  in  the  rules  of  order 
or  by-laws  governing  various  parliamentary  bodies ; 
and  in  the  doctrines  and  practices  governing  par- 
ticular religious  sects.    Where  the  authority,  then, 


86  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

is  definitely  recognized,  the  task  of  the  debater  is 
to  make  clear  just  what  the  authority  declares, 
that  it  may  be  shown  to  have  the  effect  of  proof 
on  the  matter  in  hand.  It  is  here  in  good  part  that 
the  question  of  individual  skill  comes  in.  *'  In  legal 
argument,"  says  a  distinguished  lawyer,  "  where 
so  much  depends  upon  the  marshalling  of  pre- 
cedents, it  is  particularly  important  that  the  debater 
should  make  such  a  statement  of  his  authorities  as 
will  bring  out  with  clearness  tJie  phases  of  them 
which  it  is  to  his  interest  to  emphasised  And  it  is 
no  less  important,  when  authorities  are  involved, 
in  general  debate.  As  in  the  case  of  testimony,  the 
debater  usually  has  less  time  than  the  lawyer  in 
which  to  develop  his  authority.  To  quote  exten- 
sively will  not  only  waste  time,  but  to  the  average 
audience  will  be  obscure  and  uninteresting.  Much 
depends,  therefore,  on  the  rapid  bringing  out  of  the 
points  of  authority  which  are  essential  to  the  mat- 
ter in  dispute.  When  these  points  can  be  obtained, 
they  are  among  the  debater's  most  powerful 
weapons. 

The  third  class  of  proof  into  which  we  divided 
legal  argument  was  that  of  processes  of  reasoning 
Processes  of  applied  to  the  facts  obtained.  This  sort  of 
Eeaaoning.  proof  is  no  morc  truly  a  matter  of  in- 
ference than  the  direct  use  of  testimony  or  author- 
ity, but  it  involves  inferences  of  a  more  elaborate 
and  appreciable  character.    Let  us  consider  these 


^  METHODS  OF  PROOF.  87 

processes  according  as  they  are  based  on  matters 
before  the  fact  in  dispute,  or  on  matters  after  the 
fact. 

By  matters  before  the  fact  in  dispute  are  meant 
those  circumstances  leading  up  to  the  point  under 
discussion,  which,  when  the  time  of  the  a  priori 
disputed  event  is  past,  are  examined  as  Evidence, 
throwing  some  light  upon  that  event.  Of  these  the 
most  important  are  those  which  may  have  been  the 
causes  of  the  disputed  fact.  Argument  based  on 
these  has  commonly  been  called  argument  from 
"  Antecedent  ProbabiHty,"  since  the  method  of  its 
use  is  to  show  that  the  event  was  possible  or  prob- 
able, on  the  ground  that  there  was  sufficient  cause 
to  produce  it.  The  great  example  of  this  method 
of  proof  is  found  in  the  proof  of  motive  in  criminal 
cases.  If  B  has  been  murdered,  and  A  is  accused 
of  the  crime,  the  first  effort  of  the  prosecution  is 
to  show  that  A  had  some  motive  in  committing  the 
crime.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  he  bore  an  old 
grudge  against  B,  that  B  was  aware  of  secrets 
which  it  was  to  A*s  interest  not  to  have  revealed, 
or  that  A  would  profit  by  the  property  of  B  at  his 
"death,  then  an  aspect  of  probability  is  thrown  about 
the  charge.  The  object  of  the  argument  is  to  carry 
the  minds  of  the  jury  to  the  moment  immediately 
preceding  the  crime,  and  make  them  see  that  at 
that  moment  it  was  not  unlikely  that  it  would  be 
committed  by  the  accused  person,  if  it  was  to  be 


SB  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

committed  at  all.  In  like  manner,  after  an  acci- 
dent to  a  railroad  bridge,  the  attempt  might  be 
made  to  prove  that  the  bridge  was  imperfectly  con- 
sftructed,  not  only  from  the  fact  of  the  accident,  but 
from  facts  previous  to  the  completion  of  the  struc- 
ture which  would  indicate  such  negHgence  on  the 
part  of  the  builders  as  to  lead  to  faulty  construc- 
tion. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  value  of  this  sort  of 
proof  is  wholly  of  a  preparatory  and  corroborative 
Value  of  character.  Standing  by  itself,  the  proof 
fecelnt^"  ^^  antecedent  probability  is  absolutely 
Probability,  worthless.  No  matter  how  many  circum- 
stances combine  to  make  it  probable  that  A  will 
murder  B,  no  one  will  bring  A  to  trial  if  there  is 
no  evidence  that  B  has  been  murdered.  Nor  will 
any  one  sue  a  builder  on  the  ground  of  negHgence, 
if  there  is  no  proof  of  actual  fault  in  his  work. 
Such  proof  is  also  worthless  if  there  is  a  single 
piece  of  strong  evidence  on  the  other  side.  If  A 
is  shown  to  have  been  absent  from  the  town  where 
the  murder  was  committed,  at  the  time  of  its  oc- 
currence, no  amount  of  proof  of  motive  will  have 
any  weig^ht  against  him.  But  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  to  be  noticed  that  proof  of  antecedent  proba- 
bility is  a  very  valuable  accessory  to  other  sorts  of 
proof,  when  the  other  proof  is  of  a  doubtful  charac- 
ter. Without  the  most  positive  evidence  against 
him,  it  is  difficult  to  convict  a  man  of  a  serious 


METHODS  OF  PROOF.  89 

crime  if  no  motive  for  it  can  be  shown.  Such 
proof  is  valuable,  too,  not  only  as  being  corrobora- 
tive of  direct  evidence,  but  as  preparing-  the  way 
for  such  evidence  in  the  mind.  Predisposed  opin- 
ions have  such  weight  that  it  is  difficult  to  persuade 
men  to  believe  even  direct  evidence,  if  they  are  con- 
vinced of  its  antecedent  improbabiHty.  A  striking 
example  of  this  is  the  general  disbelief  in  miracles 
and  other  alleged  supernatural  events.  Most 
people  do  not  take  the  trouble  even  to  investigate 
such  events  when  reports  of  them  are  circulated, 
and  do  not  credit  even  what  seems  to  be  the  evi- 
dence of  their  own  eyes,  because  they  are  so  firmly 
convinced  of  the  improbability  of  supernatural  oc- 
currences. If  they  could  once  be  convinced  that 
such  things  were  antecedently  reasonable,  that 
there  was  adequate  cause  for  them  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  universe  or  the  peculiar  circumstances 
preceding  their  manifestation,  it  would  be  much 
easier  to  persuade  them  that  the  evidence  was  good. 
Advertisers  of  proprietary  medicines  make  use  of 
the  same  principle.  Before  presenting  testimonies 
of  cures,  they  make  it  plain  why  their  particular 
remedy  may  be  expected  to  cure  such  and  such 
diseases,  from  the  nature  of  both  disease  and  rem- 
edy; after  the  reasonableness  of  cure  has  been  indi- 
cated, testimony  of  cure  is  more  readily  received. 
This  suggests  a  somewhat  wider  use  of  the  argu- 


90  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

ment  from  antecedent  probability  than  the  proof 
Antecedent  which  IS  based  simpIy  on  an  adequate 
fn  GeS  c^^se  for  an  alleged  effect.  The  method 
Debate.  may  be  used  in  general,  to  show  that  what 
one  wishes  to  prove  true  is  theoretically  possible 
or  probable,  that  it  conforms  to  known  laws,  that 
it  is  likely  to  be  true.  Such  proof  is  widely  service- 
able. In  debating  economic  problems,  for  exam- 
ple, one  may  show  that  the  alleged  fact,  if  it  can 
be  proved  to  exist,  will  be  in  conformity  with  some 
recognized  economic  law.  Or  in  proving  a  politi- 
cal proposition  one  may  use  the  doctrines  of 
authorities  on  political  science  to  show  that  the 
proposition  is  likely  to  be  true,  and  thus — in  a  sense 
— make  the  argument  from  authority  a  proof  of 
antecedent  probability.  Proof  of  some  hypotheses, 
indeed,  like  that  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  is 
based  almost  entirely  on  this  method-  of  demonstra- 
tion, and  never  reaches  beyond  the  point  of  show- 
ing that  the  matter  in  question  is  likely  to  be  true. 

Another  sort  of  proof  dependent  on  reasoning 
from  matters  before  the  fact  in  dispute,  is  that  from 
Analogy  or  analogy  or  example.  In  a  certain  sense 
Example.  t^ig  method  of  proof  runs  through  all  the 
methods  we  have  discussed  or  can  discuss;  for 
since  all  proof  is  a  matter  of  inference  based  on 
experience,  we  must  base  our  proofs  on  the  resem- 
blance between  the  disputed  matter  and  similar 
matters  which  have  come  within  the  range  of  our 


METHODS  OF  PROOF,  91 

experience.  Thus  the  inference  that  a  voice  in- 
dicates a  person  speaking,  or  that  a  smoke  indicates 
fire,  is  based  on  a  number  of  examples  running 
through  all  our  past  experience,  so  numerous 
and  orderly  as  to  amount  to  actual  demonstration. 
If  the  proof  is  based  on  only  one  or  two  examples, 
or  on  a  resemblance  so  slight  as  to  deserve  no  better 
name  than  analogy,  we  then  say  that  the  existing  re- 
semblance indicates  a  certain  likelihood  or  proba- 
bility that  the  fact  in  dispute  will  correspond  to  the 
similar  fact  of  experience.  Thus  if  a  man  has  acted 
in  a  particular  way  under  certain  circumstances,  we 
may  argue  that  under  similar  circumstances  he 
will  act  in  a  similar  way.  If  the  circumstances  of 
a  murder  are  similar  to  those  of  another  murder 
occurring  some  time  before,  we  may  argue  that 
the  guilty  person  may  be  discovered  in  a  man- 
ner similar  to  that  previously  employed.  If  the 
condition  of  a  country,  economic  or  political, 
closely  resembles  that  of  another  country  in  a 
period  known  to  historians,  we  may  use  the  history 
of  the  other  country  to  prove  what  we  wish  about 
the  modern  condition, — that  is,  as  Patrick  Henry 
said,  we  may  judge  of  the  future  by  the  lamp  of 
the  past.  In  all  these  cases  we  infer  from  similar 
conditions  that  similar  causes  are  or  have  been  at 
work,  and  will  be  likely  to  produce,  or  to  have  pro- 
duced, similar  results. 

The  weakest  form  of  this  argument,  the  argu- 


92  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

ment  from  analogy,  is  frequently  abused.  Many 
Abuse  of  debaters  in  fact  mistake  a  mere  illustra- 
Anaiogy.  ^[on  for  a  proof.  That  this  mistake  is  a 
very  old  one  is  shown  by  some  remarks  of  Sir  Philip 
Sidney  in  his  "  Defense  of  Poesy  ": 

"  The  force  of  a  similitude,"  he  said,  "  not  being  to 
prove  anything  to  a  contrary  disputer,  but  only  to  ex- 
plain to  a  willing  hearer,  the  rest  is  a  most  tedious  prat- 
tling: rather  over-swaying  the  memory  from  the  pur- 
pose whereto  they  were  applied,  than  any  whit  inform- 
ing the  judgment,  already  either  satisfied  or  by  simili- 
tudes not  to  be  satisfied." 

The  same  thought  was  suggested  by  George 
Eliot,  in  connection  with  Mr.  Stelling's  ''  favorite 
metaphor,  that  the  classics  and  geometry  consti- 
tuted that  culture  of  the  mind  which  prepared  it  for 
the  reception  of  any  subsequent  crop." 

"  It  is  astonishing,"  she  observed,  "  what  a  different 
result  one  gets  by  changing  the  metaphor!  Once  call 
the  brain  an  intellectual  stomach,  and  one's  ingenious 
conception  of  the  classics  and  geometry  as  plows  and 
harrows  seems  to  settle  nothing„  But  then  it  is  open 
to  some  one  else  to  follow  great  authorities,  and  call 
the  mind  a  sheet  of  white  paper  or  a  mirror,  in  which 
case  one's  knowledge  of  the  digestive  process  becomes 
quite  irrelevant.  It  was  doubtless  an  ingenious  idea 
to  call  the  camel  the  ship  of  the  desert,  but  it  would 
hardly  lead  one  far  in  training  that  useful  beast." 

Resemblances,  then,  may  illuminate  an  argument 


METHODS  OF  PROOF.  93 

when  they  admittedly  indicate  that  similar  princi" 
pies  are  involved;  otherwise  they  are  mere  rhetori- 
cal embellishments.  In  a  debate  on  the  prohibition 
of  the  liquor  traffic  the  advocate  of  prohibition 
compared  the  liquor  traffic  to  a  deadly  upas-tree, 
and  urged  that  the  only  thing  to  do  with  such  a 
tree  was,  not  to  trim  it  or  fence  it,  but  to  cut  it 
down;  this  indicated  the  method  of  prohibition. 
His  opponent  replied  that,  while  it  might  be  a 
good  plan  to  cut  down  the  tree,  a  great  tree  cannot 
be  felled  at  a  stroke,  but  that  one  must  chop  a  little 
on  one  side,  then  a  little  on  the  other,  and  that 
a  long  period  of  maneuvering  is  necessary  be- 
fore the  fall  of  the  tree  can  be  accomplished. 
The  impression  produced  was  that  the  second 
speaker  had  the  best  of  the  argument.  He  had  in 
fact  made  use  of  a  rhetorical  opportunity,  such  as 
hastily  chosen  illustrations  will  commonly  afford; 
but  neither  speaker  had  done  anything  by  way  of 
proof.  The  first  one  had  illustrated  the  principle 
that  an  admitted  evil  is  to  be  destroyed  if  possible; 
the  second  had  illustrated  the  principle  that  evils 
cannot  always  be  destroyed  at  a  single  blow.  Both 
principles  were  perfectly  obvious;  the  question  as 
to  which  of  them  applied  to  the  Hquor  traffic  in 
the  particular  community  concerned,  was  still  un- 
touched. 

These  are  some  of  the  methods  of  argument 
based  on  matters  before  the  fact  in  dispute.    They 


94  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

are  often  valuable  as  introductory  to  more  direct 
proof,  in  order  to  prepare  one's  hearers  for  such 
proof  and  to  indicate  that  one's  proposition  is  rea- 
sonable and  probable;  they  are  rarely  of  value 
standing  by  themselves.  We  now  turn  to  proof 
based  on  matters  after  the  fact  in  dispute. 

Corresponding  to  the  argument  from  antecedent 
probability,  which  attempts  to  show  the  probability 
A  posteriori  ^f  an  event  by  pointing  out  causes  likely 
Evidence.  to  producc  it,  is  the  argument  which 
points  out  effects  likely  to  have  been  produced  by 
the  event  in  question.  This  is  a  safer  method  of 
proof  than  the  former,  since  it  is  easier  to  see  the 
cause  of  an  effect  than  to  predict  an  effect  from  a 
cause.  If  a  man  has  been  shot  we  know  that  some- 
one shot  him,  but  if  a  man  has  fired  a  shot  we  can- 
not say  certainly  that  it  took  effect.  Or,  if  an  act 
has  been  accomplished  we  know  there  was  a  motive 
back  of  it,  but  we  cannot  be  so  sure  that  a  motive 
will  be  completed  in  action.  Proofs  arising  from 
facts  appearing  after  the  disputed  event,  indicating 
the  disputed  event  as  their  cause,  are  therefore 
among  the  most  highly  valued  methods  of  argu- 
ment. They  are  frequently  called  arguments  from 
"  Sign,"  the  effect  being  regarded  as  the  sign  of 
the  cause. 

Thus  in  a  trial  for  murder,  all  the  facts  relating 
to  the  accused  person  after  the  occurrence  of  the 
crime  belong  to  proofs  of  this  class.    The  fact  that 


METHODS  OF  PROOF,  95 

the  accused  was  found  with  a  smoking  pistol  in 
his  hand,  that  there  was  blood  upon  his  garments, 
that  footprints  near  the  place  of  the  murder  cor- 
respond with  the  shape  of  his  shoe,  that  he  hid 
himself  and  showed  consciousness  of  guilt, — all 
these  are  effects  indicating  his  guilt  as  the  cause. 
Or,  in  a  suit  based  on  criminal  negligence  in  a  rail- 
road accident,  evidence  drawn  from  the  condition 
of  the  track  where  the  accident  occurred,  or  from 
the  condition  of  the  signals  in  a  switching-tower, 
would  be  effects  indicating  criminal  negligence  as 
their  cause.  The  same  sort  of  proof  is  common  in 
all  kinds  of  debate.  The  use  of  statistics  furnishes 
a  familiar  example.  In  order  to  prove  that  a  cer- 
tain tariff  or  monetary  system  has  been  beneficial 
to  the  country,  statistics  are  quoted  showing  in- 
creased prosperity  in  the  years  following  the  time 
when  the  system  in  question  took  effect.  Such 
facts  indicate  the  beneficial  operation  of  the  law 
as  the  cause  of  the  increased  prosperity. 

But  this  method  of  proof,  while  it  is  more  to  be 
relied  upon  than  proof  from  antecedent  probability, 
yet  has  marked  limitations.      It  will  al-  Limitationa 
ready  have  occurred  to  the  reader  that  the  ^'I^^f^™" 
examples  just  given  belong  to  that  sort  of  ETidenoe. 
proof  which  is  called  "  circumstantial  evidence; " 
and  the  danger  of  relying  too  impHcitly  on  such 
evidence  has  passed  into  a  proverb.    Much  hesita- 
tion is  felt  in  convicting  a  man  of  a  crime  on  cir- 


96  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

cumstantial  evidence  alone.  Some  striking  works 
of  fiction,  such  as  Miss  Green's  *'  Leavenworth 
Case "  and  Miss  Woolson's  "  Anne,"  have  been 
written  to  illustrate  the  danger  of  such  judgments. 
The  source  of  the  danger  is  evident  on  a  moment's 
thought.  This  method  of  proof  is  based  on  two  as- 
sumptions: first,  that  the  alleged  fact  was  of  itself 
sufficient  to  be  a  cause  of  the  known  fact;  and 
second,  that  there  was  no  other  fact,  existent  at  the 
same  time,  which  may  have  been  sufficient  cau;->e 
of  the  known  fact.  These  assumptions,  espe- 
cially the  second,  are  difficult  of  certain  proof. 
Men  have  therefore  been  convicted  of  crime  cm 
the  ground  that  known  facts  could  be  accounted 
for  only  by  their  guilt,  and  other  facts  have  after- 
ward been  discovered  which  were  ample  to  account 
for  the  facts  first  known,  without  the  assumption 
of  guilt.  The  difficulty  is  to  prove  so  large  a  nega- 
tive as  the  statement  that  there  are  no  other  possible 
causes  than  the  one  alleged.  The  same  difficulty  is 
strongly  felt  in  general  debate.  It  forms  the  chief 
hindrance  to  the  use  of  statistics  in  such  arguments 
as  those  indicated  a  moment  ago.  If  one  is  to  prove 
that  the  prosperity  of  a  given  year  was  due  to  a 
certain  tariff  law  passed  the  year  previous,  he  must, 
theoretically,  be  prepared  to  show  that  there  was 
no  other  cause  operating  to  produce  the  prosper- 
ity, as  well  as  that  the  law  in  question  was  com- 
petent to  produce  it.    But  in  public  affairs  all  man- 


METHODS  OF  PROOF,  97 

ner  of  causes  and  effects  are  almost  inextricably 
interwoven,  so  that  it  is  a  serious  task  to  trace  out 
any  one  event  or  force  to  its  own  particular  conse- 
quences. Students  of  natural  science,  in  order  to 
study  cause  and  effect,  arrange  materials  so  as  to 
isolate  the  particular  event  under  investigation 
from  all  concomitant  circumstances,  and  perform 
original  experiments  in  order  to  test  their  theories. 
But  students  of  economic  and  political  laws  cannot 
ordinarily  do  anything  of  this  kind.  Such  diffi- 
culties are  so  well  recognized  that  many  economists 
confine  their  proofs  almost  entirely  to  the  range 
of  theory, — that  is,  of  antecedent  probability, — de- 
clining to  give  evidence  drawn  from  concrete  facts. 
l^his,  however,  of  course  imperils  the  convincing- 
ness of  their  arguments.  It  is  usually  dangerous 
to  let  either  the  argument  from  cause  or  that  from 
effect  go  without  the  support  of  the  other.  If 
antecedent  probability  and  sign  agree,  one's  case 
will  be  strong. 

Thus  far  we  have  been  considering  methods  of 
proof  most  clearly  applicable  to  questions  of  dis- 
puted fact;  questions,  that  is,  in  which 
inferences  are  to  be  drawn  from  one  ^^^^^^^ 
fact  to  another.  Beyond  these  are 
the  more  complicated  problems  of  interpreta- 
tion and  application.  Such  problems,  however, 
when  analyzed,  are  found  to  depend  upon 
such  simple  processes  as  we  have  already  consid- 


98  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

ered.     If  one  can  establish  the  general  principles 
on  which  one's  case  must  be  decided,  and  if  one  can 
then  search  out  and  establish  the  essential  facts 
that  belong  to  it,  the  rest  is  simply  that  application 
of  facts  to  principles  which  any  normal  mind  can  be 
trusted  to  make.     This  is  the  sort  of  reasoning  that 
is  expressed  in  the  syllogism.     When  one  says  that 
all  men  are  mortal  and  that  A  is  a  man,  it  only 
requires  that  the  two  facts  shall  be  set  forth  so  as 
to  be  readily  compared,  in  order  to  have  it  believed 
that  A  is  mortal.    In  like  manner,  if  one  shows  from 
the  Constitution  that  an  ex  post  facto  law  is  for- 
bidden, and  then,  from  an  analysis  of  its  text,  that 
a  given  law  is  an  ex  post  facto  law,  the  conclusion 
is  plain.     The  third  term  of  the  syllogism  never 
needs  to  be  proved.    The  great  task  of  the  debater, 
then,  is  to  set  forth  the  principles  and  the  facts  at 
issue  in  such  a  manner  that  their  relations  are  per- 
fectly clear  and  that  the  minds  of  those  addressed 
will  proceed  naturally  to  the  conclusion. 

Something  should  be  said  of  methods  of  proof 
in  questions  of  policy,  beyond  what  was  suggested 
Proofin  regarding  them  in  the  chapter  on  De- 
Questions  of  batable  Questions.  Such  questions  dif- 
°^°^'  fer  from  those  involving  legal  discussion, 
because  they  are  directed  not  to  the  past  or  present, 
but  to  the  future.  If  one  argues  for  the  adoption 
of  a  certain  law,  the  election  of  a  certain  can- 
didate,   or    the   acceptance    of   a    certain    line    of 


METHODS  OF  PROOF.  99 

conduct,  he  is  dealing  with  issues  not  yet  reached, 
and  to  which  the  rules  of  evidence  applicable  to  past 
events  cannot  be  directly  applied.  Yet  the  proof  of 
facts  is  almost  always  involved.  The  choice  of 
the  candidate  will  depend  on  proof  as  to  his 
career  in  the  past;  the  passage  of  the  tariff  law  will 
depend  in  part  upon  what  can  be  shown  of  the  ef- 
fect of  previous  tariff  laws;  the  adoption  of  a  line 
of  conduct  will  depend  on  the  fact  that  others  have 
prospered  by  its  adoption.  These  questions  of 
policy,  as  was  hinted  in  the  former  chapter,  com- 
monly depend  first  upon  principle,  secondly  upon 
interest.  The  task  is  to  show  that  a  given  proposi- 
tion is  theoretically  just  or  reasonable,  and  then 
that  it  will  be  practically  useful.  This  may  be  com- 
pared with  the  method  of  proof  based  on  matters 
before  the  fact  and  that  based  on  matters  after  the 
fact.  In  other  words,  one  will  seek  first  to  show 
the  antecedent  reasonableness  of  the  policy,  before 
giving  evidence  of  its  probable  success.  The  rea- 
sons for  doing  this  will  be  the  same  that  lead  one 
to  use  the  argument  from  antecedent  probability 
on  questions  of  disputed  fact.  The  effort  is  really 
to  raise,  at  the  outset,  a  presumption  in  favor  of 
one's  case.  We  may  recall  the  examples  suggested, 
in  the  last  chapter,  of  arguments  in  which  such  an 
effort  was  made.  Thus  in  the  argument  on 
woman's  suffrage  the  effort  was  to  show,  in  the 
first  place,  that  the  adoption  of  woman's  suffrage 


xoo  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

would  be  on  the  face  of  it  reasonable  and  natural, 
in  consideration  of  the  theories  of  government  held 
in  a  republic  like  our  own;  then,  in  the  second 
place,  to  show  that  the  evidence  of  experience  fav- 
ored the  plan,  as  beneficial  to  the  state  and  its  in- 
terests. This  general  method  of  proof,  two-fold 
in  its  form,  is  applicable  to  all  sorts  of  debatable 
questions.  The  general  development  of  the  argu- 
ment will  be,  (i)  The  proposition  is  likely  to  be  true; 
(2)  It  is  true  as  shown  by  the  facts  in  the  particular 
case  examined;  and  we  may  add,  (3)  It  will  be  true 
in  all  corresponding  cases. 

Let  us  further  illustrate  these  various  methods 
Typical         qI  proof  by  a  number  of  typical  outlines, 

Bohemesof  ...  ,  r       , 

Proof.  suggestive  of  the  general  manner  of  set- 

ting about  the  preparation  of  argument. 

(I.) 
A  is  guilty  of  crime. 

I.  He  committed  the  act  charged. 

1.  It    was    antecedently    probable    that    he 
should  do  so. 

a)  Facts  that  were  competent  causes, 
h)  Facts  drawn  from  similar  cases. 

2.  He  is  shown  to  have  done  so. 
a)  Direct  testimony. 

h)  Facts  that  are  effects. 

II.  The  law  makes  this  act  a  crime. 

1.  There  is  every  reason  why  it  should  (moral 
reasons). 

2.  Such  and  such  a  statute  makes  it  a  crime. 


METHODS  OF  PROQF  ;    '  ,  '  \i<>%  ' 

d)  It  makes  " x"  a  crime. 
h)  This  act  is  "  x." 

i.  Authority  in  similar  cases. 

(II.) 

The  proposed  plan  should  he  adopted. 

I.  It  is  antecedently  reasonable. 

1.  It  is  in  accordance  with  precedent. 

2.  It  is  just  (i.e.,  in  accordance  with  prin- 
ciple). 

3.  It  is  favored  by  A,  B  and  C 

II.  It  is  expedient. 

1.  It  meets  existing  needs. 

a)  X  is  needed. 

a')  It  will  supply  x. 

b)  y  is  needed. 

b')  It  will  supply  y. 

2.  It  has  worked  well  elsewhere, 
o)  Testimony. 

3.  The  effects  will  be  good 

a)  upon  the  interests  oi  x; 

b)  upon  the  interests  of  y. 

III.  There  is  no  better  plan. 

1.  .«•  is  not  better. 

2.  y  is  not  better. 

Such  outhnes  as  (I.)  and  (II.)  evidently  involve 
the  syllogistic  type  of  argument  for  the  establish- 
ment of  certain  of  their  parts.  Particular  types  of 
proof  in  syllogistic  form  are  as. follows: 


**S'  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

(III.) 

A  is  commendable. 

1.  ;r  is  commendable,  and 
i'.  ;r  is  characteristic  of  A. 

2.  y  is  commendable,  and 
2'.  y  is  characteristic  of  A. 

etc. 

(IV.) 
Evils  exist. 

1.  X  exists. 

2.  X  is  an  evil. 

etc. 
(V.) 

A  is  a  case  coming  under  the  law  x, 

1.  The  law  x  covers  0,  />,  and  q. 

2.  A  involves  0  (p,  or  q). 

Again,  we  may  invert  any  of  these  types  for  thtf 
purpose  of  proving  a  negative.  Thus  (II.)  inverted 
would  become 

(VI.) 
X  should  not  be  adopted. 

I.  It  is  unreasonable. 

1.  Contrary  to  precedent. 

2.  Contrary  to  principle. 

3.  In  disfavor. 

II.  It  is  inexpedient. 

1.  Meets  no  existing  needs. 

a)  It  seems  to  be  intended  to  meet  a, 

b)  But  a  is  not  needed. 

2.  Has  proved  unsuccessful. 
a)  Testimony. 


METHODS  OF  PROOF,  103 

3.  Effects  would  be  evil 
o)  upon  the  interests  of  A; 
h)  upon  the  interests  of  B. 
III.  There  is  a  better  plan. 
I.  3;  is  better. 
Finally,  we  may  arrange  the  proof  in  such  a  way 
that  all  parts  of  it  relating  to  general  conditions 
may  be  treated  together,  as  introductory,  and  all 
parts  relating  to  the  particular  case  in  dispute  in 
a  second  division.    By  such  a  method  the  full  na- 
ture of  the  proof,  perhaps  of  the  proposition  itself, 
is  reserved  with  a  sort  of  cumulative  effect.    Such 
a  plan  might  take  t'he  form  of 

(VII.) 

I.  In  a  case  like  the  present  the  true  proposition 
must 

1.  Conform  to  the  principle  x. 

2.  Be  consistent  with  precedent. 

3.  Meet  existing  needs,  such  as  a,  b  and  c, 

4.  Have  proved  successful  where  tried. 

5.  Satisfy  the  interests  of  A,  B  and  C. 

6.  Explain  all  the  facts  in  the  case. 

II.  The  proposition  in  question 

1.  Violates  the  principle  x. 

2.  Is  inconsistent  with  precedent. 

3.  Does  not  meet  needs  such  as  fl,  b  and  c. 

4.  Has  proved  unsuccessful  where  tried. 

5.  Is  opposed  to  the  interests  of  A,  B  and  C. 

6.  Fails  to  explain  facts  x,  y  and  2. 

It  is  of  course  quite  impracticable  to  suggest  in 
this  way  all  possible  types  of  choice  and  arrange- 


I04  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

ment  of  proof.  It  is  sufficient  to  show  how  a  few 
such  outlines  indicate  the  general  methods  which 
may  most  conveniently  be  followed  in  the  demon- 
stration of  ordinary  propositions.  The  particular 
case  must  always  determine  how  the  methods  are 
to  be  chosen  and  combined.  The  analysis  of  the 
question  will  show  just  what  must  be  proved;  one 
may  then  apply  the  means  of  proof  described  in 
this  chapter  to  the  thing  to  be  proved  and  the 
audience  to  be  addressed.  To  do  this  successfully 
one  may  ask  himself  these  questions:  What  facts 
must  I  estabHsh?  By  w'hat  witnesses  can  I  estab- 
lish them?  Can  I  cite  any  accepted  authority  in 
my  behalf?  How  can  I  show  the  antecedent  rea- 
sonableness of  my  proposition?  What  evidence 
can  I  adduce  that  can  be  explained  in  no  other  way 
than  by  the  truth  of  my  proposition?  And — if  the 
question  be  one  of  policy, — how  can  I  show  that 
the  proposition  conforms  to  the  principles  in  which 
my  hearers  believe,  and  to  the  interests  which  most 
concern  them? 

These,  then,  are  the  common  methods  of  proof. 
But  a  word  of  caution  must  be  said  against  the 
assumption  that  when  one  has  found  a  method  of 
proof  he  has  really  proved  his  case.  Processes  of 
reasoning,  keenly  devised,  are  all  very  well;  but 
they  must  ultimately  rest  upon  facts.  To  have 
these  facts  at  his  command  is  the  business  of  the 
debater.     No  mistake  is  more  common,  among 


METHODS  OF  PROOF.  105 

young  debaters,  than  the  habit  of  making  many  as- 
sertions which,  if  true,  would  no  doubt  prove  their 
case,  but  which  are  not  backed  up  by  evidence. 
Many  a  speech  which  seems  to  contain  a  good  deal 
of  material  can  really  be  reduced  to  a  series  of 
statements  of  the  speaker's  opinions  about  the  sub- 
ject. But  the  very  fact  that  the  subject  is  debated 
indicates,  of  course,  that  something  more  than 
opinions  must  be  shown. 

It  will  pay,  then,  to  be  honest  with  one's  self, 
and  consider  carefully  what  can  be  proved  conclu- 
sively for  one's  case,  what  can  be  proved 
only  to  a  certain  degree  of  probability,  and  °^®"y' 
what  cannot  be  proved  at  all.  One  need  not  con- 
fess all  the  weaknesses  of  his  case  to  his  hear- 
ers; but  when  one  is  speaking  from  conviction,  it 
may  be  well  to  remember  that  other  people's  con- 
victions ought  naturally  to  be  established  on  no 
better  and  no  worse  foundations  than  one's  own. 
The  proof  that  is  sufficient  for  an  honest  speaker 
ought  to  suffice  for  an  honest  hearer.  There  is  no 
need  of  asserting  roundly  what  is  after  all  only  a 
probability  or  a  guess.  It  gives  one's  opponent 
fine  opportunity  to  trip  one  up.  It  is  true  that  all 
proof  is  in  a  sense  only  an  approximation  to  cer- 
tainty; but  if  the  certainty  of  the  hearer  can  be 
made  equal  to  the  honest  certainty  of  the  speaker, 
and  brought  to  the  point  of  the  desired  action,  that 
is  enough. 


VI. 

METHODS    OF    REFUTATION. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  the  subject  of  proof 
almost  entirely  on  its  positive  side:  given  a  propo- 
Whatisto      sition,  how  to  demonstrate  the  truth  of 

the^^o'Ste  ^^^  ^^^  ^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^  debatable  sub- 
Side?  ject  there  must  always  be  in  mind  the 
other  side  of  one's  task:  namely,  how  to  demon- 
strate the  error  of  the  opposite  proposition.  When 
one  has  the  negative  side,  indeed, — the  opposite 
side  from  that  on  which  the  burden  of  proof  chiefly 
rests, — refutation  constitutes  the  great  part  of 
one's  work.  And  it  has  already  been  remarked, 
in  the  chapter  on  Preliminary  Work,  that  the  study 
of  both  sides  of  the  question,  and  of  what  is  nec- 
essary to  be  said  on  one  side  in  refutation  of  the 
other,  is  an  indispensable  part  of  the  preliminary 
analysis.  Before  entering  upon  debate,  there- 
fore, the  well-prepared  disputant  will  have  deter- 
mined just  what  position  he  will  take  regarding 
every  probable  argument  of  his  opponent,  quite  as 
definitely  as  he  will  have  determined  what  direct 
proof  he  will  offer  for  himself. 

The  outline  of  various  methods  of  proof,  as  given 

in  the  preceding  chapter,  has  already  indicated,  by 

xo6 


METHODS   OF  REFUTATION.  107 

implication,  the  methods  which  are  naturally  to  be 
employed  in  refutation.  To  refute  an  argument 
one  must  simply  understand  its  weak  points  and 
aim  at  them.  If  no  weak  points  can  be  found,  it 
must  be  shown  that  the  argument — though  per- 
haps good  in  itself — is  insufficient  to  prove  the 
main  proposition  in  dispute.  The  place  and  order 
in  which  this  refutation  will  be  undertaken  are  mat- 
ters that  we  must  consider  a  little  later.  For  the 
present  it  will  be  well  briefly  to  reconsider  the  vari- 
ous methods  of  proof,  having  in  mind  the  manner 
in  which  they  are  open  to  attack. 

The  first  division  of  proof  was  that  relating  to 
the  simple  establishing  of  the  facts  in  the  case,  and 
this  was  seen  to  be  done  largely  by  the  Questioning 
ofifering  of  testimony.  In  considering  the  of  Facts, 
facts  set  forth  by  an  opponent,  one  must  first  of 
all  decide  whether  they  may  be  admitted  as  true 
or  whether  they  must  be  disputed.  There  is  a 
choice,  then,  of  three  methods  of  refutation.  One 
may  say,  The  alleged  facts  are  not  true;  or.  The 
facts  were  correctly  stated,  but  wrong  inferences 
were  drawn  from  them;  or.  The  facts  alleged  are 
not  true,  and  even  if  they  were,  the  inferences 
would  be  unwarranted.  If  one  can  follow  the  sec- 
ond method  with  safety,  time  will  of  course  be 
saved,  and  the  opponent  who  has  occupied  himself 
in  establishing  the  admitted  facts  may  be  regarded 
as  having  done  quite  as  much  for  one  side  as  for 


Io8  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

the  other.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  alleged  facts 
cannot  properly  be  admitted,  their  incorrectness 
must  be  clearly  pointed  out.  The  simplest  way  of 
doing  this  is  to  show  that  they  are  on  the  face  of 
them  incredible:  that  they  contradict  each  other, 
for  example,  or  that  they  are  inconsistent  with  facts 
generally  known.  Thus  Mr.  Lincoln  is  said  to  have 
refuted  testimony  regarding  events  alleged  to  have 
occurred  on  a  moonlight  night,  simply  by  intro- 
ducing an  almanac  and  showing  that  there  could 
have  been  no  moonlight  at  the  time  in  question. 
It  may  be  that  one  can  indicate  the  incredibility  of 
alleged  facts  simply  by  proving  the  contrary  facts. 
Yet  if  testimony  has  been  ofifered  by  the  other  side, 
it  will  ordinarily  not  be  safe  to  ignore  it.  If  no 
witnesses  have  been  produced,  testimony  may 
simply  be  demanded;  but  if  apparently  good  wit- 
nesses have  testified,  one  must  show  distinctly  why 
they  are  not  to  be  believed. 

All  testimony,  as  was  indicated  in  the  last  chap- 
ter, is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  witness  is 
Attacking  capable  of  knowing  the  truth  about  the 
Testimony,  point  in  question,  and  that  he  is  willing 
to  tell  it.  If  the  witness  can  be  shown  to  be  preju- 
diced, then  suspicion  will  be  justly  aroused.  If 
statistics  are  offered  by  one  side,  and  it  can  be 
shown  by  the  other  side  that  they  were  compiled 
expressly  for  the  purpose  of  proving  the  disputed 
fact,  by  persons  interested  to  prove  it,  a  presump- 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION,  109 

tion  will  have  been  raised  against  them.  If  the 
witness  is  distinctly  a  witness  for  the  disputant  on 
one  side  of  the  question, — if  he  has  been  sought  out 
by  that  disputant,  questioned  so  as  to  bring  out 
what  the  disputant  desires  to  show,  and  perhaps 
even  prompted  or  coached  in  advance  of  giving 
testimony, — his  testimony  will  in  so  far  be  open  to 
question.  And  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  witness 
can  be  shown  to  be  of  incompetent  judgment,  so 
as  not  to  be  trusted  in  dealing  with  the  particular 
matters  in  question,  the  effect  is  of  course  the 
same.  Thus  a  color-blind  person,  or  a  deaf  person, 
would  be  incompetent  to  testify  on  matters  requir- 
ing the  use  of  the  senses;  and  there  are  many  mat- 
ters, involving  elements  of  art,  or  mechanics,  or 
practical  business,  on  which  witnesses  must  speak 
according  to  their  education  or  experience  along 
particular  lines.  If  testimony  can  be  shown  to  be 
worthless  in  no  other  way,  one  may  attack  the  gen- 
eral character  of  the  witness  so  as  to  destroy  belief 
in  his  truthfulness.*  All  these  methods  are  well 
recognized  in  courts  of  law,  and  skilled  lawyers 

*  A  classic  example  of  skillful  handling  of  an  opponent's 
evidence  is  Lord  Erskine's  great  speech  in  defense  of  Lord 
George  Gordon,  February  5,  1781.  A  great  part  of  the  de- 
fense consisted  in  the  analysis  of  the  testimony  presented  by 
the  Crown,  either  the  character  of  the  witnesses  or  the  con- 
sistency of  their  testimony  being  attacked.  See  the  reprint 
of  the  speech  in  Baker's  "  Specimens  of  Argumentation," 
especially  pp.  111-131. 


no  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

Spend  much  time  in  refuting  the  testimony  offered 
by  the  other  side,  by  means  of  cross-examination 
of  witnesses  and  the  like.  In  general  debate  one  is 
forced  to  refute  testimony  in  a  more  rapid  and  more 
indirect  fashion.  The  debater  must  emphasize 
clearly  the  points  about  the  testimony  or  the  wit- 
ness which  are  open  to  attack,  so  as  to  destroy 
belief  in  the  alleged  facts  in  the  minds  of  those  who 
have  heard  them  stated. 

Closely  connected  with  the  handling  of  testi- 
mony, as  we  have  seen,  is  the  use  of  the  argument 
Refutation  of  ^^^^  authority.  Argument  of  this  sort 
Authority.  ^i^y  of  coursc  be  rcfutcd  by  showing  that 
the  authority  cited  is  really  not  competent  to 
speak  authoritatively  on  the  matter  in  dispute; — 
that  the  matter  is  one,  it  may  be,  on  which  any  in- 
dividual is  at  liberty  to  form  his  own  judgments,  so 
that  there  can  be  no  ex  cathedra  judgment  set  up 
to  which  reverence  must  be  paid.  This  is  the  privi- 
lege of  any  debater,  for  example,  when  an  authority 
is  quoted  on  matters  of  religion  or  morals;  he 
may  appeal  from  the  alleged  authority  to  the  in- 
dividual conscience.  Or,  one  may  quote  a  dissent- 
ing opinion  from  an  authority  at  least  as  good  as 
that  quoted  by  one's  opponent,  and  thus  raise  a 
presumption  that  one's  own  position  has  at  least 
as  good  standing  as  the  opposite;  a  lawyer,  for 
example,  may  quote  the  judgment  of  a  highly  re- 
spected court,  Hke  that  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION,  Xil 

Massachusetts,  against  that  of  another  court  less 
widely  and  favorably  known.  It  may  be  said,  how- 
ever, that  in  a  very  large  number  of  cases  it  is  not 
worth  while  to  attempt  to  refute  directly  the  argu- 
ment from  authority.  In  most  debates  such  an  ar- 
gument is  at  best  merely  corroborative, — proof,  in 
a  sense,  of  antecedent  probability;  and  if  the  au- 
thority cited  by  an  opponent  is  recognized  and  re- 
spected by  one's  audience,  it  may  arouse  prejudice 
to  attack  it  in  an  obvious  way.  It  will  commonly 
be  wiser  to  treat  the  authority  courteously,  but  to 
heap  up  so  much  proof  on  the  other  side  as  to  show 
great  likelihood  either  that  it  was  mistaken  or  that 
it  was  misinterpreted.  Those  who  reverence  any 
book  or  body  of  men  may  be  led  to  forsake  their 
authority  unaware,  when  they  would  only  be 
roused  to  defend  it  if  it  were  directly  attacked. 

We  come  now  to  proof  based  on  inference  from 
matters  before  the  fact.  Proof  based  on  a  cause 
which  it  is  argued  was  sufficient  to  pro-  ^  ^ , ,. 

.  .         ..  .  Refutation 

duce  the  disputed  fact,  as  in  the  case  of  of  a  priori 
proof  of  motive,  may  be  refuted  in  one  of  ■^^^®^*'®* 
two  ways:  by  showing  that  the  fact  alleged  as 
cause  did  not  exist,  or  that,  while  admittedly  exist- 
ing, it  was  not  sufficient  to  produce  the  disputed 
event.  Thus  in  a  case  where  it  should  be  argued 
that  an  accident  was  due  to  defective  construction 
on  the  part  of  the  builders,  on  the  ground  that 
they  had  been  observed  to  do  their  work  in  a  neg- 


112  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

ligent  manner,  opposing  proof  might  be  directed 
to  show  that  there  had  been  no  neghgence,  or — 
that  being  impossible — to  show  that  no  amount  of 
negligence,  in  the  particular  form  charged,  could 
have  resulted  in  the  accident  whose  cause  was  in 
dispute.  In  general,  however,  the  argument  from 
antecedent  probability  is  not  susceptible  of  satis- 
factory direct  refutation.  The  same  causes  which 
make  it  a  weak  form  of  proof,  standing  by  itself, 
make  it  difficult  to  overthrow  it  definitely.  Thus 
in  the  case  of  proof  of  motive,  it  is  usually  impos- 
sible to  prove  that  the  motive  was  insufBcient  to 
account  for  the  act  alleged;  and  in  general  one 
cannot  do  much  in  proving  what  an  alleged  cause 
could  not  produce.  The  safest  method  of  refuting 
this  sort  of  proof  is  usually  to  set  up  a  proof  of  an- 
tecedent probability  on  the  other  side;  to  show 
that  if  one's  opponent's  case  is  reasonable  on  the 
face  of  it,  one's  own  is  equally  so;  and  hence  to  raise 
the  presumption  that  the  a  priori  argument  of  the 
other  side  counts  for  very  little.  If  reasons  have 
been  set  forth  why  A  would  be  likely  to  have  done 
a  certain  act,  and  one  can  in  reply  show  good  rea- 
sons why  he  was  unlikely  to  do  it,  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  first  argument  has  been  definitely  an- 
swered; but  its  effect  has  been  largely  destroyed. 

The  argument  from  Example,  so  called,  is  also 
likely  to  be  of  so  slight  a  character  as  to  require 
small  attention  from  the  opposing  debater;  it  is 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION.  113 

of    course    to    be    refuted,    when    necessary,    by 
showing  that  the  example  cited  differs  in  Refutation 
some  essential  particular  from  the  case  in  of  Example, 
dispute.    When  this  can  be  done,  the  force  of  the 
example  is  destroyed.    Thus  it  is  common  for  law- 
yers, when  the  judgment  of  a  court  has  been  cited 
against  them  by  the  opposing  counsel,  to  point 
out  by  way  of  refutation  that  while  the  case  cited 
resembles  the  pending  case  in  superficial  features, 
there  is  a  difiference  in  one  important  particular, 
and  that  on  that  difference  the  decision  of  the  court 
must  turn.    Or,  when  a  debater  cites  the  relations 
of  England  with  her  colonies  as  precedent  for  pro- 
posed policies  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  and 
dependent  territory,  it  may  be  rejoined  that  there 
are  essential  differences  between  the  conditions  of 
government  in  England  and  the  United  States, 
which  practically  nullify  the  comparison.    In  a  de- 
bate in  favor  of  an  international  court  of  arbitra- 
tion, it  was  argued  by  the  affirmative  that,  just  as 
tribes  had  grown  out  of  families  and  nations  out 
of  tribes,  so  the  establishment  of  international  re- 
lations was   a  natural   step   in  advance, — ^a  step 
toward  "  the  parliament  of  man,  the  federation  of 
the  world."    It  was  rejoined  by  the  negative,  how- 
ever, that  there  is  an  important  difference  between 
the  growth  of  government  in  the  development  of 
nations  and  federations,  and  that  proposed  in  a 
mere  treaty  of  arbitration:   in  the  former  case,  all 


114  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

departments  of  government  have  grown  and  been 
magnified  together, — executive,  judicial,  and  leg- 
islative; whereas  it  is  now  proposed  to  unite  two 
nations  in  certain  judicial  arrangements,  yet  with- 
out any  united  legislative  body  for  the  promulga- 
tion of  laws,  and  without  any  executive  arm  to 
carry  the  decisions  of  the  international  tribunal 
into  effect.  The  refutation  was  ingenious  and  ef- 
fective. 

We  must  next  consider  the  refutation  of  proof 
by  inferences  drawn  from  matters  after  the  fact, — 
E  fat  ti  f  ^^^^  proof  as  that  by  "  sign  "  or  cir- 
a  posteriori  cumstantial  evidence.  Our  examination 
71  ence.  ^^  ^j^j^  method  of  proof,  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  must  have  made  clear  the  points  at  which 
it  is  open  to  refutation.  This  proof  rests,  we  saw, 
on  the  assumption  that  the  known  fact  can  be  ac- 
counted for  only  by  presuming  the  disputed  fact  as 
its  cause.  If,  therefore,  it  can  be  shown  either  that 
the  disputed  fact,  if  it  existed,  would  have  been  in- 
sufficient to  produce  the  known  fact,  or  that  there 
are  other  facts  equally  well  known  which  might 
have  produced  it,  the  proof  is  overthrown.  Thus 
in  a  trial  for  murder,  if  the  case  against  the  accused 
person  rested  on  the  fact  that  he  was  found  near 
the  scene  of  the  murder  with  blood  on  his  cloth- 
ing, the  defense  would  undertake  to  account  for 
his  presence  and  for  the  blood-stains,  in  such  a 
way  as  to  destroy  the  necessity  of  assuming  that 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION.  115 

his  guilt  was  the  only  possible  cause.  Or,  in  the 
use  of  statistics,  which  we  saw  to  be  a  common 
case  of  circumstantial  evidence,  when  certain 
figures  are  offered  as  proof  that  a  given  law  was 
beneficial,  the  opposing  side  must  show  that  the 
figures  can  be  accounted  for  on  a  different  assump- 
tion. If  they  can  go  further  than  to  show  that 
they  could  be  so  accounted  for,  and  show  definitely 
that  the  cause  may  be  known  to  be  different  from 
that  alleged,  the  proof  by  "  sign  "  is  completely 
overthrown.  An  interesting  case  of  this  kind  oc- 
curred in  a  debate  on  the  so-called  Norwegian  or 
"  dispensary "  system  of  regulating  the  liquor 
traffic.  The  affirmative  attempted  to  prove  the 
benefits  of  the  system  by  showing  that  after  its 
adoption  the  arrests  for  drunkenness  in  the  affected 
territory  had  greatly  decreased  in  number.  The 
other  side,  however,  was  able  to  make  it  appear 
that  certain  changes  in  the  police  regulations,  oc- 
curring at  just  the  time  in  question,  were  sufficient 
to  account  for  the  smaller  number  of  arrests  with- 
out indicating  any  diminution  in  the  amount  of 
liquor  consumed. 

This  sort  of  refutation  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant weapons  of  the  debater.    It  deals  with  one 
of  the  most  difficult  duties  of  the  rea-  oauaeaand 
son, — that  relating  to  causes  and  effects.  Effects. 
The  same  reasons  which  make  it  hard  to  determine, 
when  one  has  recovered  from  a  disease,  whether 


Ii6  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

the  recovery  is  due  to  the  medicine  taken  or  to 
other  causes,  make  it  hard  to  decide  on  the  results 
of  particular  laws  and  on  many  questions  of  public 
policy.  When  there  is  a  defect  in  the  argument 
from  cause  and  effect,  it  is  commonly  due  to  the 
fallacy  called  by  logicians  the  fallacy  of  *'  Post 
hoc  ergo  propter  hoc'' — that  is,  the  fallacy  which 
assumes  that  because  one  event  is  observed  to  suc- 
ceed another,  it  must  be  the  effect  of  the  latter.  To 
refute  this  fallacy  successfully  requires,  above  all 
things,  a  mind  well  stored  with  facts  pertinent  to 
the  subject  in  hand. 

A  good  illustration  of  refutation  under  this  head 
is  quoted  by  Fowler,  in  his  "  Inductive  Logic," 
from  Professor  Rogers's  *'  Manual  of  Political 
Economy." 

"  There  is  not  a  shadow  of  evidence,"  says  Rogers, 
"  in  support  of  the  statement  that  inferior  lands  have 
been  occupied  and  cultivated  as  population  increases. 
The  increase  of  population  has  not  preceded  but  fol- 
lowed this  occupation  and  cultivation.  It  is  not  the 
pressure  of  population  on  the  means  of  subsistence 
which  has  led  men  to  cultivate  inferior  soils,  but  the 
fact  that,  these  soils  being  cultivated  in  another  way, 
or  taken  into  cultivation,  an  increased  population  be- 
came possible.  How  could  an  increased  population 
have  stimulated  greater  labour  in  agriculture,  when 
agriculture  must  have  supplied  the  means  on  which 
that  increased  population  could  have  existed?  To 
make  increased  population  the  cause  of  improved  agri- 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION,  ill 

culture  is  to  commit  the  absurd  blunder  of  confound- 
ing cause  and  effect."  * 

A  fallacy  may  be  called  a  gap  in  a  process  of  rea- 
soning, and  it  may  be  said  in  a  sense  that  all  refu- 
the  arguments  of  one's  opponents.  If  paiiacies 
tation  consists  in  pointing  out  gaps  in  or  Gaps. 
there  is  one  such  gap  in  an  argument,  sufficient  to 
expose  the  whole  case  to  attack  from  without,  it 
matters  little  how^  strong  the  rest  of  the  case  may 
be;  just  as  it  matters  little  how  large  a  break  in  the 
wall  of  a  fort  may  be,  if  it  is  sufficient  to  admit  the 
forces  of  the  enemy.  The  task  of  the  refuting  de- 
bater, therefore,  is  to  keep  his  attack  concentrated 
on  these  weak  points. 

Let  us  examine  some  common  classes  of  these 
gaps  or  fallacies.  There  may  be,  in  the  first  place, 
a  mere  lack  of  evidence.     The  opponent  may  have 

*  Dr.  Fowler  adds  the  remark  that  this  argument  "  appears 
to  ignore  the  fact  that  a  population  may  have  an  insufficient 
supply  of  food,  though  what  it  does  possess  may  be  just 
competent  to  sustain  life."  The  whole  question  indicates  the 
difficulty  of  arguing  accurately  about  economic  conditions. 
The  entire  chapter  on  "  Fallacies  Incident  to  Induction,"  in 
Fowler's  "  Logic,"  is  full  of  suggestions  to  students  of  argu- 
ment. See,  for  example,  the  quotation  from  Sir  G.  C.  Lewis 
(p.  323),  in  which  it  is  pointed  out  that  even  when  we  have 
reduced  our  facts  to  those  which  are  actually  related  as  cause 
and  effect,  the  different  facts  may  act  and  react  upon  each 
other,  so  that  each,  in  turn,  is  both  cause  and  effect.  So  with 
industry  and  wealth,  intelligence  and  good  government, 
drunkenness  and  poverty,  national  character  and  environ- 
ment, and  the  like. 


Il8  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

made  assumptions  which  he  was  bound  to  prove. 
Beffffingthe  '^^^^  involvcs  the  so-called  fallacy  of 
Question.  "  Petitio  Principii,"  or  *'  Begging  the 
Question."  In  its  simplest  sense,  to  beg  the  ques- 
tion, or  to  assume  what  one  is  bound  to  prove,  is 
merely  to  make  statements  which  appear  to  be  con- 
vincing but  which  are  really  unsupported  by  evi- 
dence. In  a  larger  sense  this  fallacy  is  involved  in 
many  inferences  of  a  complicated  sort.  Thus  one 
is  said  to  beg  the  question  when  he  uses  a  word  at 
one  time  in  one  sense,  and  at  another  time  in  a 
different  sense,  and  yet  draws  a  conclusion  depend- 
ing on  the  assumption  that  the  two  words  are  the. 
same.  Many  arguments  involving  the  use  of  sucli 
words  as  "  socialist,"  '*  democrat,"  *'  free  trade," 
"  expansion,"  and  the  like,  really  involve  this  fal- 
lacy. Thus  the  phrase  "  question-begging  epithet," 
first  used  by  Jeremy  Bentham,  has  come  to  be 
commonly  applied  to  any  term  applied  for  the 
very  purpose  of  discrediting  the  person  or  thing 
in  question.  "  It  makes  no  little  difference,"  says 
one  writer,  "  whether  we  call  a  man  a  progressive 
or  a  revolutionist,  a  conservative  or  a  reactionary." 
The  term  ''  Jingo  "  is  a  term  of  recent  origin  which 
well  illustrates  this  sort  of  fallacy.  A  '*  Jingo  "  is, 
in  the  popular  sense,  a  citizen  over-noisy  or  head- 
strong in  his  patriotism;  to  say  that  a  certain  opin- 
ion, therefore,  indicates  ''Jingoism,"  is  to  call  it 
over-no'isy  or  unreasonably  patriotic,  which  is  no 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION,  119 

doubt  the  very  matter  in  dispute.  Such  instances 
of  begging  the  question  are  to  be  refuted  by  caUing 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  term  used  has  two 
meanings,  a  colorless  one  and  a  prejudicial  one, 
and  that  to  apply  them  in  the  prejudicial  sense  is 
simply  to  assume  what  one  must  prove. 

In  a  recent  debate  on  a  question  relating  to  the 
extension  of  the  suffrage,  it  was  argued  on  one 
side  that  citizens  have  no  inherent  right  to  vote, 
since  the  state  always  decides  just  which  citizens 
shall  constitute  voters.  It  was  replied  that  such 
an  argument  really  begged  the  question,  since  the 
very  point  at  issue  was:  who  constitute  the  state? 
and  have  a  right  to  exercise  authority  in  its  name? 
To  say,  therefore,  that  the  state  sets  limits  to  citi- 
zenship and  suffrage  is  merely  equivalent  to  say- 
ing that  those  who  enjoy  such  privileges  usually 
have  a  certain  power  to  keep  others  from  getting 
them;  and  nothing  as  to  natural  right  is  proved. 
This  somewhat  ingenious  argument  illustrates  how 
the  fallacy  of  begging  the  question  appears  in  de- 
bate in  all  manner  of  forms.  Similar  examples  are 
to  be  found  in  many  discussions  of  monetary  prob- 
lems. Speakers  often  refer  to  an  increase  or 
diminution  in  the  amount  of  currency  in  circula- 
tion, as  though  it  meant  an  increase  or  diminution 
in  the  fortunes  of  individual  citizens.  "  We  are 
told,"  said  a  speaker  in  a  recent  political  campaign, 
"  that  if  this  measure  is  adopted  we  shall  have  too 


I20  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

much  currency.  I  do  not  know  how  you  feel  about 
it,  but  I  have  never  yet  seen  the  time  when  I  had 
too  much  money,  and  I  have  never  met  any  one 
else  who  complained  that  he  had  too  much."  A 
more  question-begging  argument  could  not  be 
imagined.  Whenever  one  has  to  consider  the  pos- 
sibility of  more  money  being  brought  into  the 
country,  whether  by  one  means  or  another,  he  must 
ask  himself:  Will  this  money  be  the  property  of  the 
government?  Will  it  be  in  the  hands  of  a  few  in- 
dividual citizens?  or  Will  it  come  into  the  general 
circulation?  To  assume  that  any  one  of  these  con- 
ditions is  the  same  as  any  other,  is  to  assume  what 
must  be  proved. 

A  particular  form  of  this  fallacy  is  sometimes 
called  "  Ignoratio  Elenchi,"  or  "  Ignoring  the 
Ignoring  the  Qucstiou."  This  is  a  gap  between  the 
Qnestion.  proof  offered  and  the  main  question  un- 
der debate.  It  appears  when  the  debater  really 
shifts  his  argument  from  one  issue  to  another,  and 
seems  to  have  proved  the  matter  in  dispute  when 
he  can  be  shown  to  have  proved  something  quite 
different.  Such  cases  may  arise  from  the  use  of 
ambiguous  terms  in  two  different  senses,  such  as 
we  discussed  a  moment  ago.  Or  they  may  appear 
when  the  argument  is  shifted  from  the  general  prin- 
ciple under  discussion  to  some  one  instance,  and 
that  instance  is  made  to  take  the  place  of  the  whole 
question.    Many  debaters  show  marvelous  skill  in 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION.  121 

gliding  almost  imperceptibly  from  one  proposition 
to  another,  and  it  requires  corresponding  skill  to 
make  them  hold  their  ground.  Thus  even  lawyers, 
who  are  held  within  bounds  more  than  most  de- 
baters, will — when  their  case  is  weak  on  the  side 
of  evidence — attempt  to  win  juries  by  much  talk 
about  vague  matters  of  justice  and  righteousness. 
In  debates  where  the  question  is  stated  to  be  one 
of  the  interests  of  the  nation  or  individuals  con- 
cerned, one  often  hears  argument  relating  solely 
to  matters  of  theoretical  right  and  justice,  not  in- 
volved in  the  question  of  interest  at  all.  Whenever 
a  debater  indulges  largely  in  vague  talk  about  per- 
sonal liberty,  public  justice,  freedom  and  independ- 
ence, and  similar  phrases,  one  may  have  a  suspi- 
cion that  he  feels  that  his  actual  proof  is  weak,  and 
is  attempting  to  "  ignore  the  question "  without 
being  discovered.  This  is  the  opportunity  for  ef- 
fective refutation.  In  all  such  cases  it  is  one's  privi- 
lege to  admit  everything  that  has  been  said  on  the 
side  issue,  and  then  show  with  rigid  distinctness 
just  what  the  question  involves,  and  how  this  has 
been  neglected  for  other  things. 

It  will  be  seen  that  these  various  fallacies,  so- 
called,  cannot  be  perfectly  distinguished  from  one 
another,  and  applied  as  exact  names  to  particular 
arguments.  Their  boundaries  intermingle  and 
are  easily  lost.  In  a  sense  most  flaws  in  proof  may 
be    called    instances    of    "  non    sequitur," — that    is, 


122  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

mistaken  inferences  where  we  say,  "  It  does  not  fol- 
low ";  in  a  sense  nearly  all  may  be  called  instances 
of  "  begging  the  question."  It  is  of  little  import- 
ance to  name  them.  The  point  is  to  recognize 
where  there  is  a  gap  in  the  proof  which  invalidates 
the  argument,  and  to  make  this  so  clear  that  the 
effect  of  the  fallacious  argument  will  be  swept 
away. 

A  particular  method  of  refutation  which  is  widely 
used,  and  of  which  a  word  should  be  said  at  this 
Reduotlo  ad  point,  is  that  called  the  "  Reductio  ad 
Absurdum.  AbsurdtimJ'  This  is  a  term  borrowed 
from  geometrical  demonstration,  where  the  pro- 
cess is  very  familiar.  If  we  wish  to  show  the  im- 
possibility of  constructing  a  triangle  of  which  one 
side  shall  be  longer  than  the  sum  of  the  other  two, 
we  draw  a  triangle  and  declare — for  the  moment — 
that  one  of  its  sides  is  longer  than  the  sum  of  the 
other  two;  then  we  show  to  what  absurd  conclu- 
sions this  immediately  leads  us.  The  process  in 
general  argument  is  precisely  similar.  We  assume 
that  the  proposition  we  wish  to  refute  is  true,  and 
then  point  out  to  what  absurd  results  it  leads.  This 
method  may  of  course  be  applied  to  the  main  ques- 
tion against  which  we  are  debating,  or  to  any  par- 
ticular proposition  which  has  been  raised  by  an 
opponent.  When  well  done  it  is  among  the  most 
effective  means  of  refutation.  A  particular  form  of 
it  is  called  the  Dilemma,  when  one  can  show  that 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION.  X23 

an  opponent's  position  must  lead  to  one  of  two  al- 
ternate results,  and  can  then  show  the  falsity  of 
each  of  these. 

A  story  is  told  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  the  early  years 
of  his  career  as  a  lawyer,  that  he  had  to  defend  a 
man  accused  of  murdering  another  by  striking 
him  down  with  a  shovel  in  the  village  store.  The 
witnesses  for  the  prosecution  all  agreed  as  to  the 
places  where  the  murdered  man  and  the  murderer 
were  standing  at  the  moment  of  the  crime.  Mr. 
Lincoln  measured  ofif  in  the  court-room  distances 
corresponding  to  those  indicated  by  the  testimony, 
himself  took  a  shovel  in  his  hand,  and  then  showed 
that — although  he  was  considerably  taller  than 
his  client — it  was  quite  impossible  for  him  to 
reach  as  far  as  from  the  point  where  the  ac- 
cused was  said  to  have  stood  to  the  place  where 
the  murdered  man  fell.  The  testimony  for  the 
prosecution  was  thus,  in  a  sense,  reduced  to  an 
absurdity.  In  a  sense,  too,  this  is  done  wherever 
witnesses  can  be  shown  either  to  contradict  them- 
selves so  strikingly,  or  to  agree  with  such  sus- 
picious exactness,  as  to  make  it  absurd  to  credit 
the  statements  to  which  they  testified. 

A  familiar  example  of  the  rediictio  ad  ahsurdum 
occurs  in  Macaulay's  Copyright  speech  of  1841.* 
He  was  arguing  that  any  copyright  is  open  to  cer- 

*  See  the  speech,  in  Baker's  "  Specimens  of  Argumenta- 
tion," and  the  Brief  in  the  Appendix  to  this  book. 


1^4  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

tain  objections  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  monopoly, 
and  that  monopoly  always  makes  things  dear. 

"  If,  as  my  honorable  and  learned  friend  seems  to 
think,  the  whole  world  is  in  the  wrong  on  this  point, 
if  the  real  effect  of  monopoly  is  to  make  articles  good 
and  cheap,  why  does  he  stop  short  in  his  career  of 
change?  Why  does  he  limit  the  operation  of  so  salu- 
tary a  principle  to  sixty  years  ?  Why  does  he  consent 
to  anything  short  of  perpetuity?  He  told  us  that  in  con- 
senting to  anything  short  of  perpetuity  he  was  making 
a  compromise  between  extreme  right  and  expediency. 
But  if  his  opinion  about  monopoly  be  correct,  extreme 
right  and  expediency  would  coincide.  Or  rather  why 
should  we  not  restore  the  monopoly  of  the  East  India 
trade  to  the  East  India  Company?  Why  should  we 
not  revive  all  those  old  monopolies  which,  in  Eliza- 
beth's reign,  galled  our  fathers  so  severely  that,  mad- 
dened by  intolerable  wrong,  they  opposed  to  their 
sovereign  a  resistance  before  which  her  haughty  spirit 
quailed  for  the  first  and  for  the  last  time?  Was  it  the 
cheapness  and  excellence  of  commodities  that  then  so 
violently  stirred  the  indignation  of  the  EngHsh  people? 
I  believe,  Sir,  that  I  may  safely  take  it  for  granted  that 
the  effect  of  monopoly  generally  is  to  make  articles 
scarce,  to  make  them  dear,  and  to  make  them  bad." 

The  same  method  is  used  in  the  speech  on  Mr. 
Cleveland's  Venezuelan  Message,  quoted  in  the 
Appendix.  In  reply  to  the  objection  that  the  Presi- 
dent had  adopted  an  unduly  warlike  tone  in  his 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION.  125 

reference  to  our  relations  with  Great  Britain,  the 
speaker  said: 

"  Doubtless  he  should  have  said  that,  although  he 
believed  the  American  people  support  his  position,  yet 
if  Great  Britain  should  object  we  would  of  course  sub- 
mit; and  that  no  serious  consequences  could  possibly 
occur,  since  no  consideration  of  our  own  rights  could 
compare  with  the  evil  of  having  to  fight  for  them. 
We  are  not  in  the  habit,  however,  of  electing  Presi- 
dents who  talk  that  way." 

Sometimes  this  method  appears  when  there  is  an 
opportunity  to  show  the  weakness  of  an  opponent's 
position  simply  by  stating  it  in  another  form.  Thus 
Senator  Hoar,  in  a  recent  debate  in  the  United 
States  Senate,  referred  in  this  way  to  Senator  Bev- 
eridge's  claim  that  to  establish  good  colonial  gov- 
ernments in  distant  islands  would  stimulate  good 
government  at  home: 

"  If  I  understood  him  correctly,  he  said  also  that  he 
thought  it  was  not  necessary  to  wait  until  we  could  get 
the  very  best  of  government  here,  but  if  we  established 
it  abroad  under  some  commissioners  to  be  appointed 
by  some  executive  authority,  they  would  govern  so 
well  that  they  would  furnish  a  good  example  for  us  at 
home,  and  we  should  improve.  I  suppose,  though  he 
did  not  say  it,  that  he  thinks  also  we  had  better  not 
have  free  speech  here  in  the  United  States  Senate  until 
they  have  got  it  out  among  the  Filipinos,  to  see  whe- 
ther it  works  there,  and  then  it  may  come  back  to  us 


126  THE  yiRT  OF  DEBATE, 

in  a  way  which  gradually  would  permit  us  to  use  it 
here,  in  a  sort  of  diluted  form."  * 

The  form  of  the  method  of  Dilemma  is  equaUy 
familiar.  A  single  example  will  sufifice,  taken  from 
The  Di-  Lord  Mansfield's  great  speech  in  the  case 
lemma.  q{  Evans,  before  the  House  of  Lords  in 
1767.  His  claim  was  that  to  be  a  Dissenter  from 
the  Established  Church  was  no  longer  recognized 
by  law  as  in  any  sense  a  crime. 

"  If  it  is  a  crime  not  to  take  the  sacrament  at  church, 
it  must  be  a  crime  by  some  law;  which  must  be  either 
common  or  statute  law,  the  canon  law  enforcing  it  being 
dependent  wholly  upon  the  statute  law.  Now  the 
statute  law  is  repealed  as  to  persons  capable  of  plead- 
ing that  they  are  so  and  so  qualified ;  and  therefore  the 
canon  law  is  repealed  with  regard  to  those  persons. 

"  If  it  is  a  crime  by  common  law,  it  must  be  so  either 
by  usage  or  principle.  But  there  is  no  usage  or  custom, 
independent  of  positive  law,  which  makes  nonconform- 
ity a  crime.  The  eternal  principles  of  natural  religion 
are  part  of  the  common  law.  The  essential  principles 
of  revealed  religion  are  part  of  the  common  law;  so 
that  any  person  reviling,  subverting,  or  ridiculing  them 
may  be  prosecuted  at  common  law.  But  it  cannot  be 
shown,  from  the  principles  of  natural  or  revealed  re- 
ligion, that,  independent  of  positive  law,  temporal 
punishments  ought  to  be  inflicted  for  mere  opinions 
with  respect  to  particular  modes  of  worship. 

*  Congressional  Record,  Jan.  9,  1900. 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATIOU.  127 

"  Persecution  for  a  sincere  though  erroneous  con- 
science is  not  to  be  deduced  from  reason  or  the  fitness 
of  things.    It  can  only  stand  upon  positive  law."  * 

Such  forms  of  refutation  as  these  depend  upon 
the  ability  of  the  debater  quickly  to  analyze  and 
test  the  reasoning  processes  of  his  oppon-  Paotsin 
ent.  Skill  of  this  sort  is  of  the  greatest  Befatation. 
service;  but  an  equally  important  element  in  suc- 
cessful refutation  is,  as  has  already  been  indicated, 
an  ample  knowledge  of  all  the  facts  in  the  case  in 
dispute.  It  is,  after  all,  mastery  of  incontrovertible 
facts  rather  than  ingenious  reasoning  v^hich  is  likely 
to  be  most  convincing;  and  if  in  the  progress  of  an 
argument  a  debater  is  able  to  bring  forward  facts 
which  have  been  neglected  by  the  other  side,  the 
effect  is  most  important.  This  is  to  show  a  great 
gap  in  the  structure  of  one's  opponent;  if  he  has 
built  up  his  argument  regardless  of  essential  mat- 
ters, he  has  built  it — no  matter  how  finely — in 
vain.  Many  striking  examples  of  this  will  occur 
to  those  who  have  listened  to  well-fought  debates. 
Not  long  ago  a  public  official  was  attacked  by  one 
who  was  a  candidate  to  succeed  him  in  office.  The 
official  was  a  prosecuting  attorney.  It  was  proved 
that  he  had  left  untried  several  hundred  criminal 
cases  that  were  awaiting  attention,  that  many  of 

•  See  the  whole  speech,  in  Baker's  "  Specimens  of  Argu- 
mentation." 


laS  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

these  had  remained  on  the  docket  for  months  and 
years,  that  several  of  them  were  cases  involving 
serious  charges,  three  being  based  on  indictments 
for  murder.  When  the  attorney  appeared  in  per- 
son to  reply  it  seemed  that  the  evidence  was  over- 
whelmingly against  him.  He  showed,  however, 
that  he  had  tried  as  many  cases  as  the  courts  would 
give  him  time  for;  that  of  the  hundreds  remaining 
on  the  docket  most  related  to  trivial  charges  of 
assault  or  breach  of  the  peace;  that  in  the  case  of 
many  of  these  the  parties  making  the  complaint 
had  themselves  requested  the  withdrawal  of  pro- 
cess; and  that  of  the  three  oersons  not  yet  tried 
for  murder,  two  had  committed  suicide,  and  tlie 
third  had  run  away!  It  was  a  striking  instance  of 
the  way  in  which  an  apparently  strong  case  may 
be  overthrown  by  the  presentation  of  facts  which 
the  other  side  has  ignored. 

Let  us  now  briefly  summarize  the  methods  of 
refutation  we  have  been  considering,  so  as  to  indi- 
cate roughly  the  various  possible  types  of  argument 
one  would  be  likely  to  adopt,  in  attacking  the  proof 
of  another. 

In  general,  one  may  refute  the  argument  of  an 
opponent  either  (-i)  by  showing  that  the  facts  in 
„  .  ,    i,     the  case  are  not  true  as  alleged;  or  (2) 

Methods  of  ...  o       '  v    / 

Eefatation     that,  the  facts  bcmg  admittedly  as  alleged, 
umma  ize  .  ^|^^  inferences  drawn  from  them  are  in- 
correct; or  (3)  that  the  alleged  facts  are  not  true, 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION,  129 

and  that  even  if  they  were  true,  the  inferences  are 
unwarranted.  It  is  important  that  there  shall  be 
no  doubt,  in  the  mind  either  of  the  debater  or  of 
his  audience,  as  to  which  of  these  positions  he 
wishes  to  occupy. 

In  particular,  one  may  refute  opposing  argu- 
ments— 

(i)  By  showing  that  the  witnesses  cited  are 
either  (a)  prejudiced,  {jS)  of  incompetent  judgment, 
or  (c)  morally  untrustworthy. 

(2)  By  showing  that  the  evidence  alleged  is  in- 
credible because  (a)  inconsistent  with  known  facts, 
or  (^)  self-contradictory. 

(3)  By  showing  that  the  fact  alleged  as  sufficient 
cause  of  the  disputed  fact  either  (a)  did  not  exist, 
or  (6)  was  insufficient  to  act  as  cause  in  the  manner 
alleged. 

(4)  By  showing  that  the  fact  alleged  as  the  re- 
sult of  the  disputed  fact  (a)  did  not  exist,  or  (&)  is 
not  evidently  a  sign  of  the  disputed  fact,  or  (c) 
that  there  were  other  acting  causes. 

(5)  By  showing  that  examples  cited  are  differ- 
ent, in  essential  points,  from  the  case  in  dispute. 

(6)  By  showing  that  the  opposite  side  has  as- 
sumed something  which  it  was  under  obligation  to 
prove. 

(7)  By  showing  that  the  proof  offered  does  not 
bear  directly  on  the  matter  in  dispute. 


130  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

(8)  By  showing  that  statements  made  lead  to  ad- 
mittedly absurd  conclusions. 

(9)  By  showing  that  the  opposite  side  has  ig- 
nored essential  facts. 

It  remains  only  to  add  a  few  suggestions  regard- 
ing the  general  character  and  use  of  refutation. 
_^  .  In  the  first  place,  regarding  the  need  for 
pieofRefa-    such  direct   refutation  as  we   have  just 

*'  been  considering.  It  may  be  thought  that 

it  is  enough  to  prove  one's  own  case  directly,  with- 
out disproving  that  of  one's  opponent.  But  where 
the  question  in  dispute  is  genuinely  debatable,  this 
is  never  safe.  If  one  side  of  a  proposition  is  proved 
directly,  and  then  the  other  appears  to  be  proved 
equally  well,  the  result  is  confusion.  The  audience 
finds  difficulty  in  judging  between  the  two  argu- 
ments, and  may  be  left  to  base  its  judgment  on 
mere  trivialities,  not  being  able  to  decide  on  the 
merits  of  the  case.  Where  a  debater  contents  him- 
self with  proving  his  own  case,  finely  scorning  the 
arguments  of  his  opponent,  he  has  his  hearers  at 
his  mercy  for  the  time  being;  but  if  his  opponent 
has  the  last  word,  he  will  leave  no  permanent  ef- 
fect. It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  persons  can- 
not be  soundly  convinced  of  the  truth  of  a  dis- 
puted proposition,  until  they  have  not  only  been 
shown  the  arguments  in  its  favor,  but  the  defects 
in  the  arguments  brought  against  it.  More  than 
this,  the  refutation  of  opposing  arguments  should, 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION.  ^Sl 

if  possible,  show  not  only  that  they  are  false,  but 
why  they  are  false.  The  effort  should  be  to  lead 
one's  audience  to  see  just  how  one's  opponents 
came  to  mistake  the  truth  of  the  question,  and  to 
be  led  into  the  sort  of  proof  they  offer.  If  one 
shows  only  the  fact  that  a  statement  is  to  be  dis- 
believed,-— that  something  is  wrong  with  it, — it  may 
still  crop  up  again  and  be  believed  in  a  different 
form;  but  if  one  can  make  clear  its  fundamental 
error,  he  has  destroyed  its  chances  of  effectiveness 
in  the  minds  of  his  hearers. 

Yet  while  refutation  should  be  so  thorough,  from 
this  point  of  view,  in  another  sense  there  is  need 
for  a  word  of  warning  against  carrying  Distinction 
the  attempt  at  complete  refutation  too  ^^^^X^' 
far.  Many  debaters  make  the  mistake  of  gnments. 
attacking  everything  said  by  their  opponents,  so 
long  as  there  is  the  slightest  chance  of  attacking 
it,  with  little  regard  for  its  importance  in  the  argu- 
ment. Statements/ made  by  one's  opponents  in  de- 
bate may  be  roughly  divided  as  follows:  first,  those 
which  one  may  admit  to  be  true  without  com- 
promising one's  case;  secondly,  those  which  are 
open  to  attack,  but  which  have  no  bearing  on  the 
argument, — mere  errors  of  memory  or  the  like; 
thirdly,  those  which  may  be  questioned  and  which 
have  some  connection  with  the  argument,  but 
which  evidently  make  no  great  impression  on  the 
audience  addressed;  fourthly,  those  which  must  be 


13*  THE  yfRT  OF  DEBATE, 

overthrown  in  order  to  destroy  the  impression  that 
they  are  strong  proofs  on  the  opposite  side.  These 
four  classes  of  statements  require  very  different 
treatment.  The  first  class  should  be  admitted  to 
be  true,  in  order  to  clear  up  the  ground  of  argu- 
ment so  far.  The  second  class  should  be  ignored 
altogether.  The  third  class  should  be  lightly 
touched  upon,  and  briefly  refuted  if  there  is  suffi- 
cient time.  The  fourth  class  should  receive  the 
brunt  of  the  refutation.  A  watchful  debater  can 
easily  tell  which  portions  of  the  opposing  argument 
have  made  an  impression  on  the  hearers,  so  that 
they  must  be  overthrown  if  his  own  case  is  to  make 
a  good  showing.  Yet  one  often  sees  much  time 
wasted  in  the  refutation  of  statements  which  have 
made  no  special  impression,  merely  because  they 
can  be  refuted.  The  typically  clumsy  debater  may 
be  easily  known  in  what  he  calls  his  rebuttal  argu- 
ment; he  has  noted  down  on  a  slip  of  paper  a  long 
list  of  "  points  "  made  by  his  opponent,  which  he 
rehearses  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  them;  some 
of  Ihem  are  mere  illustrations,  passing  thrusts, 
perhaps  mere  misquotations  or  shps  of  the  tongue. 
His  refutation  is  a  long  series  of  short  dabs  at  all 
parts  of  his  enemy's  armor,  without  a  single  sweep- 
ing stroke  at  a  vital  part.  Choice  and  emphasis 
are  as  important  qualities  in  refutation  as  in  all 
other  sorts  of  discourse.  ^  ^^ 

All  this  goes  to  show,  what  was  pointed  out  in 


METHODS  OF  REFUTy4TION.  I33 

the  chapter  on  Preliminary  Work,  that  one  must 
make  as  careful  a  study  of  the  case  of  his  j^o^jg^-g 
opponent  as  of  his  own.    One  must  know  of  the  other 

f  .  <  •  J    Sidei 

its  Strong  pomts  and  its  weak  points,  and 
show  the  audience  that  one  understands  it  and  ap- 
preciates its  material.  Oftentimes  one  of  the  most 
useful  methods  of  refutation  is  simply  to  state  the 
case  of  the  opposite  side  better  than  it  has  been 
stated  by  its  adherents,  and  then  to  analyze  it  so  as 
to  exhibit  its  flaws.  If  they  have  stated  it  in  the 
form  of  abstract  principles,  one  may  put  it  in  con- 
crete form,  and  perhaps  make  the  absurdity  of  the 
principle  clear  by  a  practical  illustration;  or,  if  it 
has  been  stated  in  a  specific  form,  one  may  restate 
it  in  the  form  of  the  general  principle  involved,  and 
show  the  unreasonableness  of  that.  Oftentimes  the 
most  important  element  in  refutation  is  to  show 
that  the  opposite  side  has  really  misunderstood  or 
misrepresented  one's  position,  and  to  relieve  it 
from  the  error  that  has  gathered  about  it.  One 
needs  constantly  to  avoid  letting  the  discussion  be 
led  o^  to  side  issues,  by  turning  back  at  every  step 
to  the  real  issue  under  consideration.  Many  ob- 
jections raised  by  opponents  are  quibbles  about 
words,  and  the  simplest  way  to  dispose  of  them  is 
to  recall  the  minds  of  the  audience  to  the  real  situa- 
tion. "  If  you  will  turn  back,"  said  a  debater  on 
one  occasion,  "  from  the  imaginary  cases  which 
my  opponent  has  presented  for  our  solution,  to  the 


134  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

question  with  which  we  started,  it  will  be  clear  that 
the  difficulties  raised  do  not  exist  in  actual  condi- 
tions, but  are  only  theoretical  and  imaginary."  But 
in  all  these  cases  equally,  it  is  clear  that  not  to  un- 
derstand the  position  of  the  opposite  side  will  be 
to  run  every  risk  of  defeat. 

This  leads  us  to  a  final  thought,  regarding  the 
general  attitude  of  the  debater  toward  his  oppon- 
Attatude  ent,  during  the  process  of  refutation. 
Opponent.  Should  he  treat  his  adversary  as  an 
enemy,  or  as  a  friend  who  has  gone  astray? 
Should  he  pour  forth  scorn  upon  the  arguments  he 
has  to  answer,  or  treat  them,  when  he  can,  as.  de- 
serving of  respectful  consideration?  The  former 
method  is  undoubtedly  in  frequent  use,  but  the  lat- 
ter is  undoubtedly  the  more  intelligent  and  safe. 
It  is  the  clumsy  debater  who  begins  his  reply  by 
saying  that  he  has  really  heard  nothing  worthy  of 
being  answered,  and  that  he  has  been  astonished 
to  see  how  much  breath  has  been  wasted  in  the 
absence  of  real  argument.  Besides  being  a  boorish 
and  discourteous  method  of  retort,  this  style  of  re- 
buttal does  small  credit  to  the  case  one  is  discuss- 
ing. If  there  is  really  nothing  requiring  one's  pow- 
ers of  refutation,  small  skill  is  needed  in  one's  re- 
ply. But  if  the  adversary  has  really  made  out  a 
strong  case,  and  one  is  ready  to  admit  it,  the  task 
of  rebuttal  is  seen  to  be  worthy  of  one's  best 
powers.    It  happens,  therefore,  that  those  debaters 


METHODS  OF  REFUTATION,  135 

usually  win  the  greatest  respect  and  show  most 
real  argumentative  power,  who  recognize  from  the 
first  that  there  is  something  to  be  said  on  both  sides 
of  the  question,  that  something  has  been  said  on 
the  opposite  side  from  their  own,  and  that  the  ar- 
guments of  their  opponents — at  the  point  where 
they  cannot  be  admitted  as  valid — deserve  respect- 
ful treatment  and  serious  reply. 

It  must  of  course  be  admitted  that  something  de- 
pends on  the  character  of  one's  opponent.  Occa- 
sionally it  seems  to  be  necessary  to  answer  a  fool 
according  to  his  folly,  and  a  boor  according  to  his 
rudeness.  Something,  too,  depends  upon  the  au- 
dience. If  one  has  been  unfairly  treated  in  debate, 
if  one's  opponent  has  persistently  misrepresented 
one's  position,  or  indulged  in  the  rudeness  of  per- 
sonal attack,  then  one  may  well  leave  the  mild  man- 
ner in  which  he  would  have  preferred  to  speak — 
not,  indeed,  in  order  to  return  the  misrepresenta- 
tion and  abuse  in  kind,  but  in  order  to  strike  back 
with  genuine  indignation  and  reproach.  If  the  au- 
dience has  perceived  the  unfairness,  it  will  be  ready 
to  join  in  the  indignation  of  the  reply.  But  one 
must  not  anticipate  his  audience  too  far,  and  show 
much  more  feeling  than  they  can  easily  share. 

The  sympathy  of  the  audience  is,  indeed,  the 
great  end  of  the  wise  debater.  If  he  can  carry  them 
with  him,  his  success  is  assured.  The  audience  may 
be  a  single  man,  such  as  a  judge  in  a  court  of  law, 


13^  THE  /^/?T  OF  DEBATE, 

it  may  be  a  half  dozen  judges,  or  a  crowded  popu- 
Persuasive  ^^^  assembly.  If  it  is  desired  not  merely 
Refutation,  to  show  one's  skill  in  argument,  but  to 
carry  the  hearers  along  in  the  train  of  one's  argu- 
ment, to  bring  them  to  see  from  one's  own  point 
of  view,  then  the  manner  of  attack  must  be  friendly. 
If  they  hold  some  of  the  opinions  which  one  is  en- 
gaged in  refuting,  they  will  not  listen  if  those  opin- 
ions are  treated  with  scorn.  They  must  be  ap- 
proached as  friends.  It  must  be  assumed  that  they 
are  anxious  to  know  the  truth,  and  will  eagerly  re- 
ceive it  if  they  can  be  made  to  see  it  aright.  The 
debater,  then,  should  seek  not  only  to  destroy  the 
error  he  is  refuting,  but — if  possible — at  the  very 
moment  of  doing  so,  to  build  up  the  corresponding 
truth."^  His  refutation  should  be  keen,  unflinching, 
thorough,  but  at  the  same  time  respectful,  friendly, 
and  not  merely  destructive  but  constructive  as  well. 

*  A  good  illustration  of  this  method  will  be  found  in  the 
speech  on  the  Retirement  of  the  Greenbacks,  quoted  in  the 
Appendix,  where  the  argument  of  the  negative,  though  in 
form  refutation,  is  largely  built  upon  the  advocacy  of  a  better 
proposition  than  that  offered  by  the  affirmative. 


VII. 

STRUCTURE   AND    STYLE. 

We  have  now  reached  the  point  where  the  work 
of  the  debater  is  to  be  put  into  its  final  form.  The 
question  has  been  analyzed;  the  outline  Matter  and 
of.  proof  has  been  determined  upon;  the  ^<'™' 
ntethods  of  proof  and  the  evidence  have  been 
dhosen;  and  the  arguments  of  the  opposite  side 
have  been  examined,  so  far  as  possible,  with  a  view 
to  refutation.  For  some  debaters  the  hard  part  of 
tlie  work  has  been  completed;  for  others  it  has  just 
begun.  Some,  that  is  to  say,  will  find  that  when 
tliey  have  gathered  and  arranged  their  material, 
tlie  matter  of  verbal  form  goes  far  toward  looking 
OHit  for  itself;  while  others  enjoy  the  more  exacting 
task  of  prepapation,  but  find  themselves  awkward 
when  it  comes  to  clothing  their  material  in  pleasing 
form. 

The  outhne  or  brief,  prepared  as  the  result  of  the 

preliminary  work  of  the  debater,  should  form  the 

basis  of  his  finished  argument.    Its  order  „^    ^^^^ 

and  divisions  will,  in  a  general  way,  indi-  the  basis  oi 

cate  the  order  and  divisions  of  his  speech,      "^^^^®" 

— subject,  of  course,  to  such  changes  as  the  laws  of 

rhetoric  or  the  exigencies  of  the  debate  may  sug- 

137 


138  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

gest.  Certainly  his  outline  will  provide  for  the 
three  general  divisions  of  his  argument,  the  Intro- 
duction, the  body  of  proof,  and  the  Conclusion. 
Let  us  briefly  consider  these  divisions. 

The  object  of  an  Introduction  is  twofold.  In 
the  first  place  it  serves  to  furnish  the  basis  for 
iTjjg  debate,  in  an  adequate  statement  of  the 

Introduction,  question  in  dispute  and  the  reasons  for 
considering  it.  In  the  second  place,  to  use  the 
familiar  saying  of  Cicero,  it  aims  to  render  the 
audience  "  benevolos,  attentos,  dociles," — well- 
disposed  toward  the  speaker's  personality,  atten- 
tive to  his  speech,  and  ready  to  be  instructed  by 
his  arguments.  These  results  are  secured  largely 
by  a  combination  of  the  qualities  of  clearness  and 
persuasiveness.  The  opening  of  a  speech  in  de- 
bate, unless  it  is  to  be  immediately  connected  with 
a  speech  which  has  just  preceded  it  (when  practi- 
cally no  introduction  may  be  required),  should 
state  in  unmistakable  terms  the  nature  of  the  ques- 
tion under  consideration,  and  its  origin — that  is  to 
say,  the  reason  why  it  deserves  attention  from  the 
audience.  It  should  also  state  very  briefly  (or  refer 
to  them  if  they  are  perfectly  well  known)  the  funda- 
mental facts  in  the  case,  in  so  far  as  they  are  agreed 
upon  by  both  sides.  If  the  burden  of  proof  rests 
upon  the  speaker,  he  may  do  well  to  admit  the  fact 
frankly,  and  at  the  same  time  in  a  way  that  will 
lead  up  to  his  intended  attempt  to  shift  the  burden 
upon  the  other  side.    If  the  presumption  is  in  hii 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  139 

favor,  he  >vill  do  well  to  point  this  out  in  a  manner 
that  will  not  arouse  prejudice  by  its  arrogance.  He 
will  then  make  clear  what  he  feels  to  be  those 
elements  in  the  subject  which  should  especially 
interest  the  audience,  and  upon  which  the  case 
must  chiefly  rest.  All  this — unless  the  circum- 
stances are  unusual — should  be  done  in  a  manner 
indicating  respect  for  the  opposite  side  in  the  de- 
bate, and  showing  that  the  speaker  forgets  him- 
self and  his  personal  interests  in  his  desire  to  pre- 
sent his  subject  to  the  audience.  Statements  cal- 
culated to  arouse  the  opposition  of  persons  hold- 
ing views  different  from  the  speaker's  will,  for  the 
time  being,  be  avoided.  The  effect  will  be  that, 
at  the  end  of  the  Introduction,  the  audience  will 
know  precisely  what  the  debate  is  to  be  about,  and 
precisely  what  the  present  speaker  takes  to  be  the 
main  issue;  they  will  also  beUeve  that  he  is  capable 
of  presenting  his  side  of  the  case  in  a  calm  and  fair 
frame  of  mind. 

In  a  sense,  of  course,  the  debater  has  choice  of 
more  than  one  method  in  constructing  his  Intro- 
duction. He  may  state  definitely  not  only  TwoMeth- 
the  side  of  the  case  which  he  wishes  to  proach. 
support,  but  the  sort  of  proof  which  he  intends 
to  offer  in  supporting  it.  He  may  take  the  audi- 
ence into  his  confidence,  and  tell  them  just  what 
the  plan  of  his  speech  is  to  be,  in  order  that  they 
may  follow  it  as  he  proceeds  and  see  that  he  does 
just  what  he  proposed  to  do.    Under  ordinary  cir- 


I40  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

cumstances,  this  method  has  great  advantages. 
Thus  it  is  common  for  lawyers,  before  presenting 
their  proof  in  detail,  to  state  to  the  court  or  jury 
precisely  the  points  on  which  they  wish  to  offer 
evidence,  and  just  how  they  expect  to  show  that 
those  points  establish  their  case.  The  court  may 
then  decide  whether  these  "  offers,"  as  they  are 
called,  are  admissible  in  view  of  the  nature  of  the 
case.  An  audience  in  general  debate  enjoys  being 
taken  into  the  speaker's  confidence  in  a  similar 
way.  Yet  there  may  be  cases  where  a  different 
plan  is  advisable.  When  the  cause  to  be  defended 
is  an  extremely  unpopular  one,  when  the  audience 
must  be  won — if  at  all — by  slow  and  careful  de- 
grees, or  when  the  proof  to  be  presented  is  of 
such  a  nature  as  not  to  be  appreciated  until  all 
the  evidence  is  in,  then  the  debater  may  adopt  a 
more  wary  course.  He  may  not  explain  the  nature 
of  his  argument  at  the  outset,  perhaps  not  even 
admit  which  side  he  intends  to  establish;  but  may 
open  up  the  question  as  though  he  had  little  inter- 
est in  deciding  it  in  either  one  way  or  the  other, 
and  then  lead  his  hearers  on  by  paths  that  they 
have  not  foreseen,  until  he  brings  them,  unex- 
pectedly perhaps,  to  the  point  which  he  wished 
them  to  reach.  Such  a  plan  requires  skill,  but  is 
occasionally  of  no  little  value.  The  Introduction, 
then,  either  may  or  may  not  conclude  with  a  clear 
statement  of  the  plan  of  the  speaker's  argument. 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE,  141 

Regarding  the  structure  of  the  main  body  of 
proof,  very  little  can  be  said  that  is  applicable  in 
a  general  way.  The  nature  of  the  proof  orderof 
must  determine  the  best  order  for  its  ^^°°^' 
presentation.  In  general,  however,  it  will  of  course 
be  well  to  present  at  the  outset  the  argument  from 
antecedent  probability, — proof  that  the  proposition 
is  likely  to  be  true,  or  at  least  that  there  is  no 
valid  presumption  against  it, — since  it  is  the  object 
of  this  argument  to  prepare  the  minds  of  skeptical 
hearers  for  the  stronger  proof  that  is  to  follow. 
There  are  perhaps  very  few  cases  in  which  it  is  not 
well  for  the  debater,  immediately  following  his  intro- 
duction, to  show  in  a  general  way  the  antecedent 
reasonableness  of  his  proposition,  before  stating 
direct  evidence  in  its  behalf.  Such  proof  leads  up 
gradually  and  persuasively  from  the  introductory 
matter  to  the  central  portion  of  the  argument. 
Examples  of  this  sort  of  procedure  have  already 
been  given  in  considering  the  burden  of  proof  and 
methods  of  proof.  Following  the  argument  for 
antecedent  probability  naturally  comes  such  proof 
as  circumstantial  evidence.  In  the  case  of  ques- 
tions of  policy,  proof  relating  to  the  principle  in- 
volved would  naturally  be  followed  'by  that  re- 
lating to  the  interests  involved.  These  are  the 
general  rules  of  order  which  suggest  themselves  to 
any  intelligent  debater. 

Sometimes  it  is  necessary  to  consider  what  the 


I4«  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

or4er  of  arguments  shall  be,  viewed  from  the 
standpoint  of  their  relative  strength.  Shall  one 
proceed  gradually  from  the  weaker  sort  of  proof 
to  the  stronger?  Certainly  this  would  be  better 
than  the  reverse  order.  Rhetoricians  generally 
agree,  however,  that  the  beginning  and  the  end  of 
discourses  and  parts  of  discourses  are  the  places  of 
greatest  emphasis;  one's  best  material,  therefore, 
should  naturally  come  here.  The  weaker  proof  may 
then  be  brought  in  in  a  position  protected  by  what 
has  preceded  and  what  is  to  follow;  there  will 
thus  be  a  chance  that  its  weakness  may  escape  ob- 
servation. Sometimes  it  is  necessary  to  place  one's 
very  best  proof  at  the  beginning  of  the  argument, 
in  order  to  overcome  prejudice  or  to  overthrow 
the  effect  of  a  speech  just  made  on  the  other  side. 
Genung  remarks — what  is  undoubtedly  true — that 
in  such  a  case  this  strong  proof  should  be  briefly 
repeated  at  the  end  of  the  argument,  in  order  to 
secure  the  benefit  of  its  force  in  that  emphatic  posi- 
tion. 

In  general  it  is  to  be  said  that  all  rules  regarding 
the  ordering  of  material  are  to  be  regarded  as 
merely  provisional,  when  it  comes  to  the 
^f Debate*  exigencies  of  actual  debate.  This  is  par- 
ticularly true  in  the  cause  of  refutation. 
One  may  and  should  plan  the  order  of  his  refu- 
tation according  to  a  consistent  scheme,  so  that 
it    will    take    its    place    easily    and    clearly    in 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  143 

connection  with  the  direct  proof.  He  should 
make  up  his  mind  wher-e  it  will  probably  be 
best  to  take  up  the  main  points  of  his  oppo- 
nent's argument,  and  where  it  will  be  best  to 
return  to  the  matters  wherein  his  opponent  may 
have  attacked  his  arguments  as  first  advanced.  But 
the  circumstances  of  the  debate  may,  and  often 
will,  make  it  necessary  for  him  to  throw  this  plan 
overboard,  and  spring  at  once  to  the  point  where 
it  has  become  evident  that  the  main  contest  is  going 
on.  It  is  not  the  order  in  which  ideas  ought  theo- 
retically to  have  precedence,  but  the  order  in  which 
ideas  present  themselves  to  his  hearers,  that  he 
must  consider;  and  if  he  insists  on  proceeding  ac- 
cording to  his  original  plan,  when  the  audience  is 
impatient  to  hear  what  he  has  to  say  upon  some 
matter  that  has  become  prominent  in  the  discus- 
sion, he  will  be  likely  to  lose  his  case. 

In  the  concluding  arguments  made  before  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  famous 
*'  income  tax  "  cases,  occurred  an  interest-  inverted 
ing  example  of  what  we  may  call  inverted  Sefatation. 
refutation, — refutation,  that  is  to  say,  where  the 
point  last  made  by  an  opponent  was  the  first  to 
be  taken  up  by  the  debater  in  reply.  This  argu- 
ment was  carried  on  by  two  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished American  lawyers,  Mr.  Carter  for  the 
government,  and  Mr.  Choate  for  the  opponents  of 
the  income  tax.       In  his  concluding  speech  Mr. 


144  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

Carter,  having  finished  his  positive  constitutional 
argument,  made  a  final  appeal  urging  the  court  to 
abstain  from  interfering,  on  technical  grounds,  with 
the  will  of  the  people.  The  present  subject,  he 
said,  was  one  calculated  to  arouse  the  interests, 
even  the  passions,  of  the  people,  and  to  array  class 
against  class.  ''  Noithing  could  be  more  unwise 
and  dangerous  than  an  attempt  to  baffle  and  defeat 
a  popular  determination  by  a  judgment  in  a  law- 
suit. When  the  opposing  forces  of  sixty  millions 
of  people  have  become  arrayed  in  hostile  political 
ranks  upon  a  question  which  all  men  feel  is  not  a 
question  of  law,  but  of  legislation,  the  only  path  of 
safety  is  to  accept  the  voice  of  the  majority  as 
final."  Mr.  Carter  even  hinted  that  previous  at- 
tempts on  the  part  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  thwart 
the  popular  will  had  been  swept  away  by  the  power 
of  public  opinion.  When  Mr.  Choate  rose  to  reply 
he  referred  facetiously  to  Mr.  Carter's  eloquent 
warnings,  and  continued:  "It  never  would  hav€ 
occurred  to  me  to  present  either  as  an  opening  or 
closing  argument,  to  this  great  and  learned  court, 
that  if,  in  their  wisdom,  they  found  it  necessary  to 
protect  a  suitor  who  sought  here  to  cling  to  the 
Ark  of  the  Covenant,  and  invoke  the  protection  of 
the  Constitution,  that  possibly  the  popular  wrath 
might  sweep  the  court  away.  I  have  had  some 
surprises  this  morning.  I  thought  until  to-day 
that    there    was    a    Constitution    of   the    United 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  145 

States,  and  that  this  court  was  created  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  Constitution  as  against 
unlawful  conduct  on  the  part  of  Congress.'* 
In  this  way  Mr.  Choate  swept  away  whatever 
effect  had  been  produced  by  the  peroration  of 
Mr.  Carter.  One  need  not  suppose,  of  course, 
that  either  passage  had  any  important  effect  on  the 
court  or  the  case.  They  were  the  mere  by-play  of 
giants  in  controversy;  but  they  illustrated  the 
method  of  skilled  debaters.  In  particular,  the 
incident  showed  how  it  may  sometimes  be  well,  at 
the  opening  of  one's  argument,  to  sweep  away  an 
effect  just  produced  by  an  opponent,  before  pro- 
ceeding with  one's  own  case. 

This  brings  us  to  the  matter  of  the  Conclusion. 
The  Conclusion  should  be  the  point  at  which  the 
skill  of  the  debater  is  most  in  evidence,  TheOon- 
and  where  he  masses  all  his  forces  for  diision. 
final  attack  and  victory.  Almost  invariably  the 
nature  of  the  Conclusion  should  be  decided  on  in 
advance.  One  may  not  know  how  he  is  to  open 
his  speech,  nor  just  what  line  of  argument  will  be 
most  advisable,  until  he  has  heard  all  that  his  op- 
ponent has  to  say;  but  one  can  usually  know  be- 
forehand how  he  wishes  to  conclude, — what  great 
thought  or  feeling  he  wishes  to  leave  finally  ring- 
ing in  the  ears  of  his  audience.  Unforeseen  cir- 
cumstances may,  of  course,  upset  one's  plans,  and 
make  the  proposed  conclusion  inappropriate;   but 


146  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

in  nine  cases  out  of  ten  there  is  little  danger  of 
this.  When  the  speaker,  therefore,  observes  that 
his  time  is  about  to  expire,  he  should  rapidly  bring 
to  a  point  the  particular  matter  on  which  he  is 
speaking,  and  should  then  pass  over — even  if  much 
that  he  wished  to  say  must  be  omitted — ^to  that 
with  which  he  wished  to  end.  Otherwise  his  speech 
may  be  left  hanging  in  the  air. 

The  first  object  of  a  Conclusion  should  be  to 
leave  the  hearers  with  a  full  understanding  of  what 
the  line  of  argument  has  been,  and  how 
it  has  established  one's  case.  This  may 
require  a  brief  summary  of  the  entire  line  of  proof, 
if  the  proof  has  been  somewhat  long  and  compli- 
cated; or  it  may  require  only  an  emphatic  restate- 
ment of  the  strongest  arguments  already  advanced 
— those  on  which  the  speaker  conceives  his  suc- 
cess chiefly  to  depend.  The  method  and  extent  of 
these  concluding  restatements  or  summaries  must 
depend  on  the  exigencies  of  the  particular  debate. 
They  are  of  small  value  as  mere  formalities,  so 
that  one  need  not  take  time  at  the  close  of  a  de- 
bate to  say,  "  Let  me  now  briefly  summarize  the 
ground  over  which  we  have  gone,"  merely  for  the 
sake  of  appearing  systematic.  The  point  is,  to  re- 
hearse and  emphasize  those  arguments  which  the 
audience  needs  to  have  left  ringing  in  their  ears; 
And  a  watchful  speaker  can  judge,  in  any  particular 
case,  which  these  arguments  are. 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  147 

One  wishes  not  only  to  leave  the  audience 
clearly  possessed  of  the  conclusion  of  one's  argu- 
ment, but  also  in  a  proper  state  of  mind,  persuaiiTe- 
— well-disposed    toward    the     whole    side     nesamthe 

P       ^,  ,  1  •    1  Conolusion. 

of  the  controversy  which  one  repre- 
sents, and  willing  to  act  upon  the  conclusions 
reached,  if  action  is  required.  Something  like  an 
application  of  one's  case  to  the  immediate  audience, 
then,  will  naturally  follow  the  restatement  of  proof. 
But  whether  this  application  shall  be  direct  and 
unimpassioned, — a  simple  effort  to  reach  the  will 
of  the  hearers  through  their  reason, — or  more 
elaborate  and  impassioned, — an  effort  to  reach  the 
will  through  the  feelings, — must  be  decided  for 
each  particular  debate.  The  character  of  the  audi- 
ence and  the  nature  of  the  subject  will  determine 
how  far  any  appeal  to  the  emotions  will  be  appro- 
priate. A  judge  in  a  court  of  law  will  be  likely 
to  determine  questions  according  to  pure  reason; 
a  jury  will  be  more  likely  to  be  moved  by  their 
feelings.  In  general,  the  more  intellectual  an  audi- 
ence the  more  suspicious  it  is  likely  to  be  of  merely 
emotional  appeals.  And  there  is  quite  as  much  dif- 
ference in  subjects  as  in  audiences.  To  attempt  any 
considerable  appeal  to  the  emotions  on  a  subject 
relating  to  the  tariff  or  the  currency,  will  be  likely 
to  be  absurd;  while  other  subjects,  such  as  those 
relating  to  wars  for  liberty,  are  of  course  highly 
susceptible  of  emotional   treatment.     The  safeguard 


148  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

of  the  speaker  must  be  to  avoid  going  any  further 
than  he  can  be  sure  of  carrying  his  audience  with 
him. 

Some  illustrations  of  different  methods  of  stating 
a  concluding  application  or  appeal  may  make  these 
Diff  t  suggestions  somewhat  more  clear.  The 
kinds  of  great  speech  of  Lord  Mansfield  in  the 
case  of  Kvans,  delivered  m  the  House  of 
Lords  in  1767,  is  an  example  of  a  dispassionate,  dis- 
tinctly intellectual  conclusion  to  an  argument.  The 
summary  of  the  main  points  of  the  argument  is 
merged  with  the  parliamentary  motion  to  afBrm 
the  judgment  which  Lord  Mansfield  had  been  de- 
fending. 

"  In  the  case  before  your  Lordships,  the  defendant 
was  by  law  incapable  at  the  time  of  his  pretended  elec- 
tion; and  it  is  my  firm  persuasion  that  he  was  chosen 
because  he  was  incapable.  If  he  had  been  capable,  he 
had  not  been  chosen,  for  they  did  not  want  him  to 
serve  the  office.  They  chose  him  because,  without  a 
breach  of  the  law,  and  a  usurpation  on  the  Crown, 
he  could  not  serve  the  office.  They  chose  him,  that  he 
might  fall  under  the  penalty  of  their  by-law,  made  to 
serve  a  particular  purpose;  in  opposition  to  which,  and 
to  avoid  the  fine  thereby  imposed,  he  hath  pleaded  a 
legal  disability,  grounded  on  two  acts  of  Parliament. 
As  I  am  of  opinion  that  his  plea  is  good,  I  conclude 
with  moving  your  Lordships,  That  the  judgment  be 
affirmed." 

A  still  more  striking  case  of  this  sort  of  con- 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  149 

elusion  is  found  in  Daniel  Webster's  defense  of  the 
Kennistons.  Here,  although  addressing  the  jury, 
the  great  lawyer  was  content  to  conclude  his  argu- 
ment with  a  summary  of  his  proofs  and  a  direct  ap- 
pHcation  of  them  to  the  duty  of  the  jury. 

"  From  the  time  of  the  robbery  to  the  arrest,  five  or 
six  weeks,  the  defendants  were  engaged  in  their  usual 
occupations.  They  are  not  found  to  have  passed  a 
dollar  of  money  to  anybody.  They  continued  their 
ordinary  habits  of  labor.  No  man  saw  money  about 
them,  nor  any  circumstance  that  might  lead  to  a  sus- 
picion that  they  had  money.  Nothing  occurred  tend- 
ing in  any  degree  to  excite  suspicion  against  them. 
When  arrested,  and  when  all  this  array  of  evidence 
was  brought  against  them,  and  when  they  could  hope 
in  nothing  but  their  innocence,  immunity  was  offered 
them  again  if  they  would  confess.  They  were  pressed, 
and  urged,  and  allured,  by  every  motive  which  could 
be  set  before  them,  to  acknowledge  their  participation 
in  the  offence,  and  to  bring  out  their  accomplices. 
They  steadily  protested  that  they  could  confess  nothing 
because  they  knew  nothing.  In  defiance  of  all  the  dis- 
coveries made  in  their  house,  they  have  trusted  to 
their  innocence.  On  that,  and  on  the  candor  and  dis- 
cernment of  an  enlightened  jury,  they  still  rely. 

"  If  the  jury  are  satisfied  that  there  is  the  highest 
improbability  that  these  persons  could  have  had  any 
previous  knowledge  of  Goodridge,  or  been  concerned 
in  any  previous  concert  to  rob  him;  if  their  conduct 
that  evening  and  the  next  day  was  marked  by  no  cir- 
cumstances of  suspicion;    if  from  that  moment  until 


ISO  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

their  arrest  nothing  appeared  against  them;  if  they 
neither  passed  money,  nor  are  found  to  have  had 
money;  if  the  manner  of  the  search  of  their  house, 
and  the  circumstances  attending  it,  excite  strong  sus- 
picions of  unfair  and  fraudulent  practises;  if,  in  the 
hour  of  their  utmost  peril,  no  promises  of  safety  could 
draw  from  the  defendants  any  confession  affecting 
themselves  or  others,  it  will  be  for  the  jury  ta  say 
whether  they  can  pronounce  them  guilty." 

Turn  now  to  a  conclusion  of  another  sort,  when 
Lord  Chatham  was  addressing  the  House  of  Lords 
in  his  splendid  protest  against  the  inhumanities  of 
some  of  the  early  British  efforts  to  suppress  -the" 
American  Revolution.  Here  the  appeal  is  not  to 
a  court,  nor  on  a  legal  question,  but  to  the  House 
of  Lords  in  its  representative  capacity  and  on  a 
question  of  colonial  policy  tand  public  justice. 

"  I  call  upon  that  right  reverend  bench,  those  holy 
ministers  of  the  Gospel,  and  pious  pastors  of  our 
Church — I  conjure  them  to  join  in  the  holy  work,  and 
vindicate  the  religion  of  their  God.  I  appeal  to  the 
wisdom  and  law  of  this  learned  bench,  to  defend  and 
support  the  justice  of  their  country.  I  call  upon  the 
Bishops  to  interpose  the  unsullied  sanctity  of  their 
lawn;  upon  the  learned  Judges,  to  interpose  the  purity 
of  their  ermine,  to  save  us  from  this  pollution.  I  call 
upon  the  honor  of  your  Lordships,  to  reverence  the 
dignity  of  your  ancestors  and  to  maintain  your  own. 
I  call  upon  the  spirit  and  humanity  of  my  country,  to 
vindicate  the  national  character.    I  invoke  the  genius 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE,  ^S' 

of  the  Constitution.  From  the  tapestry  that  adorns 
these  walls  the  immortal  ancestor  of  this  noble  Lord 
frowns  with  indignation  at  the  disgrace  of  his  coun- 
try.    .     . 

"  I  again  call  upon  your  Lordships,  and  the  united 
powers  of  the  state,  to  examine  it  thoroughly  and  de- 
cisively, and  to  stamp  upon  it  an  indelible  stigma  of  the 
public  abhorrence.  And  I  again  implore  those  holy 
prelates  of  our  religion  to  do  away  these  iniquities 
from  among  us  !  Let  them  perform  a  lustration ;  let 
them  purify  this  House,  and  this  country,  from  this 
sin. 

"  My  Lords,  I  am  old  and  weak,  and  at  present  un- 
able to  say  more;  but  my  feelings  and  indignation 
were  too  strong  to  have  said  less.  I  could  not  have 
slept  this  night  in  my  bed,  nor  reposed  my  head  on  my 
pillow,  without  giving  vent  to  my  eternal  abhorrence 
of  such  preposterous  and  enormous  principles." 

We  have  now  considered  briefly  the  general 
structure  of  the  finished  argument  as  a  whole.  The 
detailed   inner  structure   of  the   various  ^  ,  ^,     . 

Relation  of 

main  divisions  is  of  no  less  importance,  Structure 
but  it  is  difficult  to  do  more  than  call  at-  *^  ^  *' 
tention  to  the  problem  as  one  to  be  solved  accord- 
ing to  the  general  laws  of  rhetoric.  The  problem 
of  structure  in  an  argument  is  one  of  peculiar  im- 
portance, and,  in  a  sense,  of  peculiar  difficulty.  The 
various  parts,  and  their  relation  to  one  another,  are 
to  be  made  perfectly  clear  to  the  audience,  and  yet 
this  is  to  be  done  without  such  an  appearance  of 


IS*  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

formality  and  baldness  as  to  make  the  argument 
seem  like  a  mathematical  demonstration.  In  a 
word,  structure  must  be  emphasized,  and  yet  not 
to  the  sacrifice  of  literary  form.  The  skeleton  must 
be  discernible,  but  it  must  be  clothed  in  flesh.  The 
difficulty  here  is  a  real  one.  In  most  arguments  the 
structure  is  not  clear  enough,  and  the  audience  has 
no  definite  idea,  at  any  particular  moment,  just 
what  progress  has  been  made.  But  when  debaters 
realize  this,  study  the  subject  of  structure,  and  draw 
careful  outlines  or  briefs  of  what  they  wish  to  say, 
they  are  very  likely  to  go  to  the  other  extreme, 
and  make  a  speech  that  is  full  of  firsts,  secondlies 
and  thirdlies,  of  formal  phrases  like  "  Thus  it  will 
be  seen,"  ''  I  now  proceed  to  another  point,"  and 
the  like,  which  destroy  all  artistic  effect.  Mathe- 
matics and  art  are,  in  fact,  if  not  enemies,  neigh- 
bors of  such  incompatible  temperaments  that  it 
requires  some  skill  to  make  them  live  together  in 
peace. 

It  has  already  been  said  that  the  structure  of 
the  brief  should  be  the  basis  of  the  structure  of 
Paragraph  the  finished  argument.  Ordinarily,  too. 
Structure.  ^\^^  paragraph  structure  of  the  brief  will 
suggest  the  paragraph  structure  of  the  finished 
argument;  and  upon  the  paragraph  structure  of 
the  latter  a  great  part  of  its  clearness  and  force  will 
depend.  If  the  paragraphs,  then,  follow  one  an- 
other according  to  the  arrangement  of  the  headings 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  153 

in  the  outline  or  brief,  the  general  orderliness  of 
the  argument  is  insured.  But  these  paragraphs  are 
of  course  not  to  be  numbered  or  lettered  as  in  a 
brief.  They  cannot  even  be  made  visible  to  the 
persons  addressed;  for  it  is  of  spoken,  not  of  writ- 
ten argument  that  we  are  thinking,  and  a  slight 
pause  for  the  taking  of  breath,  with  perhaps  a 
change  of  the  pitch  of  the  voice  and  a  still  slighter 
change  of  bodily  posture,  is  all  the  speaker  can 
provide  to  indicate  transition  in  the  argument.  He 
can,  however,  by  a  careful  use  of  the  connective 
tissue  of  language,  help  to  make  his  structure  clear. 
He  must  not  omit  a  single  step  in  his  line  of  argu- 
ment, and  expect  the  audience  to  supply  it  for 
tliemselves.  He  must  not  even  omit  the  conjunc- 
tions, ''  hence,"  and  "  therefore,"  and  ''  because," 
and  all  the  rest,  which  serve  to  show  just  how  two 
statements  are  related  to  each  other.  And  if  he 
wishes  to  be  pleasing  as  well  as  clear,  he  must  do 
this  with  variety,  not  marshalling  his  sentences  in 
monotonous  array  like  the  statements  in  a  brief, 
but  letting  them — so  far  as  their  mere  verbal  form 
is  concerned— trip  about  in  constantly  changing 
ifashion  like  the  sentences  of  ordinary  speech.  The 
result,  if  he  is  successful,  will  be  that  one  can  listen 
to  his  argument  as  easily  as  to  the  conversation  of 
a  friend,  and  at  the  same  time  can  follow  its  struc- 
ture as  easily  as  the  demonstrations  in  a  geometri- 
cal text-book. 


154  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

The  study  of  the  paragraph  is  a  whole  subject  in 
itself,  and  there  is  little  time  in  this  connection  in 
which  to  take  it  up.  But  it  is  perhaps  of  even 
greater  importance  in  argumentative  work  than  in 
ordinary  composition.  The  paragraphs  in  a  speech, 
as  in  an  essay,  should  each  be  a  unit,  the  expression 
of  one  central  idea;  and  it  is  even  more  important 
in  a  speech  than  in  an  essay  that  this  central  idea 
should  be  instantly  and  clearly  understood.  A 
reader  may  go  back  and  read  the  paragraph  over 
again,  if  he  is  not  sure  of  its  purpose  on  first  read- 
ing, but  a  hearer  cannot  do  this;  he  must  catch 
the  thought  at  once  or  never.  For  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  the  para- 
graph are  of  chief  importance;  and  two  rules  re* 
lating  to  these  parts  will  be  found,  while  not  uni- 
versally useful,  of  very  wide  significance.  First, 
Let  the  opening  sentence  of  the  paragraph  indicate 
what  its  general  subject  is  to  he,  and,  if  possible,  what 
is  its  connection  with  the  paragraph  that  has  preceded. 
Secondly,  Let  the  last  sentence  of  the  paragraph  state 
in  a  summary  form  the  main  thought  which  the  para- 
graph is  intended  to  express. 

The  effect  of  these  rules  in  a  speech  is  as  marked 

as  in  a  written  discourse.    In  the  latter  the  opening 

and  closing  sentences  of  the  paragraph 

are  especially  emphatic  because  they  are 

conspicuous  to  the  eye.     In  speech  they  must  be 

made  emphatic  by  the  speaker's  voice,  and  by  the 


STRUCTURE  AHD  STYLE,  I55 

pause  which  precedes  and  follows  the  paragraph. 
In  other  words,  at  each  transition  point  in  the  argu- 
ment the  speaker  will  indicate  by  a  change  of  tone 
and  a  pause  that  the  point  is  one  of  transition;  and 
the  first  sentence  of  the  new  division  will  indicate 
clearly  what  point  the  speaker  wishes  now  to  bring 
before  the  audience.  At  the  end  of  the  period  he 
will  restate  the  main  thought  of  the  division  in  a 
short,  emphatic,  summarizing  sentence,  which  will 
leave  no  shadow  of  a  doubt  as  to  what  it  is  that  he 
has  just  been  trying  to  declare. 

In  order  to  illustrate  the  ways  in  which  a  portion 
of  an  argument  may  develop  from  a  group  Development 
of  headines  in  an  outline,  let  us  consider  o/^^^^^®^ 

»  '  _  Argument 

what  might  be  done  in  developing  a  sec-  illustrated. 
tion  of  a  brief  on  the  subject  of  a  law  restricting 
immigration  into  this  country. 

In  the  decision  of  this  question,  all  interests  save  those  of 
the  United  States  are  to  he  rejected. 

1.  For  if  our  interests  and  those  of  aliens  are  identi- 

cal, the  latter  need  not  be  considered. 
And  if  our  interests  and  theirs  conflict.  Congress 
must  prefer  ours. 

2.  The  government,  like  an  individual,  has  the  pri- 

mary duty  of  self-preservation;  and  this  meas- 
ure is  for  that  end. 

3.  The  fact  that  America  has  a  mission  to  perform 

on  behalf  of  the  races  of  the  world  can  have  no 
bearing  on  the  action  of  Congress;  for 


iS^  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

Congress  is  not  empowered  to  take  action  of 
a  purely  altruistic  nature,  even  when  such 
action  would  be  consistent  with  home  in- 
terests; how  much  less,  therefore,  when  it 
is  inconsistent  with  our  own  interests  ? 

Moreover,  the  duty  of  the  United  States 
toward  the  world  cannot  be  accomplished 
if  the  fundamental  character  of  its  institu- 
tions deteriorates;  and  it  is  for  the  pre- 
vention of  such  deterioration  that  the  pres  • 
ent  bill  is  framed. 

With  this  section  of  an  outline  as  a  basis  for  th<i 
corresponding  part  of  the  finished  argument,  ;i 
speaker  might  pursue  one  of  two  or  4:hree 
Mctst^e.  different  methods.  He  might,  in  the  first 
place,  follow  the  form  of  his  outline  as 
closely  as  possible.  The  result  v^ould  perhaps  be 
somewhat  as  follows: 

"It  is  true  that  all  Interests  save  those  of  the  United 
States  are  to  be  thrown  aside  in  the  consideration  of 
this  question.  This  is  so  for  three  reasons.  First: 
either  our  interests  and  those  of  aliens  are  identical,  in 
matters  affecting  immigration,  or  they  are  not.  If  they 
are  identical,  the  interests  of  aliens  certainly  need  not 
be  considered.  If  they  conflict,  Congress  must  cer- 
tainly choose  our  interests  to  those  of  outsiders,  re- 
membering that  it  is.  the  sworn  duty  of  every  legislator 
to  represent  his  own  country  first  of  all.  Secondly, 
the  government,  like  individuals,  has  a  certain  right  of 
self-preservation  that  takes  precedence  of  everything 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE,  157 

else;  and  it  has  already  been  shown  that  the  restric- 
tion of  immigration  is  an  act  which  would  operate  in 
the  interest  of  such  self-preservation.  Thirdly,  it  can- 
not be  said  that  our  country  has  certain  duties  to  per- 
form toward  other  races,  duties  which  have  been  laid 
upon  us  by  the  special  traits  and  special  privileges 
which  we  possess;  for  Congress  has  no  constitutional 
right  to  undertake  measures  of  a  purely  altruistic  char- 
acter, for  missionary  purposes,  even  if  they  are  not  in- 
consistent with  the  interests  of  our  own  people.  How 
much  less,  then,  can  it  either  pass  laws  or  neglect  to 
pass  laws  for  the  sake  of  profiting  alien  races,  con- 
trary to  the  pressing  interests  of  the  United  States? 
Such  interests  are  to  be  wholly  rejected  by  a  legislative 
body  that  exists  for  a  particular  purpose,  namely,  to 
fulfill  the  demands  of  its  constituents.  But  suppose 
we  do  admit  that  the  mission  of  the  United  States 
among  the  peoples  of  the  world  is  to  be  taken  into 
consideration,  this  mission  cannot  be  performed  if  the 
fundamental  character  of  our  government  or  our  cit- 
izenship deteriorates.  In  order,  therefore,  to  carry  out 
this  very  purpose  of  altruism,  the  integrity  of  our  cit- 
izenship and  form  of  government  must  be  preserved ; 
and  our  claim  is,  once  more,  that  this  cannot  be  done 
without  the  further  restriction  of  immigration.  Hence 
we  see,  since  Congress  must  prefer  American  interests 
to  those  of  aliens,  since  the  government,  like  an  in- 
dividual, has  the  duty  of  self-preservation,  and  since 
the  beneficent  mission  of  America  to  the  world  is  not 
a  matter  for  our  legislators  to  take  into  consideration, 


15^  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

that  in  the  decision  of  this  question  all  interests  save 
those  of  the  United  States  are  to  be  rejected." 

This  is  a  very  close  transcription  of  the  state- 
ments in  the  outline,  and  in  a  sense  is  entirely  clear 
and  orderly.  Regarded,  however,  as  a  part  of  a 
speech  in  actual  debate,  it  is  a  very  poor  produc- 
tion. It  states  the  case  baldly,  and  is  utterly  with- 
out elements  aiming  at  persuasion  or  at  the  forcible 
pointing-  of  arguments.  Moreover,  the  phraseology 
is  too  compact  and  abstract — in  other  words,  too  far 
removed  from  the  colloquial  style — to  be  quickly 
understood  by  any  audience.  It  would  require 
thoughtful  reading  to  bring  out  its  real  content. 

One  can  imagine  a  speech  which  should  have 
nearly  all  the  merits  which  are  wanting  in  the  one 
The  DiffttBi  j^st  Considered,  and  yet  none  of  the  merits 
Style.  which  this  one  illustrated.     The  corres- 

ponding passage  might  run  somewhat  as  follows: 

"  We  are  charged  with  thinking  only  of  the  selfish 
interests  of  the  United  States.  And  whose  interests, 
let  me  ask,  are  we  supposed  to  consider,  when  we  are 
talking  about  a  law  that  is  being  debated  in  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States?  The  interests  of  the  Hot- 
tentot? of  Patagonia?  or  of  Spain,  it  may  be!  I  tell 
you,  sir,  if  the  people  of  the  United  States  do  not  con- 
sider their  own  interests  for  a  while,  and  put  a  stop  to 
the  incoming  elements  that  are  cutting  away  the  very 
foundations  of  our  historic  government  and  our  demo- 
cratic citizenship,  there  will  be  nobody  so  low  as  to 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  159 

care  to  appeal  to  us  to  take  an  interest  in  him!  It  is 
very  fine  to  talk  of  altruism,  of  the  interests  of  others, 
but  self-preservation  is  the  first  law  of  existence;  al- 
truism comes  afterward.  If  Congress  has  to  choose 
between  the  interests  of  a  pack  of  Italians,  or  a  ship- 
load of  filthy  Chinamen,  and  those  of  her  own  citizens, 
do  you  suppose  they  are  going  to  hesitate,  and,  before 
they  take  action,  make  up  their  minds  that  they  are 
not  doing  anything  to  hurt  those  refugees  and  fortune- 
hunters?  Our  opponents  tell  us  that  we  have  a  mis- 
sion to  the  whole  world.  I  have  been  reading  the 
newspapers  a  good  many  years,  and  I  never  heard  of 
Congress  passing  a  law  entitled,  '  An  act  to  carry  the 
blessings  of  free  government  to  foreign  peoples/  I 
never  heard  of  their  defeating  a  bill  on  the  ground  that 
it  would  injure  the  missionary  interests  of  America. 
I  hope  they  will  not  begin  now.  No,  sir!  if  this  bill 
for  the  restriction  of  immigration  is  defeated,  let  the 
gentlemen  who  vote  against  it,  when  they  remember 
how  the  Chinaman  in  the  West,  and  the  Italians  and 
Bohemians  in  the  East,  and  the  French-Canadians  in 
the  North,  are  cheapening  wages  and  taking  work 
from  hungry  American  citizens, — let  them  pass  a  law 
for  the  encouragement  of  alien  immigration,  and  let 
them  entitle  it,  in  Scripture  language,  '  An  act  to  take 
the  children's  bread  and  give  it  to  the  dogs '!  ** 

This  is  a  type  of  debate  which  is  well  worth 
study.  Anyone  who  has  heard  much  public  debate 
IS  familiar  with  the  sort  of  speaker  who  has  the  gift 
of  putting  things  in  a  vigorous  and  interesting  way, 
even  if  it  be  at  some  expense  of  dignity  and  method. 


i6o  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

The  imaginary  passage  just  cited  really  contained 
all,  or  nearly  all,  the  arguments  included  in  the 
one  previously  quoted.  They  were  scattered  about, 
however,  without  order  or  clearly  progressive 
thought;  so  that  upon  a  serious  and  intelligent 
hearer  they  would  make  little  impression.  On  the 
other  hand,  this  second  passage  was  twice  as  inter- 
esting and  forcible  as  the  preceding  one.  The  first 
speaker  would  probably  have  put  his  audience  to 
sleep,  in  spite  of  his  methodical  style;  the  second 
would  have  sat  down  amid  a  burst  of  applause.  The 
popular  style  of  debate,  therefore,  is  not  to  be 
despised,  but  should  be  studied  in  order  to  see  if 
its  merits  can  be  imitated  by  one  who  avoids  its 
defects. 

Let  us  attempt  to  imagine  a  passage  embody- 
The  Com-  '^^^y  "'Ot  perfectly  but  approximately,  the 
pronuse.  merits  of  both  the  styles  already  illus- 
trated. 

"  We  are  charged  with  thinking  only  of  the  selfish 
interests  of  the  United  States.  But  is  it  altogether 
selfish  and  unreasonable  to  confine  the  discussion  of 
this  particular  measure  to  a  particular  class  of  inter- 
ests? It  is  not  that  the  interests  of  others  are  always  to 
be  neglected.  It  is  simply  a  question  as  to  whether, 
when  this  bill  for  the  restriction  of  immigration  comes 
before  our  Congress,  that  body  is  justified  In  resting 
its  decision  solely  on  American  interests.  We  believe 
It  is. 

"  It  will  clear  up  the  matter,  perhaps,  if  we  consider 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE,  i6l 

that  different  interests  must  either  harmonize  or  not 
harmonize.  Now  if  the  interests  of  Americans  regard- 
ing the  immigration  question  are  identical  with  those 
of  the  Chinese,  for  example,  or  the  Italians,  there  is 
surely  no  trouble.  To  satisfy  our  needs  will  satisfy 
theirs.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  our  interests  clash  with 
theirs  on  this  question,  and  there  is  presented  to  Con- 
gress the  definite  choice  between  passing  a  law  which 
would  benefit  Americans,  or  of  not  passing  it  because 
it  is  opposed  to  the  interests  of  aliens,  what  can  Con- 
gress do?  Its  members  cannot  go  home  and  say  to 
their  constituents.  The  law  would  have  been  to  your 
advantage,  but  lo!  the  poor  Chinaman!  As  a  repre- 
sentative body.  Congress  can  regard  no  interests  as 
paramount  to  those  of  America.  American  interests 
alone,  then,  must  determine  the  issue. 

"  But  more  than  this.  While  governments,  like  in- 
dividuals, may  have  other  duties  than  purely  selfish 
ones,  they  have  also,  like  individuals,,  a  primary  right 
of  self-protection  and  self-preservation.  They  have  it, 
indeed,  much  more  than  individuals;  for  a  man  may 
think  it  his  duty  to  sacrifice  his  life  in  the  interests  of 
others,  but  a  government  has  no  right  to  expose  itself 
to  disease  or  other  danger,  being  itself  the  protectOi 
of  thousands  of  individuals.  If,  therefore,  a  measure 
is  urged  as  one  of  protection  to  the  government,  will 
you  stay  legislation,  saying,  'Wait!  Before  taking 
action  on  this,  before  protecting  our  people  from  in- 
vasions of  armies  perilous  to  our  safety, — though  they 
do  not  come  with  sword  and  spear, — pause  and  con- 
sider whether  to  do  so  will  be  for  the  best  interests  of 
alien  peoples ! '    America  will  reply  by  drawing  the 


z6a  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

protecting  folds  of  her  garments  more  closely  about 
her,  and  saying  proudly,  My  own  children  first ! 

"  We  must  go  a  step  further,  to  make  our  position 
perfectly  clear.  We  have  heard  no  little  talk  about  the 
mission  of  America  to  other  peoples,  and  the  pity  of 
interfering  with  this  by  Congressional  legislation.  It 
is  true  that  America  has,  in  a  sense,  a  mission  to  other 
peoples.  Yet  the  Constitution  does  not  recognize  it; 
the  law  does  not  recognize  it;  Congress  could  not 
recognize  it  to  the  extent  of  appropriating  public 
money,  for  example,  for  spreading  the  blessings  of 
liberty  throughout  the  world.  They  could  not  do  it 
even  if  to  do  so  would  be  entirely  consistent  with 
American  interests,  simply  because  it  is  not  the  busi- 
ness of  Congress  to  do  that  sort  of  thing.  How  much* 
less,  then,  can  Congress  seek  to  give  aid  to  aliens  at 
the  expense  of  our  own  people? 

"  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  remain  on  this  purely 
selfish  ground.  From  the  very  fact  that  America  has 
a  mission  to  the  world,  the  pending  bill  should  be 
passed.  The  fulfillment  of  such  a  mission  is  absolutely 
dependent  upon  the  preservation,  in  all  their  purity, 
of  those  elements  which  make  America  a  vision  of 
Liberty  enlightening  the  world.  Destroy  our  pure 
democracy,  shake  the  least  of  the  pillars  of  self-govern- 
ment, make  law  less  sacred,  and  liberty  a  more  noisy 
but  less  certain  thing, — and  America's  mission  is  over. 
If  her  own  banner  is  torn  and  her  own  garments 
stained,  no  need  for  her  going  on  a  crusade  to  enlighten 
the  world.  To  speak  more  definitely,  if  the  purity  of  our 
politics  is  destroyed,  and  the  security  of  life,  property, 


( 


STKUCTUKh  AND  STYLE.  163 

education,  citizenship,  or  family  in  our  great  cities  is 
made  uncertain,  there  is  small  use  in  bothering  our- 
selves about  setting  an  example  for  others.  For  the 
very  end,  then,  of  preserving  that  example  which  our 
fathers  set  up,  we  must  protect  our  own  borders,  pre- 
serve our  own  citizenship,  defend  our  own  flag! 

"  We  reaffirm,  then,  with  no  fear  of  laying  ourselves 
open  to  the  charge  of  narrowness  or  selfishness,  that 
this  measure  is  to  be  considered  solely  in  the  light  of 
American  interests.  We  do  this  first,  because  if  there 
is  a  conflict  between  our  interests  and  those  of  aliens. 
Congress  has  no  choice  but  to  give  ours  the  right  of 
way ;  secondly,  because  the  measure  is  one  looking  to 
the  protection  of  the  republic,  and  that  must  always  be 
of  paramount  interest  to  our  law-makers ;  and  thirdly, 
because  even  for  the  sake  of  other  peoples,  and  the  per- 
petuity of  our  mission  and  example,  the  purity  of  our 
citizenship  and  our  institutions  must  be  preserved." 


This  imaginary  passage  is  in  no  sense  offered  as 
a  general  model  for  debaters.  It  may  be  questioned 
whether  the  particular  line  of  proof  involved  would 
require  any  such  careful  demonstration  before  an 
ordinary  American  audience.  A  somewhat  obvious 
proposition  was  chosen,  in  order  that  attention 
might  be  fixed  on  the  form,  not  the  substance,  of 
the  argument.  The  passage  is  intended  to  illus- 
trate one  point  only:  the  development  of  the  fin- 
ished argument  from  the  outline.  The  third  pas- 
sage, like  the  first,  follows  the  structure  of  the 
outline  closely  and  clearly;    but  it  also,  like  the 


1^4  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

second,  adopts  the  style  of  the  platform  and  at- 
tempts to  be  sufficiently  vigorous  and  interesting" 
to  hold  the  attention.  The  increased  length  of  this 
third  passage,  when  compared  with  the  other  two, 
seems  to  require  comment.  It  illustrates  the  fact, 
which  will  be  brought  out  more  clearly  a  little 
later,  that  the  language  of  spoken  discourse  must 
be  more  diffuse  and  less  compact  than  that  of  writ- 
ten discourse.  The  passage  just  cited  was  revised 
with  the  most  scrupulous  care,  in  order  to  reduce  its 
length  if  possible;  but  it  seemed  that  not  a  sentence 
could  be  safely  omitted,  if  all  the  proof  suggested 
by  the  outline  on  page  155  were  to  be  made  both 
clear  and  interesting  to  those  addressed.  It  takes 
time  to  develop  a  line  of  proof  before  an  audience 
so  as  to  make  the  structure  clear  and  the  substance 
impressive. 

It  must  by  this  time  be  evident  how  important, 
in  the  make-up  of  a  finished  argument,  are  the  gen- 
^  ,  ,  eral  laws  of  style.  It  is  common  for 
Style  in  rhetoricians  to  classify  the  qualities  of  a 
Argument,  ^qq^  g^yj^  under  the  three  heads  of  Clear- 
ness, Force,  and  Elegance.  All  these  qualities  are 
to  be  sought  by  the  debater,  and  the  classification 
will  serve  as  well  as  any  for  the  few  further  remarks 
that  can  now  be  made  on  the  subject  of  style  in 
debate. 

It  requires  no  comment  to  show  that  clearness  is 
in  every  sense  the  first  requisite  of  an  argument.    If 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  165 

the  line  of  proof  is  not  made  clear,  it  is  impossible 
to  secure  conviction.  The  best  aid  to- 
ward clearness  in  the  finished  argument, 
namely,  the  construction  of  it  on  the  basis  of  an 
outline  or  brief  previously  prepared,  has  already 
been  fully  considered.  It  has  been  remarked,  too, 
that  the  style  of  the  oral  debater  must  be  even  more 
painstakingly  clear  than  that  of  the  writer,  since  the 
audience  has  no  chance  to  study  his  sentences  at 
their  leisure.  The  debater  must  keep  in  mind, 
then,  the  peculiarities  of  spoken  discourse.  He 
must  remember  that  a  sentence  of  some  length  and 
intricacy,  with  a  half  dozen  modifying  clauses,  while 
it  might  be  perfectly  intelligible  in  print,  will  be 
hard  to  follow  by  the  ear.  Short,  simply  con- 
structed sentences  are  great  aids  to  clearness.  So 
also  are  short  summaries,  compact  restatements 
of  what  has  just  been  said, — restatements  such  as 
we  have  seen  are  especially  useful  at  the  ends  of 
paragraphs  and  of  main  divisions  of  the  argument. 
It  may  be  set  down  as  a  general  law  that  it  is  not 
only  necessary  to  state  facts  with  especial  clearness, 
in  addressing  an  audience  in  oral  debate,  but  also 
necessary  to  state  the  facts  over  and  over  again.  So 
it  happens  that  a  discourse  which  would  be  intoler- 
ably wordy  in  print,  and  which  could  be  easily  re- 
duced to  two-thirds  its  size  for  publication,  will  be 
well  adapted  to  a  popular  audience.  It  is  related  of 
Patrick  Henry  that  in  trying  a  celebrated  case  be- 


i66  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

fore  a  jury,  he  repeated  his  closing  argument,  in 
slightly  varying  form,  twelve  times  over, — once, 
he  said,  for  every  man  on  the  jury.  Any  speaker 
of  experience  knows  that  when  he  has  simply  stated 
a  thought  to  his  audience,  even  though  it  be  ex- 
pressed with  perfect  clearness,  not  a  third  of  the 
audience  has,  as  we  say,  "  taken  it  in."  He  must 
enlarge  upon  it,  and,  in  effect,  repeat  it  perhaps  a 
half  dozen  times. 

The  debater,  then,  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  must 
keep  to  a  certain  diffuseness  of  style  which  belongs 
Economy  of  to  spokcn  discoursc,  as  contrasted  with 
Time.  ^he  more  compact  style  of  written  dis- 

course. But  a  difificulty  arises  at  this  point.  Not 
only  must  one  be  constantly  on  guard  against  let- 
ting this  diffuseness  become  intolerably  tiresome, 
but  one  has  to  consider  the  matter  of  economy  of 
time.  Most  debaters  find  themselves  obliged  to 
speak  within  definite  Hmits  of  time;  and  even  if 
their  speeches  are  not  cut  off  in  their  prime  by  the 
gavel  of  a  presiding  officer,  they  are  bound  by 
limits  of  courtesy  and  of  prudence.  How,  then, 
shall  one  be  diffuse  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  and 
compact  for  the  sake  of  brevity?  It  is  the  paradox 
of  all  public  speakers,  and  how  few  there  are  that 
find  the  solution!  In  particular,  many  debates  are 
lost  simply  for  lack  of  time.  The  debater  begins 
a  ten  or  fifteen  minutes'  speech  as  though  he  had 
an  evening  before  him,  and  is  just  getting  well  on 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  167 

in  his  introduction  when  he  is  warned  that  he  has 
but  a  minute  more.  If  he  could  only  bid  time  stand 
still,  like  Joshua  at  Ajalon,  all  would  be  well.  As 
it  is,  the  body  of  his  argument  is  never  heard. 

The  debater,  then,  must  have  a  definite  under- 
standing of  the  amount  of  time  before  him,  and 
must  order  the  divisions  of  his  speech  accordingly. 
He  must  beware  of  providing  an  introduction  suit- 
able for  an  hour's  speech,  when  his  whole  time  is 
fifteen  minutes.  He  must  in  all  cases  be  watchful 
that  the  introduction  does  not  occupy  dispropor- 
tionate space.  He  must  see  that  the  critical  points 
in  the  proof  have  the  right  of  way  in  the  matter 
of  time,  so  that  if  anything  is  left  out  it  will  be  mat- 
ters of  less  significance.  And  if  he  discovers  that 
his  time  is  too  short  for  his  material,  he  must  study 
how  to  put  the  latter  into  the  briefest  effective  form. 
There  is  such  a  thing  as  a  style  that  is  rapid  and 
condensed,  and  yet  is  suited  to  hold  the  attention 
of  an  audience.  And  it  is  possible  to  strike  out 
many  sentences  from  the  first  draft  of  an  argument, 
and  yet  not  lose  what  is  essential  to  the  purpose  in 
hand. 

To  pack  one's  materials  into  small  space,  for 
presentation  in  a  brief  but  effective  speech,  is  a 
matter  involving  no  little  skill.    Many  fine  ArtofOon- 
debaters   owe  their  reputation   to   their  Sensation, 
ability  in  this  single  direction.     It  is  possible  to 
state  one's  evidence  in  great  detail,  giving  all  the 


'I<^8  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

words  of  witnesses  and  all  the  minutiae  of  the  facts 
involved;  and  it  is  also  possible  to  select  just  the 
points  essential  to  the  proof,  and  state  nothing  be- 
side. One  may  tell  a  story  at  length,  so  that  it 
becomes  a  sort  of  digression  from  the  body  of  one's 
speech;  or  one  may  seize  upon  the  phrase  that  will 
give  the  point  of  it  and  yet  occupy  very  little  time.* 
The  first  method  is  that  of  the  speaker  with 
abundant  time  at  his  disposal;  the  second  is  that 
of  the  speaker  who  must  do  a  great  deal  in  a  short 
speech. 

This  matter  has  been  referred  to  in  an  earlier 
chapter,  in  connection  with  the  citation  of  authori- 
Oitationof  ^i^^;  and  it  is  in  such  citation  that  the 
Authorities,  ability  to  condense  is  especially  important. 
A  speaker  in  recent  debate  took  nearly  half  the 
time  allowed  for  one  of  his  speeches,  in  reading 
an  extended  quotation  from  a  law-book.  The  audi- 
ence was  not  interested  in  the  details  of  the  opinion 
cited,   and   it   would   have   been   possible    to   put 

*  Compare,  for  example,  the  incident  related  on  page  179, 
below.  Told  in  a  leisurely  manner,  it  would  open:  *'  A  gen- 
tleman who  was  traveling  from  B to  A offered  a 

ticket  reading  '  From  A to  B .'    It  was  refused  by  the 

conductor,  and  the  passengtr,  declining  to  pay  his  fare,  was 
put  off  the  train.  He  brought  suit  for  damages,"  etc.  Since, 
however,  it  is  desired  to  present  the  central  matter  of  the 
anecdote  as  quickly  as  possible,  it  serves  the  purpose  quite 
s^s  wJl,  or  better,  to  begin  rapidly:  "There  was  a  suit  for 
^lamages    brought   against    a   railroad   company   which    had 

refused  a  ticket  reading  '  From  A to  B ,'  because  the 

passenger  was  traveling  from  B to  A ." 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE,  169 

the  gist  of  it  in  two  sentences.  Often,  indeed,  one 
may  find  a  single  sentence  in  the  passage  to  be  cited 
which  will  convey  compactly  the  import  of  the 
whole.  Debaters  who  have  occasion,  therefore,  to 
make  use  of  such  authorities  as  the  decisions  of 
courts,  should  study  the  problem  of  summarizing 
such  decisions  rapidly.  A  sense  of  proportion  must 
govern  the  extent  to  which  the  summarizing  proc- 
ess will  be  carried.  If  a  debater  has  an  hour  in 
which  to  speak  on  a  constitutional  question,  he 
may  think  it  well  to  read  verbatim  the  passages  in 
the  Constitution  bearing  on  the  pending  question, 
jind  may  also  quote  at  some  length  from  the  text 
of  Acts  of  Congress  and  judicial  decisions.  But  if 
he  has  but  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  his  time  must  be 
largely  saved  for  argument,  and  the  fundamental 
itacts  must  be  stated  only  in  outline.  Thus,  in  a 
(Hscussion  of  the  constitutionality  of  an  income  tax, 
a  speaker  stated  the  law  in  the  case  as  follows: 

"  When  we  look  at  the  Constitution,  as  literally  set 
down  and  as  interpreted  by  the  highest  judicial  au- 
thority, in  order  to  discover  what  sort  of  a  tax  an  in- 
come tax  may  be,  and  how  it  can  be  levied  by  Con- 
gress, we  find  the  matter  is  not  so  difficult  as  some 
expressions  of  our  opponents  would  lead  us  to  sup- 
j)Ose. 

"  The  provisions  of  the  Constitution  relating  to  tax- 
ation by  the  Federal  government,  stated  in  a  word,  are 
these:  Direct  taxes  (whatever  they  are),  are  to  be  ap- 


I70  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE.  "    'l 

portioned — like  Representatives  in  Congress — among 
the  States  according  to  population  as  indicated  by  the 
census.  Other  taxes  (presumably  indirect),  called 
'  duties,  imposts,  and  excises,'  shall  be  uniform 
throughout  the  United  States,  but  may,  of  course,  be 
levied  by  Congress  directly. 

"These  provisions  of  the  Constitution  have  come 
before  the  Supreme  Court  for  interpretation  almost 
from  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  to 
the  present;  and  while  the  Court  has  always  avoided 
the  necessity  of  clearly  defining  what  is  meant  by 
*  direct '  taxes  and  taxes  of  the  contrasted  class,  its  de- 
cisions have  all  been  practically  based  on  one  assump- 
tion. That  assumption  is  that  *  direct  taxes '  are  lim- 
ited to  capitation  taxes  and  taxes  on  land.  This  wa* 
first  suggested  in  the  decision  of  1796,  in  the  case  of 
Hilton  V.  U.  S.,  when  a  tax  on  carriages,  levied  directly 
by  Congress,  was  sustained  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
not  a  direct  tax.  Later  the  question  recurred  in  the 
case  of  Veazie  Bank  v.  Fenno.  In  this  case  the  chief 
question  was  the  right  of  Congress  to  tax  the  notes 
of  State  banks;  incidentally  it  was  held  that  such  a 
tax,  being  allowed,  is  not  direct,  and  certain  expres- 
sions of  the  Chief  Justice  indicate  that  it  was  the  dis- 
position of  the  Court  to  reserve  the  term  '  direct  tax  * 
to  the  two  classes  already  mentioned. 

"  In  like  manner,  in  the  case  of  the  Pacific  Insurance 
Co.  V.  Souky  it  was  held  that  a  tax  on  the  incomes  of 
insurance  companies  is  not  a  direct  tax;  and  again,  in 
1874,  in  Scholey  v.  Rew,  a  tax  on  succession  to  real  es- 
tate was  held  not  to  be  direct.     In  all  these  cases  th« 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  171 

C'ourt,  while  avoiding — as  I  have  said — expHcit  defini- 
tion, referred  with  apparent  agreement  to  the  dicta  of 
the  earher  decisions.  Thus  the  term  '  direct  tax  '  has 
been  limited  by  the  Court,  through  a  process  of  exclu- 
sion, to  mean  land  taxes  and  capitation  taxes, — in  other 
words,  to  taxes  such  as  have  never  yet  been  levied  by 
the  Federal  government.  And  the  final  touch  was 
given  to  this  process  of  exclusion  by  the  decision  in 
the  case  of  Springer  v.  U.  S.,  in  which  the  income  tax 
of  1864,  levied  directly  upon  incomes  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States, — including,  of  course,  even  the  incomes 
derived  from  land, — was  held  to  be  indirect.  Thus  a 
consistent  line  of  interpretative  decisions  has  made 
clear  the  meaning  of  phrases  which,  outside  the  Con- 
stitution, might  be  as  darkly  ambiguous  as  the  other 
side  would  have  us  believe." 

This  passage  is  not  given  as  an  illustration  of 
argument,  but  simply  to  illustrate  the  process  of 
compression  as  applied  to  the  citation  of  authori- 
ties. Hundreds  of  pages  of  Supreme  Court  de- 
cisions were  read,  and  the  gist  of  them  packed  into 
less  than  four  hundred  words,  so  as  to  serve  the 
purpose  of  the  speaker.  That  purpose  was  to  sup- 
port the  Income  Tax  of  1894.  If  it  had  been  dif- 
ferent,— if  he  had  wished  to  attack  the  constitu- 
tionality of  the  law, — he  would  doubtless  have 
selected  and  condensed  his  material  in  a  different 
fashion. 

Such  condensation,  then,  is  nearly  always  pos- 
sible.   But  to  save  time  in  this  way  while  speaking 


tj2  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

requires  the  spending  of  time  in  preparation.  It 
Timers-  takes  longer  to  prepare  a  short  speech 
Oondensa-  ^^^^  ^^  prepare  a  long  one,  on  almost  any 
tion.  subject.    The  man  who  knows  his  subject 

from  top  to  bottom  can  glance  through  it  and  seize 
the  essentials  for  rapid  presentation,  "  striking,'' 
as  John  Bright  once  said  of  his  own  method  as  a 
debater,  "  from  headland  to  headland." 

A  striking  example  of  the  relative  values  of  long 
and  short  arguments  is  given  by  the  following  in- 
cident that  occurred  in  a  Philadelphia  court.  A 
complicated  case  regarding  the  tenure  of  land  was 
pending,  and  was  suddenly  called  up  for  trial,  some 
weeks  before  the  counsel  on  one  side  had  expected 
it.  This  side  was  represented  by  two  lawyers,  oi1>e 
of  whom  had  gathered  most  of  the  material  for 
argument,  the  other  of  whom  was  to  make  the  prin- 
cipal argument  in  court.  The  latter  said  to  his 
colleague,  the  junior  counsel,  who  was  a  brilliant 
and  unusually  ready  speaker:  "The  case  is  called 
for  this  afternoon.  I  cannot  be  ready  to  speak  until 
to-morrow.  If  you  can  occupy  the  time  till  court 
adjourns  to-day,  I  will  be  on  hand  at  nine  in  the 
morning."  The  young  lawyer  went  into  court  and 
began  to  speak.  He  brought  with  him  hundreds 
of  pages  of  records  relating  to  the  case,  and  read 
them  as  leisurely  as  the  court  would  allow.  It 
seemed  to  him  that  time  had  never  passed  so  slowly, 
but  he  talked  on  and  on,  perceiving, — as  he  told 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE,  i73 

his  friends  afterward, — that  everyone  in  the  court- 
room was  growing  more  and  more  impatient  of 
him  and  his  case.  The  judge  tried  to  hurry  him, 
but  he  declined  to  be  hurried.  At  length  the  time 
for  adjournment  came,  and  he  announced  that  his 
colleague  would  finish  the  argument  in  the  morn- 
ing. So  far  as  his  afternoon's  speech  was  con- 
cerned, not  an  inch  of  progress  had  been  made  in 
winning  the  case.  Meantime  his  colleague,  one  of 
the  most  distinguished  members  of  the  bar,  went 
home  after  a  hard  day's  work,  prepared  his  argu- 
ment in  the  pending  case  during  six  hours  of  the 
night,  went  into  court  next  morning,  and  in  twenty 
minutes  made  the  speech  that  'he  had  been  six  hours 
preparing.    That  speech  won  the  case. 

We  come  now  from  the  quality  of  Clearness  to 
that  of  Force.  Many  persons  who  would  other- 
wise be  successful  debaters  make  a  failure 
at  just  this  point.  They  gather  and  ar- 
range their  material  with  skill,  but  they  fail  to  make 
it  interesting  or  to  drive  it  home.  The  general 
judgment  of  those  who  have  heard  many  debates, — 
whether  in  debating  societies,  conventions  of  citi- 
zens, legislative  bodies,  or  courts  of  law, — is  that, 
where  there  is  no  unusual  excitement  present,  the 
debating  is  abominably  dull.  And  this  is  not  the 
fault  of  the  subjects  discussed,  for  everyone  knows 
that  certain  speakers  are  always  listened  to  with 
interest    and    even    entertainment,    whether   they 


174  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

speak  on  popular  themes  or  on  the  most  technical 
matters  in  the  world.  There  are  a  half  dozen  men 
in  the  United  States  Senate  who  are  sure  of  hav- 
ing- crowded  galleries  to  hear  them,  even  if  they 
speak  on  some  abstruse  question  of  tariff  or  cur- 
rency, or  on  some  private  pension  bill.  Such  men 
should  be  carefully  studied  by  all  who  wish  to  be- 
come successful  debaters.  They  have  the  quality 
of  forcefulness,  which  carries  what  they  have  to 
say  into  the  ears  of  their  audience,  and  even  draws 
hearers  to  them,  eager  to  listen. 

A  certain  degree  of  force  is  secured  by  the  mere 
quality  of  clearness,  combined  with  earnestness.  If 
Sources  of  ^  Statement  is  made  in  a  manner  to  be 
Porce.  at  once  understood,  and  if  it  is  made  in 

a  manner  that  shows  the  speaker  thoroughly  be- 
lieves it  and  is  eager  to  give  it  to  others,  there  must 
be  a  responsive  spark  struck  off  in  the  mind  of  the 
hearer.  To  develop  an  enthusiasm  for  one's  sub- 
ject, then,  an  intense  desire  to  convince  and  per- 
suade others  of  the  proposition  in  hand,  will  usu- 
ally result  in  a  forcible  style.  One's  sentences  will 
be  short  and  vigorous,  and  will  be  driven  home  by 
the  earnestness  that  is  behind  them. 

Apart  from  this,  perhaps  the  element  of  style 
that  contributes  most  to  the  quality  of  force  is  that 
Concrete-  ^^  concreteness.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that 
"»»*•  a  statement  couched  in  general  terms  will 

almost  never  be  as  effective  as  when  stated  in  terms 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  175 

of  a  specific,  concrete  case.  One  who  talks  wholly 
of  general  laws  will  soon  make  any  audience 
drowsy;  while  concrete  cases  will  at  least  keep 
them  awake.  The  debater  should  study  his  case 
with  this  in  mind,  and  decide  before  he  makes  his 
speech  what  specific  cases  he  can  make  use  of,  to 
add  force  to  his  theories.  It  may  be  only  a  ques- 
tion of  the  choice  of  words, — the  substitution  of  a 
particular  term  for  a  more  general  one,  or  a  figura- 
tive for  a  literal  statement.  Orators,  instead  of 
saying  that  the  British  empire  extends  over  all 
quarters  of  the  globe,  are  in  the  habit  of  saying — 
for  greater  forcefulness, — that  the  sun  never  sets 
on  the  English  flag.  Instead  of  speaking  of  alien 
races,  a  wise  debater  will  say  "  Chinese  and 
Italians  '*  when  he  can.  Instead  of  talking  of 
agricultural  conditions  in  general,  he  will  mention 
potatoes  and  pigs, — the  homelier  the  concrete  cases 
may  be,  the  better,  for  they  will  bring  distinct  and 
lively  images  to  the  hearer^s  mind.  It  is  particu- 
larly interesting  to  see  what  a  difference  this  con- 
crete method  makes  in  the  citation  of  statistics. 
Statistics  in  debate  are  in  danger  of  forming  a  per- 
fect desert  of  dullness.  Yet  they  need  not  do  so 
in  skilled  hands.  In  large  numbers  they  cannot 
be  made  to  appeal  to  the  ear,  but  must  be  seen  in 
the  form  of  tables.  "  Statistics,"  said  a  witty  pro- 
fessor, "  are  like  children:  they  should  be  seen  and 
not  heard."    In  debate,  therefore,  one  should  never 


17^  THE  /iRT  OF  DEBATE. 

read  a  whole  table  of  figures,  but  should  select  the 
point  essential  to  the  argument,  and  put  that  in  a 
brief  and  interesting-  form.  There  is  all  the  dif- 
ference in  the  world  between  this  statement:  ''  The 
exportations  of  the  United  States  to  France  in  1898 
amounted  to  $25,542,673;  while  the  exportations 
of  France  to  America  amounted  to  $12,476,316  " — 
and  this:  "  For  every  dollar  that  went  over  seas  to 
France  last  year,  two  dollars  came  back."  In 
dealing  with  statistics  in  general  debate  one  should 
nearly  always  discard  small  numbers  and  fractions; 
they  blur  the  picture,  which  is  to  be  made  as  vivid 
as  possible.  Rhetorically  speaking,  ten  thousand 
dollars  is  a  larger  sum  than  $10,142.67.  In  Hke 
manner,  images  of  individuals  loom  up  larger  in 
the  imagination  than  those  of  classes.  A  speaker 
during  the  time  of  the  Chicago  riots  of  1894  mov^id 
his  audience  to  enthusiasm  by  declaring:  "If  neces- 
sary, every  regiment  in  the  United  States  army 
must  be  called  out,  that  the  letter  dropped  by  the 
girl  Jenny,  at  some  country  post-office  back  in 
Maine,  may  go  on  its  way  to  her  lover  in  San 
Francisco,  without  a  finger  being  raised  to  stop  its 
passage!" 

In  the  same  way  any  departure  from  common- 
place forms  of  speech,  if  it  is  not  obviously  intro- 
Figures  of  duced  for  artificial  effect,  will  add  to  the 
Speech.  force  of  argument.     A  bit  of  irony,  if  not 

too  malicious  or  savage  in  style,  wiU  wake  an  audi 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE,  177 

ence  to  fresher  appreciation.  The  form  of  an- 
tithesis, in  which  opposing  ideas  are  set  over 
against  each  other  by  way  of  more  vivid  contrast, 
will  do  the  same.  A  recent  debater,  borrowing  a 
hint  from  a  remark  of  Macaulay's,  introduced  the 
following  passage  into  a  political  attack  on  the 
administration: 

"  Macaulay  says  somewhere,  in  speaking  of  King 
Charles  the  First:  *  We  charge  him  with  having 
broken  his  coronation  oath;  and  we  are  told  that  he 
kept  his  marriage  vow!  We  accuse  him  of  having 
given  up  his  people  to  merciless  inflictions;  and  the 
defence  is,  that  he  took  his  little  son  on  his  knee  and 
kissed  him!  We  censure  him  for  having  violated  the 
articles  of  the  Petition  of  Right;  and  we  are  informed 
that  he  was  accustomed  to  hear  prayers  at  six  o'clock 
in  the  morning!'  So  we  may  say  in  regard  to  the  de- 
fenders of  the  President.  When  we  charge  that  he  has 
used  his  high  office  for  poHtical  ends,  debauched  the 
civil  service,  discarded  the  very  reforms  pledged  by  the 
platform  on  which  he  was  elected,  and  given  over  the 
army  to  the  plundering  of  corruptionists,  what  is  the 
answer?  that  he  is  a  man  of  charming  disposition  in 
the  family  circle,  that  his  Thanksgiving  proclamations 
breathe  forth  piety  in  every  line,  and  that  he  scrupul- 
ously avoids  traveling  on  the  Sabbath  day!" 

This  brings  us  to  the  matter  of  the  use  of  illustra- 
tions in  debate.      We  have  seen,  in  the  uae  of  niui- 
chapter  on  Proof,  that  illustrations  are  trationa. 
not  arguments,  and  should  never  be  used  as  if  they 


178  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

were.  They  may,  however,  make  argument  clear, 
interesting,  and  forcible.  Their  quality  of  con- 
creteness  serves,  as  it  always  does,  to  keep  the 
audience  awake,  and  to  arouse  distinct  images  in 
the  mind.  If  there  is  anything  of  wit  about  them, 
and  it  is  felt  to  be  appropriate  and  not  irrelevant, 
the  effect  is  all  the  better.  Thus  even  an  amusing 
story  may  be  introduced  into  debate  with  good  re- 
sults. But  concerning  this  much  caution  must  be 
urged.  To  introduce  a  story  merely  because  it  is 
funny,  to  take  precious  time  in  the  telling  of  it  when 
every  moment  is  needed  for  argument,  or  to  make 
a  far-fetched  attempt  to  apply  it  to  the  immediate 
controversy  when  it  is  not  to  the  point, — any  of 
these  things  will  produce  an  effect  of  weakness 
which  one  cannot  afford  to  risk.  Only  when  it  is 
clearly  illustrative  of  the  matter  in  hand, — and  not 
then  if  it  will  take  long  in  the  telling, — is  an  anec- 
dote to  be  introduced  into  debate. 

Two  or  three  examples  of  successful  illustrations 
in  debate  may  make  these  principles  more  clear. 
When  an  unjust  bill  was  introduced  into  the  House 
of  Commons  in  1741,  and  was  defended  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  the  only  remedy  proposed  for 
existing  evils,  Mr.  Pitt  replied  to  its  sponsors  in 
this  fashion: 

"The  honorable  gentlemen  say  no  other  remedy 
has  been  proposed.  .  .  Suppose  no  other  remedy 
should  be  offered;   to  tell  us  we  must  take  this,  be- 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  179 

cause  no  other  remedy  can  be  thought  of,  is  the  same 
with  a  physician's  telHng  his  patient,  '  Sir,  there  is  no 
known  remedy  for  your  distemper,  therefore  you  shall 
take  poison — I'll  cram  it  down  your  throat.'  I  do  not 
know  how  the  nation  may  treat  its  physicians;  but  I 
am  sure  if  my  physician  told  me  so,  I  should  order  my 
servants  to  turn  him  out  of  doors." 

Again,  in  an  American  court  a  suit  for  damages 
was  brought  against  a  railroad  company  which  had 

refused  a  ticket  reading  ''  From  A to  B ," 

on  the  ground  that  the  passenger  was  traveling 
from  B to  A .  The  attorney  for  the  rail- 
road argued  that  the  passenger  was  really  claiming 
a  different  service  from  that  he  had  paid  for.    '^  He 

paid  for  passage  from  A to  B ,"  he  said, 

"  and  yet  demands  passage  from  B to  A . 

He  might  as  well  buy  a  barrel  of  potatoes  at  a 
grocery,  and  then  sue  the  grocer  on  the  ground  that 
he  did  not  deliver  apples  instead."  When  the 
attorney  for  the  plaintiff  had  opportunity  to  reply, 
he  said:  "The  illustration  drawn  from  the  barrel 
of  apples  and  the  barrel  of  potatoes  seems  to  be  an 
unfortunate  one  for  my  friend  on  the  other  side. 
The  present  case  would  be  better  illustrated  by  a 
grocer  who,  having  sold  a  customer  a  barrel  of  ap- 
ples, should  insist  that  he  should  begin  at  the  top 
and  eat  down,  whereas  the  customer  had  a  pref- 
erence for  beginning  at  the  bottom  and  eating  up!  " 
Here  the  illustration  was  an  admirable  one,  for 


i8o  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

it  not  only  turned  the  laugh  against  the  speaker's 
opponent,  but  served  at  the  same  time  to  make  dear 
the  very  point  of  the  argument  which  was  being 
developed. 

A  similar  example  is  found  in  the  fable  at  the 

opening  of  the  speech  on  the  Venezuelan  Message 

of  President  Cleveland,  quoted  in  the  Appendix. 

In  this  case  the  fable  was  of  course  constructed  for 

Mie  purpose  of  illustrating  the  case  in  dis- 

and  iikgiti-  P^^^'  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  Carefully  that 
matenius-  every  phrase  in  the  story  had  its  signi- 
ficance for  the  Venezuelan  question,  the 
remarks  of  the  thief  being  intended  to  cover  the 
most  important  arguments  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  debate.  So  the  story,  while  told  in  the  most 
condensed  manner  possible,  did  not  even  take 
from  the  time  of  argument  the  time  required  in  its 
telling;  for  it  was  developing  the  argument  at  the 
very  time  that  it  was  interesting  the  audience  and 
preparing  them  for  the  more  weighty  material  that 
followed.  Such  illustrations  are  serviceable  in  more 
than  one  way.  But  what  shall  be  said  of  a  speaker 
in  an  important  debate,  who  took  nearly  half  his 
time  in  telling  the  story  (amusing  in  itself)  of  a 
man  who  was  left  hanging  in  the  air  through  an 
accident  that  occurred  while  he  was  climbing  a 
tree, — the  point  being  that  the  opponents  of  the 
speaker  had  been  left  in  a  similar  position  by  their 
unsuccessful  arguments?     Such  a  story  may  well 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  i8l 

be  called  question-begging.  It  depended  for  its 
effectiveness  on  the  possibility  that  the  audience 
were  all  convinced  that  the  speaker  had  triumphed 
over  his  opponents  in  argument;  and  it  contri- 
buted nothing  to  the  argument  save  a  discourteous 
side-thrust  at  the  previous  speaker.  Debaters  who 
use  illustrations  after  this  manner  deserve  nothing 
better  than  defeat. 

The  forcible  debater,  then,  is  one  who  is  deter- 
mined that  his  audience  shall  listen  to  him,  and 
ibat  his  arguments  shall  be  driven  home.  He  will 
not  go  out  of  his  way  to  search  for  wit,  for  oppor- 
tune repartee,  for  illustration  or  anecdote,  but  he 
will  use  all  such  aids  if  they  come  appropriately  to 
his  hand.  He  will  have  such  earnestness  that  his 
audience  cannot  help  feeling  the  contagion  of  it.  He 
will  reach  out  after  the  most  homely  facts  that  be- 
long to  his  subject,  in  order  to  bring  images  of 
concrete  things  before  the  minds  of  his  hearers. 
He  will  select  the  great  essentials  of  his  argument, 
and  emphasize  them  so  that  no  one  can  go  away 
forgetting  them.  He  will  make  use  of  climax  as 
he  has  opportunity,  and  see  that  the  ends  of  his 
paragraphs,  of  his  main  divisions,  and  of  his  speech 
as  a  whole,  are  the  strongest  parts  of  all. 

We  come  now,  finally,  to  the  quality  of  Elegance. 
The  word  is  an  unsatisfactory  one,  for  it  suggests 
to  many  persons  a  quality  which  many  arguments 
would  do  quite  as  well  without.     As  rhetoricians 


l82  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

understand  it,  however,  it  means  nothing  inconsis- 
tent with  simplicity,  directness,  or  force. 
It  implies  the  choice  of  the  right  word 
in  the  right  place,  the  observance  of  the  laws 
of  unity  and  proportion,  and  the  almost  indefinable 
atmosphere  of  good  taste  and  dignity  which  should 
characterize  every  form  of  discourse.  Since  it  is 
related  to  debate,  for  the  most  part,  in  no  peculiar 
way,  we  need  give  it  only  very  brief  consideration 
here. 

It  is  perhaps  as  an  aid  to  persuasiveness  that  the 
quality  of  elegance  is  chiefly  useful  in  argument. 
Persuaaive-  One  may  Convince  another  even  while 
MSB.  giving  an  impression  of  violence  or  vul- 

garity, but  in  order  to  persuade  some  personal  sym- 
pathy should  be  established,  and  the  qualities  of 
dignity,  good  taste,  and  ease  have  much  to  do  with 
this.  Persuasiveness  depends,  too,  on  the  adapta- 
bility of  the  speaker  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
debate  and  the  audience  addressed.  The  manner 
and  method  suited  to  one  sort  of  hearers  will  be 
quite  out  of  place  with  those  of  another.  Enough 
has  already  been  said  to  indicate  that  the  attitude 
of  friendliness  on  the  part  of  the  debater,  toward 
those  he  is  addressing,  is  one  of  the  first  essentials 
to  success.  He  must  say  nothing  without  his  audience 
in  mind.  He  must  try  to  enter  into  their  feelings, 
and  mingle  his  with  theirs.  If  they  are  unfriendly, 
he   must    seek   a   common   ground    from    which 


STRUCTURE  /4ND  STYLE.  183 

they  and  he  can  make  a  start  toward  investiga- 
tion of  the  question  in  hand.  If  they  show  any 
disposition  to  go  with  him,  he  must  be  ready  to 
meet  them  half  way.  Yet  some  speakers,  if  one 
might  judge  from  their  style  and  manner,  direct 
their  remarks  into  the  air,  or  would  be  as  well  con- 
tent to  deliver  them  as  a  monologue  within  their 
own  room.  What  wonder  that  they  cannot  per- 
suade? The  secret  of  persuasive  power  seems  to 
lie,  first,  in  getting  a  personal  hold  on  one's  audi- 
ence, and  then  in  finding  out  by  what  motive  they 
may  be  moved.  If  it  be  nothing  better  than  self- 
interest,  well.  If  it  be — as  it  almost  always  will — 
through  their  higher  selves,  their  principles,  aspira- 
tions, loves  and  venerations,  better  still.  All  this 
will  have  its  effect  on  the  style  of  the  adaptable 
debater.  His  language  will  be  appropriate  to  him- 
self, to  his  subject,  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
discussion,  and  to  the  audience.  It  will  have  power 
over  the  audience,  to  hold  them  rigidly  to  pro- 
cesses of  reason,  w^hen  the  speaker  wills,  and  to 
arouse  their  feelings  and  move  their  passions,  when 
it  is  that  that  he  wills.  Used  in  this  way,  human 
speech  has  almost  magic  powers.  It  not  only 
guides  the  reason,  but  awakens  memories,  starts 
floods  of  old  associations,  stirs  the  passions,  and 
moves  the  will. 

This  brings  us  to  a  concluding  thought, — the 
artistic  quality   which   may   properly   pervade   an 


i84  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

argument,  as  well  as  any  other  form  of  discourse. 
The  debater  should  strive  to  make  his  speech  a 
Artistic  work  of  art  in  its  own  sphere.  A  work  of 
Qualities.  ^rt  must  havc,  first  of  all,  unity;  and  no 
argument  is  satisfying  without  a  dominant  idea. 
It  must  have,  in  the  second  place,  proportion;  and 
we  have  seen  how  this  quality  is  important  in  de- 
bate as  a  regulating  principle  in  the  selection  and 
emphasis  of  one's  material.  In  the  third  place,  a 
work  of  art  must  have  continuity  and  coherence; 
this  quality  will  preserve  the  argument  from  the 
scrappy,  scattering  effect  which  so  many  debates 
produce.  In  the  fourth  place,  it  must  have  some 
element  of  general  truth, — something  beyond 
merely  temporary  or  local  interest, — ^which  will 
dignify  it,  elevate  the  thought  of  those  studying  it, 
and  give  it  a  certain  permanent  significance.  A 
speech  embodying  these  qualities,  if  it  is  preserved 
by  some  chance  beyond  the  time  when  first  de- 
livered, will  still  have  the  charm  which  the  work 
of  all  great  orators  holds,  after  the  original  cir- 
cumstances of  its  utterance  have  been  forgotten. 

Now  it  may  be  admitted  that,  whereas  every 
argument  may  and  should  be  characterized  by  the 
first  three  of  these  qualities  of  a  work  of 
art,  it  is  too  much  to  ask  that  the  fourth 
quality  shall  be  present  in  every  debate.  There  are 
some  subjects,  we  have  seen,  dealing  with  matters 
of  a  slight  or  temporary  character,  and  without 


STRUCTURE  AND  STYLE.  I^S 

appeal  to  any  high  principles  or  deep  feelings,  in 
the  discussion  of  which  it  would  be  absurd  to  try  to 
introduce  the  element  of  permanent  significance  or 
broad  general  truth.  Yet  these  subjects  are,  on 
the  whole,  rare  in  the  experience  of  debaters.  It  is 
not  often  that  a  disputed  subject  is  without  con- 
nection with  some  principle,  some  general  truth, 
some  high  thought  or  deep  feeling,  which  will — if 
one  only  looks  for  it — illuminate  the  dry  details  of 
tlie  discussion.  Great  debaters  love  to  lead  their 
audiences  to  these  elevated  points  of  view.  Said  a 
dvibater  of  experience  and  success:  "  I  never  like 
to  close  a  speech  on  a  question  of  any  importance 
without  showing,  if  I  can,  some  deeper  significance 
ill  the  question  than  lies  on  the  surface,  and  mak- 
ing the  audience  see  that  the  discussion  has  been 
worth  while  wholly  apart  from  the  temporary  cir- 
ctimstances  that  gave  rise  to  it."  This  is  why 
speakers  have  a  fondness  for  concluding  an  address 
with  a  bit  of  poetry  or  other  imaginative  literature; 
for  it  is  precisely  the  quality  of  poetry  to  illuminate 
small  things  by  showing  the  elements  of  general 
truth  and  permanent  significance  that  lie  behind 
them.  In  unskillful  hands  such  attempts  are  in 
danger  of  being  absurd.  An  impassioned  perora- 
tion, or  a  sudden  flight  of  poetry,  tacked  on  to  a 
commonplace  speech  as  though  one  felt  the  neces- 
sity of  adding  something  of  the  sort  before  sitting 
down,  is  of  course  nothing  less  than  ridiculous.    If 


i86  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

there  is  any  high  thought  or  deep  feeling  in  the 
subject,  the  speaker  must  lead  his  hearers  to  it 
gradually,  and  not  affect  any  feeling  which  they 
cannot  be  prepared  to  share.  It  may  not  be  possi- 
ble to  introduce  any  element  of  feeling  whatever. 
But  one  can  nearly  always  ask  himself,  What,  after 
all,  makes  my  argument  worth  while?  What 
thought  or  purpose  animates  it  which  I  should  be 
glad  to  have  handed  down  in  my  name  to  another 
generation?  For  while  subjects  change  superficially 
from  year  to  year,  Demosthenes,  Cicero,  Pitt, 
Patrick  Henry,  Wendell  Phillips,  and  Victor  Hugo 
really  spoke  on  the  same  themes, — the  same  great 
ideas, — and  the  torch  of  the  debater  is  passed  on 
from  hand  to  hand. 


VIII. 

THE    SPOKEN    DEBATE. 

We  have  now  followed  the  progress  of  the  de- 
bater's work  up  to  the  point  of  the  actual  making 
of  his  speech  or  speeches.  He  has  decided  just 
what  he  wants  to  say,  and  just  how  he  wants  to  say 
it,  in  so  far  as  this  can  be  done  before  the  actual 
exigencies  of  debate  are  upon  him.  Some  of  his 
most  important  problems  are  still  to  be  solved. 

One  of  these  problems  we  have  temporarily 
ignored  or  avoided,  in  what  has  been  said  in  the 
preceding  chapter.  We  have  assumed,  Relation  of 
i'or  the  sake  of  convenience,  that  the  gp^tel^*^ 
speech  could  be  written  down  in  advance  Speech, 
of  its  delivery,  and  that  the  choice  and  arrange- 
ment of  words  could  be  made  at  that  time  and  ac- 
curately followed  in  the  spoken  debate.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  however,  we  know  that  this  cannot  be 
done.  Whatever  we  may  think  of  public  speaking 
of  other  sorts,  it  is  absolutely  destructive  of  debate 
to  be  bound  by  what  has  been  prepared.  And  apart 
from  the  fact  that  one  must  be  ready  for  all  sorts 
of  unforeseen  emergencies,  one  cannot  be  sure  of 
saying  just  what  he  has  decided  upon  in  advance. 
The  peculiarities  of  a  speaker's   own   mind   and 

187 


i88  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

memory  are  quite  as  uncertain,  oftentimes,  as  the 
exigencies  of  debate. 

This  brings  us  at  once  to  the  problem  of  the  re- 
lation of  written  to  spoken  language,  of  the  speech 
prepared  to  the  speech  delivered,  and  of  the  use  of 
notes  in  public  speaking.  In  all  these  matters  so 
much  depends  upon  the  ability  and  experience  of 
the  particular  speaker,  that  it  is  impossible  to  say 
anything  by  way  of  guidance  beyond  the  mc^st 
general  suggestions.  It  may  be  agreed  at  once, 
however,  that  a  written  speech,  read  from  the 
manuscript,  is  generally  unsuited  to  the  uses  of  de- 
bate. There  is  but  one  sort  of  speech  less  deserv- 
ing of  success,  and  that  is  one  written  in  advance 
and  delivered  from  memory,  word  for  word.  Per- 
haps not  one  speaker  in  a  hundred  can  deliver  a 
memorized  speech  with  perfect  naturalness  of  man- 
ner, or  can  memorize  a  speech  from  beginning  to 
end  and  yet  hold  himself  ready  to  make  such 
changes  as  occasion  may  demand.  For  most  per- 
sons it  will  be  better  to  read  from  manuscript 
directly,  and  lay  it  aside  when  necessary,  than  to 
seek  to  conceal  the  want  of  extemporaneousness 
by  the  transparent  device  of  mem.orization. 

Such  being  the  case,  shall  one  give  up  all  idea 
of  writing  out  in  advance  his  arguments  for  public 
idTantages  debate?  By  no  means.  There  are  many 
of  Writing,  reasons  why  a  speech  should  be  written 
down  at  the  outset,  even  if  the  manuscript  is  never 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  189 

used  at  all.  One  never  knows  just  what  he  has  to 
say  until  it  is  written  down.  Ideas  often  seem  to 
flow  from  the  point  of  the  pen,  and  arrange  them- 
selves on  paper  as  they  would  never  do  in  one's 
rrtind.  Certainly  one  never  knows  how  much  he 
has  to  say  until  it  is  written  down,  and  for  a  de- 
bater this  is  an  important  point.  Again,  all  those 
matters  relating  to  style,  which  we  were  consider- 
ing in  the  last  chapter,  can  be  considered  and 
worked  out  at  one's  leisure,  with  pen  and  paper  at 
hand,  and  not  left  to  the  haste  and  excitement  of 
the  public  assembly.  It  does  not  follow  that  the 
work  of  deciding  them  will  be  wasted  because  the 
written  speech  is  not  delivered  without  change. 
Finally,  the  writing  out  of  material  is  a  great  aid 
to  the  memory,  as  all  students  know  who  have 
taken  lecture  notes  or  made  written  analyses  of 
material  for  examinations;  and  the  ideas  of  the 
speaker  will  be  much  more  likely  to  occur  to  him 
in  the  orderly  fashion  in  which  he  has  planned 
them,  if  he  has  wTitten  them  down  in  that  order. 
To  write  a  thing,  word  for  word  and  letter  by 
letter,,  is  to  wear  a  path  in  one's  brain  which  it  is 
not  easy  to  efface. 

What  shall  be  done,  then,  with  this  argument 
when  once  carefully  written  out?  This  the  indi- 
vidual debater  must  answer  for  himself.  Preparation 
Perhaps  he  may  destroy  it,  and  feel  that  ^o^^^ii^e^y- 
the  mere  act  of  writing  it  has  prepared  him  for  his 


19©  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

public  speech.  Perhaps  he  will  read  it  over  once 
or  twice,  in  order  to  see  how  it  sounds  and  how 
much  time  it  takes,  and  let  it  go  at  that.  Perhaps, 
again,  he  will  study  it  over  and  over  again,  until 
he  has  almost  memorized  it  by  familiarity,  though 
not  by  rote.  All  this  will  depend,  of  course,  upon 
the  degree  to  which  the  speaker  trusts  himself  to 
say  what  he  wants  to  say  when  on  his  feet,  and  the 
extent  to  which  he  feels  that  he  must  leave  the  pre- 
cise character  of  his  remarks  to  be  determined  by 
the  state  of  the  discussion  at  the  time  he  enters  it. 
There  is  always  a  conflict  here  between  accuracy 
and  exactness,  on  the  one  hand,  and  freedom  and 
fluency  on  the  other.  There  are  debates  in  which 
every  word  must  be  measured  and  weighed  before 
it  is  uttered,  and  others  in  which  the  enthusiasm 
and  the  rapid  thinking  belonging  to  the  heat  of 
the  discussion  can  be  trusted  to  take  care  of  the 
words.  In  the  one  case,  the  debater  should  bring 
his  material  as  nearly  as  possible  to  the  point  of 
exact  preparation,  without  mechanical  memoriza- 
tion; in  the  other  he  will  take  with  him  to  the  plat- 
form or  bar  nothing  but  a  knowledge  of  his  plan, 
and  his  material  in  the  rough. 

The  following  plan  proves  useful  to  many  de- 
baters. They  first  write  out  their  argument  in  full, 
on  the  basis  of  the  preliminary  outline.  This  ar- 
gument is  carefully  timed,  and  must  then  usually 
be  condensed  in  order  to  bring  it  within  the  re- 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE,  19* 

quired  limits.  All  matters  of  phrasing  and  illus- 
tration are  as  carefully  corrected  and  polished  as 
though  the  speech  were  to  be  read  from  the  manu- 
script. Then  a  new  outline  is  made,  drawn  from 
the  full  argument  as  written.  This  outline  will  dif- 
fer somewhat  from  the  original,  for  new  material 
or  improved  arrangement  will  have  been  suggested 
in  the  writing  out  of  the  argument.  If  the  debater 
is  sure  of  his  memory,  he  is  now  ready  for  his  pub- 
lic speech.  If,  however,  he  fears  that  he  will  not 
be  able  to  say  just  what  he  has  decided  upon  say- 
ing, he  will  give  some  further  study  to  his  manu- 
script, reading  over  the  full  argument  until  it  is 
entirely  familiar,  and  then  studying  his  outHne  to 
see  whether  its  headings  suggest  to  him  what  he 
wishes  to  say  under  each  one.  The  last  step  will 
be  to  make  sure  that  he  is  familiar  with  the  out- 
line itself,  so  that  he  will  not  lose  himself  between 
one  division  of  his  speech  and  the  next.  Unless  he 
is  confident  through  experience,  he  will  do  well 
to  prepare  a  condensed  copy  of  his  outline  on  a 
card,  and  carry  it  in  his  pocket  to  the  place  of  de- 
bate. He  should  not  expect  to  use  it,  or  even  to 
hold  it  in  his  hand  as  an  advertisement  of  his  in- 
security to  the  audience;  but  it  will  be  a  comfort 
to  know  that  it  is  at  hand  in  case  of  need. 

The  principle  governing  the  question  of  the  use 
of  notes  is  simply  that  nothing  must  interfere  with 
the  natural  relations  of  speaker  and  audience.     It 


192  *'  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

is  natural  for  one  man  to  talk  to  another;  but  it  is 
not  natural  for  one  either  to  read  or  recite 
his  own  thoughts  to  another.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  quite  natural  to  read  aloud  the 
thoughts  of  another  writer;  and  in  debate,  when 
a  quotation  of  any  length  is  to  be  introduced,  such 
as  the  citation  of  an  authority  or  the  written  testi- 
mony of  a  witness,  it  is  more  natural  and  reasonable 
to  read  directly  from  book  or  paper  than  to  at- 
tempt to  quote  from  memory.  In  such  cases,  the 
very  presence  of  book  or  document  is  an  element 
of  strength;  but  the  ideas  of  the  speaker  himself 
are  to  derive  their  strength  from  his  presence  and 
utterance. 

It  may  be  asked  whether  the  careful  study  of  a 

written  argument  and  of  an  outline,  as  here  sug- 

2:ested,  is  not  in  a  sense  a  violation  of 

Degree  of 

Extempori-  the  idea  of  extemporization?  In  a  sense, 
of  course,  it  may  be  so  regarded;  but  the 
point  is  that  the  study  of  the  written  argument 
should  never  reach  the  point  of  mechanical  mem- 
orization. It  may  reach  the  point  where  the 
speaker  knows  just  how  many  paragraphs  his 
speech  will  contain,  and  what  the  general  order  of 
sentences  may  be  in  each  paragraph;  or,  when 
certain  ideas  have  to  be  expressed  very  accurately 
or  pointedly,  he  may  even  be  practically  certain  as 
to  what  words  he  will  use  in  particular  places.  But 
he  will  use  the  same  words  that  he  wrote  down  not 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  193 

because  he  has  learned  them  so  thoroughly  as  to 
be  able  to  recite  them,  but  because,  having  spent 
no  little  thought  on  the  best  method  of  expressing 
certain  ideas,  when  those  ideas  recur  to  his  mind  the 
chosen  words  will  recur  also  as  the  best  form  in  which 
to  utter  them. 

The  practical  character  of  this'  sort  of  prepara- 
tion is  illustrated  by  an  incident  that  Mr.  Holyoake 
tells  in  his  book  on  '*  Public  Speaking  and  De- 
bate": 

"  John  Arthur  Roebuck  was  the  most  mathematical 
speaker  in  Parliament  in  his  time.  He  knew  that  the 
shortest  distance  between  one  point  and  another  was 
a  straight  line,  and  he  took  it.  Sitting  at  his  table  one 
day,  he  told  me  what  he  was  going  to  say  at  Salisbury, 
where,  at  the  Bishop's  request,  he  was  to  deliver  prizes 
to  students.  A  fortnight  later  I  read  a  report  of  his 
speech  in  the  Times,  which,  so  far  as  I  remembered, 
was  word  for  word  what  he  had  said  to  me.  The 
reason  was  that  the  words  of  a  perfect  statement  are 
not  changeable.  If  any  term  can  be  changed  for  the 
better  it  means  that  a  wrong  word  has  been  used. 
Thus,  to  a  trained  mind,  understanding  is  in  place  of 
memory.  The  chosen  words  recur  to  the  speaker  be- 
cause they  are  inevitable ;  none  others  will  express  the 
sense  intended." 

The  debater  who  has  prepared  himself  in  this 
way  will  never  be  bound  to  the  words  previously 
chosen,  so  as  to  feel  embarrassed  if  different  ones 


194  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

fall  from  his  tongue ;  nor  will  his  speech  move  on  in 
Dwigerof  a  predetermined  flow  of  language,  with- 
tion.  '  out  adapting  itself  spontaneously  to  the 
need  of  the  particular  moment.  Up  to  this  point 
the  careful  preparation  of  a  speech  may  be  ad- 
vantageous, especially  if  the  speaker  is  inexpe- 
rienced, or  if  his  argument  is  to  come  at  the  open- 
ing of  debate,  when  he  can  determine  in  advance 
what  should  be  said,  or  if  he  must  be  sure  of  oc- 
cupying a  definitely  limited  period  of  time.  But 
the  debater,  no  matter  how  timid  and  inexpe- 
rienced, should  guard  carefully  against  becoming 
a  slave  to  the  speech  that  he  has  written  down,  or 
even  to  the  outline  that  he  has  brought  with  him 
as  a  safeguard.  He  can  never  gain  fluency  and 
confidence  without  trusting  himself.  It  is  better 
to  make  a  dozen  failures  in  the  attempt  to  be  gen- 
uinely extemporaneous,  than  to  educate  one's  self 
to  the  use  of  crutches.  The  dangers  of  extempore 
speaking,  imposing  as  they  are,  are  not  so  great 
as  those  of  memoriter  speaking.  As  soon  as  a 
speech  is  finally  committed  to  memory,  one  loses 
the  power  of  ut'ering  it  spontaneously.  The  mind, 
too,  is  liable  to  play  strange  tricks,  and  run  off  on 
a  line  of  thought  by  itself,  trusting  to  the  memory 
to  carry  on  the  speaking.  Then,  if  the  memory 
suddenly  weakens  in  its  mechanical  performance 
of  duty,  everything  is  lost,  and  there  is  small  chance 
of  recovery.     The  way  to  avoid  this — to  put  the 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE,  195 

matter  in  terms  of  psychology — is,  never  to  learn 
a  speech  so  thoroughly  as  to  turn  it  over  to  the 
lower  centers  of  nervous  action,  the  centers  which 
act  of  themselves  without  high  cerebral  command. 
So  long  as  the  speaker  is  choosing  for  himself  at 
each  moment  just  what  words  to  use  at  that  mo- 
ment, his  speech  will  affect  the  audience  as  a  fresh, 
real  and  spontaneous  utterance. 

The  precise  words  to  be  used  in  debate,  then, 
must  usually  be  left  to  the  moment  of  speaking, 
not  only  in  order  to  be  easily  changed 
at  the  will  of  the  speaker,  but  in  order  to  ^*"°^' 
give  an  easy  and  natural  style.  The  assurance  that 
the  right  word  will  be  at  hand  when  needed  is  of 
course  a  matter  of  experience.  To  acquire  fluency 
a  speaker  should  try  always  to  use  the  best  word 
for  his  purpose,  even  in  common  conversation  or 
when  talking  to  himself.  He  should  read  the 
works  of  great  writers  and  speakers,  and  when  he 
meets  a  new  word,  if  it  seems  a  good  one,  should 
store  it  away  for  the  first  opportunity  he  may  have 
of  putting  it  to  service.  He  should  talk  as  much 
as  his  conscience  will  permit,  not  only  in  company 
but  alone,  not  being  frightened  by  the  common 
opinion  that  to  talk  to  one's  self  is  a  symptom  of 
insanity.  Perhaps  the  most  effective  single  sort 
of  practice  in  fluency  is  that  already  suggested  in 
connection  with  the  preparation  of  a  speech:  to 
stand  up  as  though  to  speak  to  an  imaginary  au- 


igS  THE  y4RT  OF  DEBATE, 

dience,  and  attempt  to  reproduce  the  substance  of 
what  has  been  written  down,  in  words  fitted  to  the 
purpose  but  extemporaneously  chosen.  When  one 
conies  to  a  point  where  a  fitting  word  does  not 
suggest  itself,  one  may  say  something — anything, 
for  the  time  being,  as  one  would  do  before  an  au- 
dience in  such  a  case;  but  afterward  the  point 
should  be  taken  up  again  and  the  right  word  de- 
termined. It  is  surprising,  when  one  has  once 
determined  upon  the  right  words  and  phrases  for 
a  certain  number  of  occasions,  how  many  purposes 
they  will  seem  to  serve.  Gradually,  then,  one*s 
ready  vocabulary  will  grow;  and  the  time  may 
come  when  it  may  be  said  of  the  speaker,  in  small 
measure,  what  Mr.  Holyoake  says  of  Gladstone: 

"  With  Mr.  Gladstone  it  is  as  though  he  took  upon 
the  platform  with  him  vast  piles  of  the  English  lan- 
guage, from  which  he  takes,  with  a  swift  hand,  what- 
ever he  requires  for  the  purpose  of  the  moment;  words 
of  strength,  or  beauty,  or  brightness — of  light,  or 
shade,  or  force,  until  each  passage  is  perfect.  When  a 
sentence  is  begun,  you  cannot  always  foresee  how  Mr. 
Gladstone  will  end  it.  But  the  great  artist  never  fails. 
His  eye  sees  all  the  while  the  fitting  word  lying  by  his 
side,  and  he  dashes  it  in  with  the  spontaneity  of  a 
master." 

One  final  word  as  to  the  relation  of  the  written 
and  spoken  speech.  We  have  seen  that  the  style 
of  written  discourse  is  more  compact  and  less  dif- 


THE  SPOKE'N  DEBATE,  197 

fuse  than  that  of  spoken  language.  Unless,  there- 
fore, the  debater  writes  with  unusual  and  Expansion 
unnecessary  diffuseness,  his  written  wok  0^  Speech, 
will  naturally  expand  as  it  becomes  freer  and  more 
conversational  in  oral  utterance.  For  this  reason, 
as  well  as  from  the  fact  that  space  must  be  left  for 
material  suggested  at  the  moment  of  speaking,  the 
prepared  argument  should  never  be  so  long  as  to 
occupy,  in  its  written  form,  the  full  time  allowed 
for  speaking.  Otherwise  the  end  of  it  may  never 
be  heard. 

What,  it  may  be  asked  at  this  point,  of  prepara- 
tion for  rapid  rebuttal  in  debate?  This,  again,  is 
so  much  a  matter  of  individual  ability  preparation 
that  it  is  impossible  to  offer  anything  forEebuttai. 
more  than  general  suggestions.  The  ability  to  an- 
alyze, recapitulate,  and  refute  the  arguments  of  an 
opponent  rapidly,  when  there  is  little  time  for  re- 
flection, may  be  regarded  as  a  sort  of  inspiration, 
which  it  is  almost  useless  to  try  either  to  analyze 
or  teach.  Nevertheless,  granted  some  natural  apti- 
tude for  it,  it  may  be  remarkably  strengthened  by 
practice.  To  those  with  little  of  such  natural  apti- 
tude for  rapid  thinking  on  their  feet,  this  conso- 
lation may  be  offered:  that  good  rebuttal  in  debate 
is  not  by  any  means  so  largely  a  matter  of  rapid, 
extempore  thinking,  as  is  very  commonly  sup- 
posed. Observation  shows  that,  even  when  the 
debater  on  one  side  must  follow  his  opponent  with- 


198  THE  yIRT  OF  DEBATE. 

out  opportunity  for  reflection  on  the  arguments  of 
the  latter,  the  occasions  are  rare  on  which  the  op- 
ponent will  be  found  to  have  introduced  any  mate- 
rial which  could  not  reasonably  have  been  antici- 
pated. Most  debatable  questions  are  discussed 
pretty  thoroughly  in  an  informal  way,  before  they 
are  ever  brought  to  the  point  of  formal  debate;  and 
it  is  a  very  unusual  debater  (except,  of  course,  on 
occasions  when  some  new  piece  of  evidence  has 
been  discovered)  who  can  devise  a  method  of  proof 
which  a  careful  opponent  will  find  surprising  or 
unexpected.  Usually  the  most  that  will  be  unex- 
pected will  be  the  general  arrangement  of  proof,  or 
the  form  in  which  it  is  stated. 

To  prepare  for  extemporaneous  refutation,  then, 
is  simply  to  do  what  we  have  considered  in  former 
Armed  with  chapters:  to  analyze  the  question  from 
Material.  |-]^g  point  of  view  of  the  opponent  as  well 
as  from  one's  own,  to  become  acquainted  with  all 
probable  or  possible  arguments  on  the  opposite 
side,  and  to  be  provided  with  abundant  evidence 
for  overthrowing  them.  What  is  often  thought  to 
be  great  brilliancy  is  really  only  careful  prepara- 
tion. To  have  at  one's  hand  the  evidence  that  is 
needed  is  worth  more  than  great  eloquence.  In 
a  recent  intercollegiate  debate  the  speakers  on  one 
side  quoted  in  support  of  their  position  from  an  ar- 
ticle written  by  a  professor  in  the  opposing  insti- 
tution.   It  was  at  the  opposing  institution  that  the 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  199 

debate  was  being  held,  and  the  quotation  of  course 
made  no  little  impression  on  the  audience.  It  was, 
in  fact,  merely  a  half-quotation,  misrepresenting 
the  general  tenor  of  the  article  by  selecting  some 
sentences  and  carefully  omitting  others.  The  pro- 
fessor who  had  written  the  article  was  present  in 
the  audience,  was  of  course  profoundly  annoyed 
by  the  use  made  of  his  statements,  but  could  not 
rise  and  interrupt  the  debate  to  explain  the  true 
state  of  affairs.  Unfortunately  none  of  the  debaters 
representing  the  institution  where  the  debate  was 
held  had  brought  the  article  to  the  platform,  nor 
was  any  of  them  sufficiently  familiar  with  its  con- 
tents to  give  a  true  account  of  it.  There  was  noth- 
ing to  do,  therefore,  but  to  ignore  it.  If  one  of 
them  had  been  able  to  rise  and  read  two  or  three 
sentences  in  the  context  of  what  had  been  quoted, 
throwing  back  upon  his  opponents  the  charge  of 
garbling  the  evidence,  the  effect  would  have  been 
most  striking.  The  incident  illustrates  the  im- 
portance of  being  prepared  with  all  sorts  of  ijiate- 
rial  on  the  subject  in  hand,  expected  and  unex- 
pected, before  actually  entering  upon  debate. 

What  must  be  done  extemporaneously,  then,  in 
the  matter  of  refutation,  is,  first  of  all,  to  decide 
which  of  the  material  prepared  for  the  „  , 

^      ^  Eitempora- 

purpose  is  to  be  used,  and  which  may  be  neons  Refu- 

discarded.     One  need  not  answer  what 

has  not  been  charged ;  one  must  emphasize  in  refu- 


200  THE  y4RT  OF  DEBATE, 

tation  what  has  been  emphasized  in  direct  proof. 
In  the  second  place,  one  must  arrange  the  material 
of  refutation  in  a  connected  and  pleasingly  coher- 
ent fashion,  avoiding — as  has  been  suggested  in 
other  connections — the  use  of  separate,  scrappy- 
pieces  of  rebuttal.  Usually  this  arrangement  need 
not  be  wholly  a  matter  of  extemporaneous  decis- 
ion; for,  except  when  the  debate  takes  an  unex- 
pected turn,  one  can  decide  in  advance  in  what 
connections  it  will  be  best  to  take  up  particular  ar- 
guments of  the  opposite  side.  In  the  third  place, 
the  form  of  expression  in  rebuttal,  as  in  most  of  the 
argument,  must  be  left  to  the  judgment  of  the 
moment.  It  will  depend  on  what  has  been  said, 
and  on  the  way  in  which  it  has  been  said.  A  court- 
eous opponent  needs  one  sort  of  reply;  a  pug- 
nacious adversary  another.  Sometimes  the  argu- 
ments to  be  attacked  may  be  treated  with  con- 
tempt; usually  they  must  be  respectfully  answered. 
The  very  phrase  of  an  opponent  will  often  furnish 
a  skillful  debater  with  a  phrase  for  replying  to  him; 
the  emphasis  which  he  lays  upon  a  word  will  give 
one  an  emphasis  for  one's  own  case.  Thus  Pitt,  in 
a  debate  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  1741,  when 
he  was  called  to  order  in  a  passion  by  Mr.  Wynn- 
ington,  said,  in  resuming  his  speech: 

"  Sir,  if  this  be  to  preserve  order,  there  is  no  danger 
of  indecency  from  the  most  licentious  tongues.     .    • 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  201 

Order  may  sometimes  be  broken  by  passion  or  inad- 
vertency, but  will  hardly  be  re-established  by  a  moni- 
tor like  this,  who  cannot  govern  his  own  passions  while 
he  is  restraining  the  impetuosity  of  others.  .  .  That 
I  may  return  in  some  degree  the  favor  he  intends  me, 
I  will  advise  him  never  hereafter  to  exert  himself  on 
the  subject  of  order;  but  whenever  he  feels  inclined 
to  speak  on  such  occasions,  to  remember  how  he  has 
now  succeeded,  and  condemn  in  silence  what  his  cen- 
sure will  never  amend."  * 

Thus  Macaulay,  too,  when  the  poverty  of  Mil- 
ton's granddaughter  w^as  urged  as  an  argument 
for  a  long  term  of  copyright,  was  able  to  retort  in 
this  fashion: 

"  If,  Sir,  I  wished  to  find  a  strong  and  perfect  illus- 
tration of  the  effects  which  I  anticipate  from  long  copy- 
right, I  should  select, — my  honorable  and  learned 
friend  will  be  surprised, — I  should  select  the  case  of 
Milton's  granddaughter!  As  often  as  this  bill  has  been 
under  discussion,  the  fate  of  Milton's  granddaughter 
has  been  brought  forward  by  the  advocates  of  monop- 
oly. My  honorable  and  learned  friend  has  repeatedly 
told  the  story  with  great  eloquence  and  effect.  .  . 
Why,  he  asks,  instead  of  obtaining  a  pittance  from 
charity,  did  she  not  live  in  comfort  and  luxury  on  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale  of  her  ancestor's  works?     But, 

*  These  are  not,  in  fact,  the  words  of  Pitt  himself,  but  arc 
taken  from  the  report  written  down  afterward  by  Dr.  John- 
son. Th'cy  doubtless  contain  the  substance  of  Pitt's  retort, 
but  are  in  the  characteristically  heavier  style  of  Johnson. 


2oa  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

Sir,  will  my  honorable  and  learned  friend  tell  me  that 
this  event,  which  he  has  so  often  and  so  pathetically 
described,  was  caused  by  the  shortness  of  the  term  of 
copyright?  Why,  at  that  time,  the  duration  of  copy- 
right was  longer  than  even  he,  at  present,  proposes  to 
make  it.  The  monopoly  lasted  not  sixty  years,  but 
forever.  At  the  time  at  which  Milton's  granddaughter 
asked  charity,  Milton's  works  were  the  exclusive  prop- 
erty of  a  bookseller  .  .  Milton's  works  are  under 
a  monopoly.  Milton's  granddaughter  is  starving.  The 
reader  is  pillaged,  but  the  writer's  family  is  not  en« 
riched." 

To  pass  to  a  very  recent  example:  in  a  debate 
on  the  colonial  policy  of  the  United  States,  the 
debaters  on  one  side  repeatedly  quoted  statistics 
relative  to  Dutch  Guiana,  as  proving  certain  laws 
of  trade  relative  to  colonies  and  their  mother- 
countries.  In  reply,  the  opposing  debater  adduced 
contradictory  statistics  from  a  number  of  colonies 
of  great  size  and  importance,  and  concluded  with 
the  remark:  "  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  there  are 
more  things  in  heaven  and  earth  than  Dutch  Gui- 
ana!" 

Such  skillful  retorts  as  these  just  quoted  come, 
as  has  already  been  suggested,  by  a  sort  of  inspira- 
Bapidityof  ^^on,  and  all  that  a  debater  can  do  is  to 
Thought.'  pray  that,  when  the  needful  moment 
comes,  the  inspiration  may  be  his.  To  cultivate 
rapidity  of  thought  while  on  one's  feet  is  possible, 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  203 

but  not  easily  reducible  to  rules.  One  must  speak 
as  often  as  he  can  without  making  himself  a  pub- 
lic bore.  One  may  well  be  watchful,  in  conversa- 
tion, of  opportunities  for  keen  rebuttal  of  weak  ar- 
guments and  empty  sayings,  though  he  need  not 
make  himself  unpopular  by  putting  his  thoughts 
into  words.  Above  all,  one  must  be  earnest  in  his 
thinking  and  in  his  investigation  of  doubtful  ques- 
tions; for  earnestness  is  the  mother  of  fluency.  To 
such  an  one,  if  he  be  naturally  fitted  for  a  speaker, 
the  act  of  rising  to  speak,  the  presence  of  an  audi- 
ence, the  feeling  that  the  occasion  is  a  pressing 
one — that  everything  depends  upon  him,  will  act 
not  as  embarrassments,  but  as  stimulants.  His 
nerves  will  tingle,  his  blood  flow  quickly,  his  brain 
work  like  an  engine.  Ideas  will  come  pouring  upon 
him,  from  the  very  time  and  place.  Words  will  fol- 
low suit,  in  such  numbers  as  to  need  repression 
father  than  stimulus.  There  is  only  one  thing  bet- 
ter than  to  hear  a  debater  at  such  a  moment,  and 
that  is  to  be  the  debater  one's  self  ! 

We  come  now  to  the  final  problem  of  the  de- 
bater, that  of  delivery.  It  is  a  troublesome  mat- 
ter, as  being  an  essential  to  success,  and  piaceof 
yet  a  subordinate  one.  As  a  means  to  Delivery. 
an  end  it  is  of  great  importance;  in  itself  it  is  to  be 
forgotten  as  soon  as  possible.  To  the  speaker 
absorbed  in  his  subject,  and  eager  to  convince  his 
audience,  it  is  a  bore  to  be  obliged  to  give  attention 


204  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

to  the  use  of  his  voice,  the  position  of  his  feet,  or 
the  motions  of  his  arms.  He  rightly  says  that  he 
is  interested  in  more  important  matters.  It  is  no 
doubt  true  that  if  one  must  choose  between  sub- 
ject-matter and  deUvery,  subject-matter  should  be 
chosen  without  a  moment's  hesitation;  that  a 
speaker  with  fine  voice  and  presence,  but  with 
nothing  to  say,  is  far  worse  off  than  one  with  fine 
brains  but  poor  elocution.  And  it  would  be  a  corn- 
fort  to  be  able  to  add  that,  if  one  will  only  attend 
to  the  matter  of  his  speech  and  the  earnestness  of 
his  purpose,  the  delivery  will  take  care  of  itself,  or 
at  least  not  make  much  difference.  Unfortunately, 
however,  experience  forbids  our  saying  so.  We  all 
know  learned,  even  brilliant  men,  whose  writings, 
whose  conversation  perhaps,  are  of  the  very  fir^t 
rank,  and  yet  whom  no  one  cares  to  hear  make  a 
public  address.  It  may  be  from  the  simple  fact 
that  they  cannot  be  heard;  or  it  may  be  that  they 
speak  audibly,  yet  with  so  little  vigor  or  variety 
that  it  is  impossible  for  any  one  to  listen  to  them 
for  any  length  of  time,  remaining  wide  awake, 
without  great  power  of  concentration.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  know  men  with  comparatively  few 
original  ideas,  whose  speeches  when  printed  and 
read  prove  to  be  vastly  inferior  to  those  of  the 
former  class,  yet  who  can  always  command  an  au- 
dience and  move  an  audience,  through  nothing  else 
than  their  ability  as  speakers.    These  are  the  actual 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE,  205 

conditions.  And  it  follows  that  a  debater  without 
a  good  delivery  is  a  soldier  but  half  armed.  He 
may  know  what  he  wants  to  aim  at,  but  he  cannot 
be  sure  of  hitting  it. 

The  characteristics  of  a  good  delivery  may  be 
stated  in  the  same  words  as  the  qualities  of  a  good 
style:  clearness,  force,  and  elegance.  And  Qualities  of 
the  general  laws  of  delivery  are  very  Delivery. 
closely  related  to  the  laws  of  style.  Both  are  means 
for  expressing  what  one  thinks  in  a  way  that  will 
make  it  the  property  of  others.  In  both  cases  the 
aim  is  to  make  ideas  intelligible,  to  drive  them 
home,  and  to  put  them  in  pleasing  and  effective 
form. 

The  quality  of  clearness,  then,  provides  that  the 
speaker  shall  be  heard.  Whole  books  have  been 
written,  and  will  continue  to  be  written, 
on  the  use  of  the  voice  in  public  speak- 
ing; it  would  be  unreasonable,  therefore,  to  at- 
tempt here  anything  more  than  the  slightest  help 
in  the  way  of  practical  suggestion.  So  much  de- 
pends, too,  upon  the  natural  voice  of  any  particu- 
lar speaker,  that  each  person  must  find  his  own 
critics  and  learn  his  own  lessons.  It  may  be  said 
in  general  that  making  one's  self  heard  is  not  by 
any  means  altogether  a  matter  of  loudness.  Many 
speakers,  used  to  immense  audience  rooms  or  to 
open-air  meetings,  speak  too  loud  to  be  heard  when 
they  are  in  a  small  room.    To  bellow  before  a  small 


2o6  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE, 

audience  is  ridiculous  as  well  as  wearisome.  To 
speak  with  apparent  ease  and  with  quietness,  and 
yet  distinctly,  is  best  of  all.  It  is  true  that  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  loudness  is  necessary  in  a  large 
room.  Usually  a  speaker  can  judge  what  this 
should  be  by  fixing  his  mind  upon  the  part  of  the 
room  most  distant  from  him,  and  directing  his 
voice  with  such  force  that  he  will  realize  that  he  is 
reaching  at  least  that  distance.  If  the  room  is  a 
large  one,  he  may  at  first  be  content  with  making 
himself  just  audible,  and  no  more,  to  his  most  dis- 
tant hearers;  the  force  of  his  voice  will  then 
naturally  increase  as  he  proceeds. 

But  apart  from  the  matter  of  strength  of  tone, 
the  elements  of  clear  speaking  requiring  no  little 
attention  from  most  persons  are  clearness 
of  enunciation  and  purity  of  tone.  Ability 
to  make  one's  self  heard  in  large  assemblies  is  often 
simply  a  matter  of  distinct  enunciation.  There  are 
usually  three  points  to  be  noticed  here.  The  first 
is  not  to  swallow  the  tone,  but  to  keep  the  mouth 
well  open  and  let  the  vowel  sounds  have  a  good 
chance  to  go  straight  from  the  place  where  they 
are  made  to  the  ears  of  the  audience.  It  is  aston- 
ishing  how  averse  some  speakers  are  to  opening 
their  mouths  when  they  talk.  "  Dr.  Blank  may  say 
a  great  many  fine  things,"  said  one  college  profes- 
sor in  speaking  of  another  in  the  same  Faculty, 
''  but  one  seldom  realizes  it,  because  he  says  them 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  207 

inside  his  throat  and  a  good  part  of  them  never 
gets  out."  The  second  element  of  distinctness  is 
to  utter  one's  consonants  neatly  and  fully,  and  not 
to  let  them  constantly  slip  away  into  nothingness. 
Failure  to  pay  sufficient  respect  to  the  consonants 
of  the  language  is  a  cause  of  much  unintelligible 
public  speaking.  Even  if  it  does  not  interfere  with 
clearness,  it  produces  a  most  slovenly  and  inelegant 
style  of  speech.  The  third  element  of  distinctness 
is  to  keep  up  the  force  of  utterance  to  the  very  end 
of  each  sentence,  and  not  let  the  conclusion  dis- 
appear into  the  speaker's  throat.  Many  speakers 
seem  to  tire  of  their  sentences  before  they  are 
through  uttering  them;  their  minds  no  doubt  are 
running  on  ahead  to  prepare  for  what  is  to  be  said 
next;  the  result  is  that  a  hearer  must  fall  back  on 
his  knowledge  of  the  subject  or  of  the  language  to 
know  how  their  sentences  probably  end.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  we  have  seen  that  the  end  of  a  sentence 
or  paragraph  is  usually  its  most  important  part.  It 
should  therefore  be  brought  out  with  special  dis- 
tinctness, and  serve  to  clinch  the  thought  which 
has  just  been  uttered. 

The  element  of  purity  of  tone  is  even  more  dif- 
ficult to  treat  apart  from  individual  cases.     It  is  a 
matter   which    few    persons    understand,  p^tyof 
though  all  appreciate  it  in  the  sound  of  Tone, 
different  voices.     Impure  tones  are  caused  by  the 
presence  of  inharmonious  "  over-tones,"  as  they 


2o8  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

are  called,  which  sound  in  conjunction  with  the 
principal  pitch  at  which  one  speaks.  Any  one  can 
appreciate  this  by  speaking  in  a  deliberately  harsh 
tone  of  voice,  and  listening  for  the  discordant  over- 
tones which  can  be  heard  in  the  throat.  Singers 
spend  many  weary  hours  of  practice  in  order  to  rid 
themselves  of  these  impure  tones.  Speakers  can  do 
the  same  thing,  if  they  will.  Indeed  the  quality  of 
the  voice  can  usually  be  improved  at  will,  by  fix- 
ing the  mind  on  it,  and  deliberately  relieving  it  of 
the  poor  qualities  of  sound  which  one  uses  in  com- 
mon speech.  A  poor  quality  of  tone  is  often  due 
to  the  same  cause  which  produces  a  weak  or  indis- 
tinctly enunciated  manner  of  utterance, — namely, 
the  failure  to  fix  one's  thought  on  the  audience 
addressed,  and  to  force  out  the  tone  in  their  direc- 
tion. If  one  speaks  in  a  sort  of  soliloquy,  not  let- 
ting the  voice  really  escape  from  one's  own  throat, 
the  resulting  tones  will  be  Hkely  to  be  impure  and 
unpleasant.  If  one  opens  his  mouth  and  speaks 
straight  out  of  it  at  a  definite  distant  object,  the 
quality  will  be  improved.  But  all  these  matters 
relating  to  the  use  of  the  voice  must  be  worked  out 
by  every  speaker  for  himself.  Deep  breathing  must 
be  cultivated,  in  order  not  to  tire  the  throat  and 
the  upper  part  of  the  chest  by  too  great  depend- 
ence upon  them.  An  open  throat  must  be  culti- 
vated, free  from  that  constriction  which  so  often 
tires  speakers'  voices  when  they  do  not  know  what 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  209 

IS  the  matter.  Oftentimes  catarrhal  affections,  or 
other  enemies  of  the  general  health,  must  be  dis- 
posed of  if  the  voice  is  to  be  at  its  best.  Constant 
criticism  must  be  sought  from  those  who  are  able 
and  willing  to  tell  one  the  truth  about  his  voice 
and  delivery.  In  this  way,  by  the  firm  and  con- 
stant use  of  the  will,  a  weak  and  harsh  voice  may 
become  comparatively  strong  and  pure. 

The  quality  of  force,  in  delivery,  is  of  almost 
equal  importance  with  that  of  clearness.  It  has,  in- 
deed, already  been  touched  upon,  since 
the  two  are  very  closely  connected.  The 
object  of  force  in  delivery  is  the  same  as  that  of 
force  in  style, — to  make  people  not  only  hear  but 
listen,  and  to  drive  home  into  their  consciousness 
what  the  speaker  is  saying.  Here  is  where  we  all 
realize  that  many  speakers  fail.  Those  in  the  habit 
of  speaking  to  audiences  that  feel  obliged  to  listen 
whether  they  want  to  or  not,  such  as  college  pro- 
fessors, are  very  likely  to  make  no  effort  to  do  any- 
thing more  than  simply  say  what  they  have  to  say, 
as  though  they  were  laying  the  matter  on  the  table, 
or  talking  it  into  a  phonograph,  knowing  that  any 
one  who  should  come  by  might  take  it  up  and  get 
the  benefit  of  it,  or  might  not.  But  a  debater  must 
not  be  content  with  any  such  sort  of  speaking.  He 
must  make  sure  that  his  important  ideas  are  heard 
because  the  very  tone  in  which  he  speaks  them  is 
so  insistent  that  the  audience  cannot  choose  but 


«lo  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

hear  him.  He  must  bring  out  clearly,  by  changes 
in  his  voice,  every  change  in  his  line  of  thought, 
so  that  it  will  be  more  certain  of  being  understood. 
He  must  establish  so  close  a  connection  between 
himself  and  his  hearers,  that  from  the  moment  he 
begins  to  speak  until  he  sits  down,  it  will  be  as 
though  there  were  a  current  of  electricity  running 
on  a  wire  between  him  and  each  one  of  them.  A 
good  speaker  knows  when  this  is  the  case,  and  in- 
sists on  making  and  keeping  up  this — as  it  were — 
magnetic  connection. 

Vigor  and  variety,  then,  may  be  said  to  be  the 
main  elements  of  force  in  delivery.  The  important 
Vigor  and  ideas  of  one's  speech  must  be  emphasized. 
Variety.  must  be  driven  home,  as  though  one  were 
giving  each  of  them  a  blow  with  a  hammer.  But 
if  there  is  a  constant  hammering  at  the  same  de- 
gree of  force,  its  effectiveness  will  soon  vanish. 
Some  speakers  make  the  mistake  of  beginning  at 
full  speed,  full  heat,  and  full  force.  They  are  them- 
selves excited  at  the  very  moment  of  commencing, 
and  do  not  realize  that  the  audience  is  not  yet  ready 
to  sympathize  with  their  state  of  mind.  When  a 
speaker  begins  in  a  heat,  and  the  audience  is  cool, 
they  are  likely  to  laugh  at  his  waste  of  energy,  and 
be  entirely  unmoved  or  even  repelled.  Or,  if  he 
begins  violently  and  continues  violently,  as  some 
loud-voiced  speakers  do,  the  audience  may  soon  go 
to  sleep,  as  they  would  do  under  the  influence  of 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  211 

any  other  sort  of  monotony,  when  they  have  be- 
come used  to  the  noise.  The  wise  debater,  then, 
will  begin  with  something  of  the  same  sort  of  cool- 
ness and  deliberation  which  his  audience  may  be 
supposed  to  feel;  he  may  then  gradually  warm  to 
his  subject,  and  carry  the  audience  with  him  to 
greater  degrees  of  force  and  higher  planes  of  feel- 
ing. He  will  never  pursue  one  manner  of  speak- 
ing too  long  at  a  time,  remembering  that  force  is 
always  gained  by  change  and  contrast.  A  dropping 
of  the  voice,  when  one  has  been  speaking  loudly, 
is  as  impressive  as  a  sudden  raising  of  it  when  one 
has  been  speaking  quietly.  If  both  vigor  and 
variety  are  used,  the  audience  will  be  pretty  cer- 
tain to  Hsten  if  the  speaker  has  anything  at  all  to 
say. 

Variety  of  pitch,  as  well  as  of  force,  is  an  ele- 
ment of  good  speaking  which  many  persons  find 
very  hard  to  attain.     Not  only  is  any- 

,,.  ,.  ,       -^  -^      Pitch. 

thmg  approachmg  a  monotone  sure  to 
produce  the  effect  which  we  rightly  call  '*  monot- 
ony," but  it  is  quite  impossible  to  bring  out  all 
the  shades  of  meaning  that  any  speech  contains, 
without  constant  variety  of  pitch.  We  have,  in 
fact,  in  our  common  speech,  a  vast  number  of 
little  Umcs  which  express  the  relations  of  ideas 
quite  as  accurately  as  words.  Everyone  under- 
stands these  tunes,  but  not  everyone  has  the 
flexibility  of  voice  to  produce  them  easily.     The 


21*  THE  AKT  of  debate. 

habit  of  singing,  in  which  the  pitch  of  the 
voice  is  of  course  constantly  changing,  is  per- 
haps the  most  natural  means  of  acquiring  this 
flexibiHty;  it  also  helps  in  the  gaining  of  strength 
and  good  quality  of  tone.  Not  every  speaker  can 
hope  to  sing  for  the  pleasure  of  others;  but  every 
speaker  can  and  should  sing  a  good  deal  for  the 
good  of  his  speaking  voice. 

Regarding  the  third  great  quality  of  delivery, 
elegance,  very  little  need  be  said.  It  means,  first 
of  all,  that  a  speaker  shall  rid  himself  so 
far  as  possible  of  those  particular  temp- 
tations to  awkwardness  or  uncouthness  which  es- 
pecially beset  him.  To  do  this  he  must  have 
friendly  critics,  who  will  not  spare  to  tell  him  what 
absurd  things  he  does  when  he  is  in  the  excite- 
ment of  speaking.  He  must  exercise  his  will-power 
until  he  is  sure  that  he  is  master  of  himself.  Ele- 
gance means,  too,  the  same  sort  of  dignity  and  per- 
suasiveness in  speaking  that  it  means  in  style. 
The  speaker  must  respect  himself  and  his  cause, 
but  not  be  thinking  of  himself  or  talking  of  him- 
self as  though  he  were  the  theme  of  all  his  speeches. 
This  is  the  prescription  for  true  dignity  of  manner. 
He  must  respect  his  audience,  too,  and  address 
them  with  the  courtesy  with  which  he  would  ad- 
dress any  individual  among  them  who  might  be 
his  guest.  This  is  the  prescription  for  persuasive- 
ness of  manner.    If  these  qualities  abound,  the 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE,  213 

Speaker  will  be  pardoned  much  want  of  elegance 
in  the  placing  of  his  feet  or  the  movement  of  his 
hands. 

The  mention  of  hands  and  feet  suggests  the 
question:  what  can  we  say  of  posture  and  gesture, 
that  shall  be  useful  to  the  debater  in  a 
general  way?  Almost  nothing  at  all. 
Erect  posture  is  a  matter  of  habit  and  of  a  self- 
respecting  state  of  mind.  The  speaker  who 
slouches,  or  stands  in  a  hang-dog  fashion,  has 
either  acquired  inelegant  and  unhygienic  habits 
\«hich  gymnastic  practice  must  correct,  or  else  he 
h  not  on  the  proper  terms  with  himself,  his  sul> 
jcct,  and  his  audience.  The  self-controlled  speaker, 
who  feels  that  he  is  master  of  the  occasion,  will  be 
likely  to  take  a  position  of  self-control.  Even  then, 
however,  he  may  need  friendly  caution  as  to  shuf- 
lling  his  feet,  carrying  his  hands  in  his  pockets,  or 
indulging  in  bodily  contortions  when  he  is  carried 
away  by  enthusiasm. 

As  to  gesture,  very  little  of  it  is  needed  in  de- 
bate. What  there  is  should  be  the  outcome  of  the 
natural  feeUng  of  the  speaker.  A  gesture 
prescribed  and  provided  for  a  particular  ^^^^' 
place  is  one  of  the  most  lamentable  pieces  of  gym- 
nastics in  the  world.  On  the  other  hand,  a  gesture 
that  comes  from  the  spontaneous  enthusiasm  of  the 
s])eaker  will  have  good  chance  of  being  effective, 
even  if  it  violate  all  the  commandments  of  Delsarte. 


214  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

Critkism  of  gesture,  then,  must  b'e  largely  indi- 
vidual and  corrective.  If  a  speaker  has  formed  the 
bad  habit  of  waving  his  arms  or  beating  his  fore- 
finger all  through  his  address,  he  should  be  told  of 
it  and  led  to  restrain  himself.  "  Faithful  are  the 
wounds  of  a  friend."  On  the  other  hand,  if  he 
makes  almost  no  gestures  at  all  it  is  because  there 
is  too  little  freedom  and  force  in  his  general  man- 
ner, because  he  is  embarrassed  or  constrained,  or 
has  too  little  warmth  of  feeling;  in  such  a  case  the 
cause  must  be  corrected,  not  the  effect.  There  are, 
indeed,  laws  of  gesture,  as  there  are  laws  of  style, 
though  it  seems  to  be  impossible  to  write  a  treatise 
on  them  and  keep  within  the  bounds  of  sanity.  It 
will  do  a  debater  no  harm  to  learn  something  of 
these  laws, — may  even  in  the  long  run  do  hinJ. 
good,  but  only  when  they  have  been  absorbed  into 
his  general  make-up.  The  entire  nature  and  use  o^ 
gesture,  rightly  looked  at,  are  from  within. 

How  much  training  In  mere  delivery  is  advisable 
for  an  inexperienced  speaker?  All  that  he  can  get, 
Training  for  Provided  it  is  training  of  a  general  char- 
Delivery,  acter,  and  not  for  a  particular  speech. 
Much  practice  on  a  particular  speech  is  likely  to 
destroy  its  spontaneous  quality.  But  training  of  a 
general  kind,  with  competent  criticism  and  a  rigid 
use  of  the  will  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  faults 
and  gaining  force  and  elegance,  can  scarcely  be 
overdone.    The  ambitious  speaker  should  sing  and 


THE  SPOKEN  DEBATE.  21 5 

shout  all  he  can,  to  make  his  vocal  cords  strong 
and  flexible,  and  should  practice  gymnastics  in  or- 
der to  strengthen  his  lungs  and  improve  his 
muscular  self-control.  He  should  deliver  many 
speeches  to  the  walls  of  his  own  room,  and  should 
watch  his  expression  and  gestures  in  a  good-sized 
mirror.  It  is  only  by  speaking  privately  to  a  mir- 
ror that  one  can  discover  the  mistakes  of  facial  or 
bodily  expression  which  one's  friends  will  never 
dare  point  out;  and  such  a  discovery,  made  in  pri- 
vate, is  without  the  bitterness  of  publicity.  To  do 
all  these  things  with  a  particular  occasion  in  mind 
would  be  to  incur  the  danger  that,  when  the  occa- 
sion had  arrived,  one  should  think  not  of  the 
duty  of  the  moment,  but  of  posture,  gestures,  or 
quality  of  tone.  But  to  do  it  frequently  by  way  of 
general  practice  ought  to  wear  tracks  in  the  brain 
and  along  the  nerves,  such  that,  when  an  occasion 
demands  all  one's  power,  nerves  and  brain  will  re- 
act as  they  have  been  trained  to  do,  and  leave  the 
attention  to  look  after  higher  things. 

All  these  matters  of  delivery  can,  from  one  point 
of  view,  be  reduced  to  a  single  principle.    The  suc- 
cessful speaker  is  one  who  is  able  to  reach  j^gj^^Qj^^f 
and  move  his  audience.     To  do  this  he  Speaker  to 
must  not  speak  as  though  talking  to  him- 
self, or  into  the  air,  but  must  talk  to  them.    He  must 
reach  out  after  them,  must  touch  them  by  his 
speech,  must  enter  into  their  sympathies  so  as  to 


2i6  THE  ART  OF  DEBATE. 

move  their  feelings  and  wills.  Two  great  facts 
must  be  in  his  mind:  his  subject  and  his  audience. 
To  bring  these  two  together,  as  he  sees  them,  is 
the  whole  end  of  his  work.  Himself  he  must  for 
the  time  being  forget.  If  this  principle  is  operat- 
ing in  an  ideal  way,  the  brain  will  act  logically,  the 
style  will  move  in  orderly  and  fluent  lines,  and  the 
whole  physical  man,  as  well  as  the  man  of  thought 
and  feeling,  will  be  at  its  best.  The  debater  with 
even  moderate  attainments  of  this  kind  will  be  in  a 
fair  way  to  become  what  it  was  said  at  the  very 
opening  of  this  book  that  a  great  debater  always 
is:  a  leader  of  men. 


APPENDIX. 

INTRODUCTORY  NOTE. 

The  material  in  the  Appendix  is  added  for  con- 
"venience  of  illustration  and  reference.  The  editor  is 
tinder  many  obligations  to  those  whose  courtesy  has 
aided  in  making  possible  the  use  of  it  for  the  present 
purpose. 

The  speeches  are  from  recent  discussions  on  real 
iflsues,  and  so,  while  perhaps  not  such  trustworthy 
n\odels  of  style  as  those  of  orators  whose  work  has  be- 
come historic,  illustrate  methods  of  debate  which  are 
genuinely  susceptible  of  imitation.  It  was  intended 
ti>  include  also  a  specimen  of  Congressional  debate; 
but  the  conditions  of  discussion  in  our  legislative 
bodies  are  such  as  to  make  it  difficult  to  choose 
speeches  which  are  at  once  careful,  brief,  and — stand- 
ing by  themselves — intelligible.  Any  student  of  argu- 
mentation will,  of  course,  do  well  to  seek  in  the  Con- 
gressional Record  for  suggestions  relative  to  debating 
in  deliberative  assemblies. 

The  speech  of  Mr.  Meade  is  given  as  an  example 
of  refutation  in  extemporaneous  debate.  In  this  case 
the  subject  was  such  that  the  affirmative  side  had  not 
only  to  prove  its  proposition  but,  from  the  very  begin- 

ai7 


2i8  APPENDIX. 

ning,  to  attack  the  arguments  of  the  opposite  side;  and 
the  present  argument  is  an  unusually  skillful  piece  of 
solid  rebuttal. 

The  speech  of  Mr.  Warren  is  an  example  of  clear 
analysis  and  clear  presentation  of  a  subject  unusually 
difficult  to  treat  before  a  popular  audience.  Reference 
was  made  to  it,  in  the  text  of  the  book,  as  an  instance 
of  constructive  refutation,  a  definite  plan  being  offered 
in  place  of  the  proposition  of  the  affirmative.  Its  com- 
pactness of  style  is  also  worthy  of  study. 

The  speech  on  the  Venezuelan  Message  is  given 
primarily  as  an  example  of  persuasion  in  debate.  Tha 
decision  in  this  case  was  to  be  rendered  not  by  judges, 
but  by  a  general  vote  of  the  audience,  which  consisted 
largely  of  members  of  the  club  supporting  the  nega- 
tive side.  The  object  of  the  speaker,  therefore,  was 
to  choose  the  arguments  most  likely  to  appeal  to  those 
present,  to  state  them  in  popular  form,  and — while 
making  clear  the  moderate  position  of  his  own  side — 
to  attack  the  negative  arguments  which  were  most 
influential  in  the  community  represented. 

The  briefs  which  follow  the  speeches  are  of  course 
designed  to  illustrate  different  methods  of  building  up 
an  argument  for  debate,  and  of  arranging  one's 
material  in  outline.  In  some  the  method  is  compara- 
tively free  and  simple;  while  such  an  instance  as  the 
brief  on  the  Restriction  of  Trusts  illustrates  the  most 
thorough  and  rigidly  formal  type  of  outline. 

The  legal  brief  is  included  for  the  purpose  of  illus- 
trating the  peculiar  methods  of  legal  argument,  on  a 
question  of  purely  technical,  rather  than  popular,  in- 
terest, where  matters  of  both  fact  and  law  are  involved. 


APPENDIX,  219 

In  this  case  considerable  condensation  was  necessary, 
since,  as  was  pointed  out  in  Chapter  III,  legal  briefs 
usually  involve  not  only  an  outline,  but  a  fairly  full 
statement,  of  proof.  The  material  is  given  in  sufficient 
fullness  to  indicate  the  method  of  handling  legal  pre- 
cedent and  authority;  the  handUng  of  the  evidence 
could  not  so  well  be  brought  out  in  a  limited  space. 
Complete  legal  briefs,  illustrating  the  handling  of  evi- 
dence, are  of  course  easily  accessible. 

The  brief  from  Macaulay's  speech  on  Copyright  is 
included  as  illustrating  the  way  in  which  the  clear- 
ness of  structure  of  an  argument  may  be  brought  out 
by  drawing  an  outline  from  the  finished  speech.  The 
brief  on  the  Retirement  of  the  Greenbacks  is  of  course 
an  outline  of  a  single  speech  in  a  university  debate ;  that 
on  the  Restriction  of  Trusts,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an 
outline  of  the  whole  case  of  the  negative  in  such  a 
debate — detailed  evidence  excepted.  Circumstances 
must  of  course  always  indicate  how  full  and  how 
formal  an  outline  is  advisable  for  any  particular  pur- 
pose. The  student  of  argument  should  err,  if  it  at 
all,  on  the  side  of  fullness  and  formality,  for  the  sake 
of  good  practice  in  the  analysis  and  construction  of 
material. 

Of  course  no  originality  is  claimed  for  the  list  of 
one  hundred  Propositions  for  Debate  which  make  up 
the  third  division  of  the  Appendix.  They  have  been 
gathered  from  many  sources,  and  most  of  them  have 
been  actually  tested  in  debate.  It  is  believed  that  there 
is  not  one  question  on  the  list  which  is  not  genuinely 
debatable.  Many  of  them,  however,  in  order  to  avoid 
the  limitations  of  particular  times  and  places,  have 


220  APPENDIX, 

been  stated  in  a  form  more  general  and  more  in- 
clusive than  would  be  found  serviceable  in  practice. 
Such  a  list  can,  at  best,  be  only  suggestive.  When 
formal  debates  are  held  fney  should  be  on  subjects 
chosen  so  far  as  possible  from  present  conditions  of 
living  interest;  and  general  subjects  should  be  made 
as  specific  as  may  be,  by  applying  them  to  particular 
times  and  places.  Thus  any  of  the  subjects  in  the 
present  Ust  referring  to  "  the  States "  in  general, 
should  be  altered  to  read  "  Massachusetts,"  or  "  New 
York,"  or  "  Pennsylvania,"  according  to  the  place  and 
conditions  of  the  proposed  debate. 

Subjects  relating  to  art,  literature,  pure  ethics, 
philosophy,  and  the  like,  have  been  purposely  omitted, 
as  experience  indicates  that  they  are  unlikely  to  be 
profitable  for  formal  oral  debate.  They  are  often 
valuable  for  discussion  of  a  more  informal  character, 
and  may,  of  course,  where  a  live  issue  is  clearly  drawn 
and  generally  understood,  be  debated  with  profit.  The 
one  necessary  quality  of  a  debatable  subject  is  that 
it  shall  be  one  on  which  living  opinion  is  genuinely 
divided. 


I.  ARGUMENTS. 

EXPANSION  IN  THE  EASTERN 
HEMISPHERE. 

(Speech  delivered  by  Mr.  Edward  Sherwood  Meade,  of 
the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  in  the  CornellrPennsylvania 
Debate  of  February,  1899.  Pennsylvania  had  the  affirmative 
of  the  subject:  "Resolved,  That  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  are  opposed  to  the  permanent  acquisition  of  territory 
in  the  Eastern  Hemisphere,  except  so  much  as  may  be  needed 
for  naval  stations.") 

The  affirmative  in  this  debate  has  taken  strong 
ground  in  favor  of  expansion.  We  are  expansionists 
in  the  broadest  interpretation  of  that  term.  We  are 
in  favor  of  the  largest  possible  extension  of  American 
trade  and  American  enterprise.  But  in  advocating 
expansion  we  have  not  lost  our  balance.  We  have 
been  careful  to  base  our  advocacy  of  the  American 
theory  of  expansion  on  the  American  practice  of  ex- 
pansion, which  is  expansion  on  our  own  continent, 
and  within  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  first  speaker  on  the  affirmative  made  such  a 
convincing  plea  in  favor  of  this  western  expansion 
that  he  has  won  over  to  our  view  of  the  matter  not 
only  you,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  who  have  come  here 
with  open  minds  and  unbiased  judgments,  but  even 

.  •  221 


a22  APPENDIX,  \ 

his  opponents,  who  may  reasonably  be  supposed  to 
have  inbibed  a  prejudice  in  favor  of  expansion  in  the 
East  instead  of  in  the  West.  The  arguments  of  my 
colleague  were,  indeed,  so  conclusive,  that  the  negative 
speaker  who  followed  him  so  far  departed  from  what 
we  may  suppose  was  his  original  intention,  as  to  sup- 
plement and  support  my  colleague's  argument,  show- 
ing in  great  detail  the  nature  of  our  expansion  in  the 
past  one  hundred  years,  and  filling  in  with  nice  ex- 
actness the  broader  outlines  of  the  picture  of  national 
greatness  which  my  colleague  had  so  ably  drawn.  For 
this  we  thank  him.  We  had  hoped  to  convince  the 
audience;  we  had  not  dared  to  hope  that  we  should 
convince  our  opponents. 

The  second  speaker  on  the  affirmative  has  followed 
up  this  advantage  by  showing  not  only  that  western 
expansion  is  to  our  greatest  economic  advantage,  but 
that  eastern  expansion,  which  means  of  course  the 
permanent  retention  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  will  be 
attended  with  grave  political  dangers; — dangers  of 
war,  dangers  of  political  centralization,  dangers  to  na- 
tional character  and  national  ideals.  By  this  time  the 
negative  had  recovered  themselves  sufhciently  to  take 
up  the  original  thread  of  their  argument,  from  which 
their  first  speaker  had  departed  in  his  desire  to  sup- 
port the  argument  of  my  colleague;  and  the  gentle- 
man who  preceded  me  has  given  you  a  glowing 
prophecy  of  the  advantages  to  the  United  States  of 
trade  with  China.  He  has  told  you  that  we  must  have 
markets,  that  those  markets  lie  in  the  East,  and  that 
permanent  retention  of  the  Philippine  Islands  will  not 
only  introduce  us  to  those  markets,  but  will  furnish 


ARGUMENTS,  223 

US  with  a  trading  base  from  which  we  may  capture 
the  trade  of  China,  of  enormous  extent  and  far 
greater  promise.  This  is  his  argument  for  eastern  ex- 
pansion. And  he  does  well  to  base  his  contention 
on  the  ground  of  economic  advantage,  where  we  are 
only  too  glad  to  follow  him. 

The  American  people  are  thrifty  and  enterprising. 
They  dislike  to  make  investments  in  losing  enter- 
prises. No  matter  what  expansionists  may  say  aboui 
"  our  duty  to  civilization,"  it  is  our  interests,  rather 
than  our  so-called  "  duty,"  that  will  determine  our 
course  of  action.  Now  what  are  the  commercial  ad- 
vantages of  annexation? 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  plain  that  the  trade  advan- 
tages of  annexation  do  not  lie  in  the  Philippine  Is- 
lands. No  matter  what  the  United  States  may  do 
with  the  islands, — whether  we  give  them  inde- 
pendence, or  hand  them  over  to  a  foreign  power, — 
our  government  can  provide  in  the  transfer  that  equal 
rights  with  all  other  nations  be  given  to  our  mer- 
chants. We  can  secure  no  more  than  this  by  annexa- 
tion, for,  by  declaration  of  the  President  and  by  our 
manifest  self-interest  in  the  friendship  of  England,  we 
shall  maintain  the  policy  of  the  open  door  in  the  East, 
and  under  this  policy  all  nations  will  have  an  equal 
chance  in  the  Philippine  trade.  Sixty-five  per  cent, 
of  the  imports  of  these  islands  come  from  the  British 
Empire;  from  the  United  States  practically  nothing. 
We  have  no  special  advantages  in  producing  the  cheap 
implements  and  materials  which  are  mainly  demanded 
by  the  natives,  and  it  is  unlikely  that,  unless  favored 
by  tariff  discrimination,  we  could  capture  from  other 


ai4  APPENDIX. 

nations  the  trade  which  they  now  control.  Then,  too, 
the  imports  of  the  island*  are  only  ten  and  a  half  mil ' 
lions  of  dollars,  and  all  of  this  would  be  insufficient 
compensation  for  the  burdens  of  annexation. 

Expansionists  in  general  are  quite  ready  to  concede 
this.  But  they  claim  that  possession  of  the  islands 
will  give  us  a  foothold  for  trade  with  the  East;  and 
on  this  ground  they  justify  their  policy. 

The  political  and  financial  burdens  of  annexation, 
as  shown  by  my  colleague,  are  very  serious.  At  home 
we  are  secure  from  attack,  and  therefore  free  from 
war  taxation.  Our  government  is  thoroughly  demo- 
cratic; our  people  become  more  homogeneous  twtr^ 
year.  A  policy  of  colonial  empire  weakens  our  mili- 
tary position,  increases  the  burdens  of  taxation,  intro** 
duces  the  one-man  power  into  our  government,  an(\ 
transforms  the  United  States  of  America  into  th<i 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Colonial  Depen^ 
dencies  Thereof. 

In  return  for  these  sacrifices  the  expansionists  ofifer 
the  possibilities  of  exports  to  the  continent  of  Asia.. 
Surely  this  trade  must  be  great,  and  surely  annexa- 
tion of  the  Philippine  Islands  must  greatly  aid  us  to 
secure  it,  if  the  account  is  to  be  balanced.  But  if  the 
trade  of  Asia  is  small,  and  if,  in  addition,  the  posses- 
sion of  the  Philippines  will  not  help  the  United  States 
to  secure  that  trade,  the  expansionist  has  lost  his 
case. 

What  is  the  trade  of  the  continent  of  Asia,  and  what 
chance  have  we  to  secure  it?  We  may  take  India 
and  China  as  representing  approximately  the  entire 
amount.     The  total  imports  of  China  and  India  in 


ARGUMENTS,  aaS 

1897  amounted  to  $440,000,000  to  620,000,000  of 
people,  or  seventy  cents  per  capita.  In  the  same  year 
six  European  states  imported  goods  to  the  value  of 
six  billion  dollars  to  253,000,000  of  people,  or  twenty- 
four  dollars  per  capita.  The  importance  of  this  Asiatic 
trade,  it  is  plain,  has  been  greatly  exaggerated. 

Not  only  is  the  trade  small  in  amount,  but  the 
United  States  is  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  East,  and 
therefore  has  but  a  small  share  in  the  eastern  trade. 
In  Asia  we  must  compete  with  Great  Britain,  and  in 
this  competition  we  are  handicapped  by  distance.  Our 
Atlantic  ports  are  3,000  miles  further  from  Hong  Kong 
than  is  Great  Britain,  and  it  is  in  the  States  of  the  East 
and  the  middle  West  that  we  produce  the  greater  part 
of  our  exports.  Even  after  the  Nicaragua  Canal  is 
built,  Liverpool  is  1,300  miles  closer  to  Hong  Kong 
than  is  New  York.  Distance  means  coal,  and  more 
coal  means  higher  freights  to  the  American  than  to 
the  English  exporters.  .  .  .  Again,  Japan  and  China 
are  now  absorbing  the  cotton  trade  of  China,  and  cot- 
ton gHDods  make  up  China's  largest  import.  The 
United  States  is  too  far  away  to  compete  with  English 
capital  in  these  countries. 

.  .  .  The  opportunities  of  the  United  States  do  not 
lie  on  the  continent  of  Asia,  but  in  Europe  and 
America.  In  1898  $980,000,000  of  our  exports  went 
to  Europe, — more  than  doubled  since  1888;  $184,- 
000,000  to  the  American  continent — an  increase  of  75 
per  cent,  in  eleven  years;  to  the  continent  of* Asia,  in 
the  same  period,  after  fifty  years  of  uninterrupted 
trade,  $26,000,000.  What  more  conclusive  answer 
could  be  given  to  the  claim  that  the  trade  of  the  East 


ta6  APPENDIX. 

is  sufficient  to  compensate  us  for  the  dangers,  the  diffi- 
culties, and  the  enormous  cost  of  expansion? 

But,  says  the  expansionist,  this  trade  will  grow; 
China  will  develop.  Well  and  good;  but  will  not  the 
trade  with  Europe  grow?  Will  not  the  trade  of  the 
American  continent  grow  even  faster?  Will  not  the 
same  causes  operate  in  the  future  as  have  operated  in 
the  past,  to  direct  the  current  of  American  exports 
away  from  the  farther  East?  And  when  we  look  to 
the  future,  we  see  even  stronger  ground  for  our  posi- 
tion. .  .  .  America  is  more  and  more  devoting  herself 
to  the  higher  forms  of  industry,  whose  products  satisfy 
the  wants  of  civilization,  especially  along  the  lines 
where  the  mechanical  excellence  of  her  people  gives 
them  the  greatest  advantage.  We  seek  a  market  for 
these  goods  among  the  people  who  wear  shoes  of 
leather,  not  of  wood;  who  ride  on  railways,  not  in 
bullock  carts;  who  use  improved  machinery,  and  not 
the  tools  of  antiquity;  who  have  something  to  buy 
with,  and  who  are  not  engaged  in  a  constant  struggle 
for  bare  subsistence.  For  consuming  purposes,  one 
American  is  equivalent  to  thirteen  Asiatics;  one 
European  equals  thirty-four  Chinamen  and  Hindoos. 
In  short,  we  look  to  Europe  and  America  to  buy  our 
manufactures,  and  we  realize  that  the  poverty-stricken 
myriads  of  the  East  have  little  for  us. 

The  negative  must  therefore  admit  that  the  trade  of 
Asia  promises  Httle  for  the  present;  and  they  must 
also  admit  that  in  the  future  the  same  causes  which 
have  directed  our  trade  to  Europe  and  America  will 
continue  to  operate.  They  claim,  however,  that  if  we 
will  but  acquire  territory  in  the  Eastern  Hemisphere, 


ARGUMENTS.  227 

the  result  will  be  a  great  expansion  of  our  eastern 
trade.  The  only  territory  which  it  is  proposed  to  ac- 
quire is  the  Philippine  Islands.  If  they  will  not  serve 
as  a  trading  base,  and  if  a  better  trading  base  already 
exists,  the  entire  commercial  argument  of  annexation 
falls  to  the  ground.  If  we  disprove  this  claim,  im- 
perialism has  not  a  leg  to  stand  on.  Unless  the 
Philippines  can  assist  us  to  the  trade  of  China,  no  one 
will  advocate  their  retention. 

A  trading  base  is  a  place  near  the  desired  market, 
where  commercial  agencies  and  branch  houses  can  be 
established,  from  which  more  exact  knowledge  of  the 
wants  of  the  customer  can  be  gained,  and  which  will 
act  as  agents  between  the  consumer  and  the  distant 
producer.  We  are  famihar  with  the  practice  in  the 
United  States.  Many  American  branches  are  to  be 
found  in  Europe  and  the  West  Indies.  Every  facility 
for  establishing  these  connections  with  China  should 
be  given  our  merchants.  It  is  argued  that  the  Philip- 
pines furnish  such  facilities,  and  that  they  can  serve 
as  a  trading  base  for  China.  Let  us  examine  this 
claim. 

Manila  is  but  600  miles  from  Hong  Kong,  but  is  far 
oflf  the  direct  line  from  the  United  States  to  Asia.  The 
short  line  from  North  America  to  Asia  is  direct  to  the 
Sandwich  Islands,  thence  to  Yokohama,  and  from 
there  to  China.  But  to  go  from  Japan  to  China 
by  way  of  the  Philippines  is  the  same  as  to  go 
from  New  York  to  Liverpool  by  way  of  Havana. 
It  is  more  than  a  thousand  miles  out  of  the  way 
to  go  to  Hong  Kong  by  way  of  Manila.  It  would 
be  a  heavy  expense  for  steamers  to  add  this  extra 


«aS  APPENDIX, 

cost    to    the    freights    which    they    charge    our    ex- 
porters. 

Again,  the  commercial  agency  must  be  near  the 
market  in  which  it  is  to  operate.  But  a  branch  house 
in  Manila  for  the  China  trade  is  in  the  wrong  place. 
It  must  operate  at  long  range  by  telegraph  or  mail 
service,  and  the  American  manufacturer  in  the  United 
States  could  carry  on  his  China  business  from  his  own 
office  with  as  much  facility  as  through  a  Manila  agent. 
Evidently  Manila  is  a  poor  trading  base.  If  we  wish  to 
trade  with  China,  let  us  by  all  means  trade  with  China 
directly,  and  not  from  a  post  distant  from  six  to  fifteen 
hundred  miles  from  the  principal  Chinese  ports.  Let 
us  establish  our  China  agencies  where  they  will  do 
the  most  good,  in  Hong  Kong  and  Shanghai,  in  China 
itself.  Twenty-three  ports  in  China  are  open  to  our 
merchants.  Here  Americans  can  establish,  and  do 
establish,  as  many  agents  as  they  desire,  free  from 
restriction,  with  all  their  rights  guaranteed.  If  any 
combination  of  powers  desires  to  shut  those  ports, 
they  must  meet  another  combination,  the  combined 
sea  power  of  the  United  States  and  the  British  Em- 
pire. 

Consider  for  a  moment  an  analogous  situation.  The 
Canary  Islands,  off  the  coast  of  Africa,  bear  almost 
the  same  geographical  relation  to  Europe  that  the 
Philippines  bear  to  Asia.  If  the  Philippines  can  serve 
as  a  trading  base  for  China,  it  would  have  been  ex- 
pedient to  acquire  the  Canaries  as  a  base  for  the 
European  trade,  which  is  of  incomparably  greater  ex- 
tent and  promise.  But  what  answer  would  an  Ameri- 
can merchant  make  to  a  proposition  that  he  establish 


ARGUMENTS,  229 

a  branch  in  the  Canaries  for  trade  with  Liverpool?  He 
would  say  that  he  was  a  sensible  man,  and  preferred 
to  put  his  agency  where  it  would  do  more  good,  in 
Liverpool  itself. 

The  trading-base  argument  therefore  falls  to  the 
ground,  and  carries  with  it  all  the  alleged  commercial 
advantages  of  annexation.  The  commercial  oppor- 
tunities in  the  East  are  of  small  extent.  The  United 
States  will  have  great  difficulty  in  taking  advantage 
of  them,  and  annexation  of  the  Philippine  Islands  will 
not  assist  her.  Since  eastern  expansion,  then,  would 
cause  great  evils, — military  and  naval  burdens,  politi- 
cal centralization,  international  complications,  and 
dangers  of  war, — and  since  eastern  expansion  is  justi- 
fied neither  by  industrial  nor  commercial  advantage, 
we  conclude  that  the  acquisition  of  territory  in  the 
Eastern  Hemisphere  is  opposed  to  the  interests  of  the 
United  States. 


THE  RETIREMENT  OF  THE  GREENBACKS. 

(Speech  delivered  by  Mr.  Joseph  Parker  Warren,  of 
Harvard  University,  in  the  Harvard-Princeton  Debate  of 
March,  1896.  Harvard  had  the  negative  of  the  subject: 
"  Resolved,  That  Congress  should  take  immediate  steps 
towards  the  retirement  of  all  the  legal-tender  notes.") 

My  colleague  pointed  out  that  we  of  the  negative 
stand  for  the  maintenance  of  a  Hmited  volume  of  goV' 
ernment  notes  always  convertible  into  gold;  and  he 
showed  that  we  have  the  sanction '  of  the  highest 
authorities,  and  can  point  to  the  daily  experience  of 
three  of  the  soundest  financial  systems  in  the  world, 
those  of  England,  Germany,  and  Canada.  Then  he 
showed  that  the  gentlemen  on  the  affirmative  propose 
an  indiscriminate  treatment  for  our  financial  ills  that 
does  not  square  with  the  symptoms.  He  showed  that,, 
with  the  exception  of  silver  inflation,  the  only  trouble 
is  the  unfortunate  connection  between  the  revenue  and 
issue  departments  of  the  Treasury,  the  vicious  feature 
of  which  is  the  mandatory  provision  for  the  reissue 
of  the  redeemed  legal  tender  notes.  This  mandatory 
provision  makes  the  redeemed  notes  part  of  the  gen- 
eral cash  of  the  Treasury;  and  by  their  reissue  they 
prevent  the  automatic  contraction  of  the  currency  that 
would  take  place  if  they  were  only  held.    So  they  keep 

230 


ARGUMENTS.  231 

going  the  endless  chain  that  has  carried  ofif  so  much 
of  the  gold  reserve. 

These  facts  point  unmistakably  to  the  simple  change 
that  is  necessary  to  make  the  retention  of  a  limited 
quantity  of  convertible  government  notes  not  only 
safe,  but  positively  advantageous.  This  reform  is, 
first,  to  estabHsh  an  adequate  gold  reserve;  secondly, 
to  separate  the  revenue  department  from  the  issue 
department;  and,  lastly  and  most  important,  to  with- 
hold the  redeemed  legal  tenders  from  reissue  except 
in  exchange  for  gold. 

These  changes  were  recommended  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  in  1880,  by  Hon.  Thomas  B.  Reed  in 
February,  1895,  ^^^  ^Y  Senator  Sherman  in  his  speech 
of  January  3d  of  the  present  year.  The  establishment 
of  a  separate  issue  department  is  simply  an  adaptation 
of  the  English  system  to  our  conditions.  These  re- 
forms will  restore  the  convertible  legal  tenders  per- 
manently to  the  conditions  that  they  enjoyed  by  acci- 
dent between  1879  and  1890.  During  that  time,  when 
the  existence  of  a  surplus  in  the  revenue  rendered  the 
reissue  of  redeemed  notes  unnecessary,  the  converti- 
ble legal  tenders  were  admittedly  the  best  money  we 
have  ever  had. 

Furthermore,  as  soon  as  the  simple  changes  I  have 
indicated  are  carried  out,  the  convertible  legal  tenders 
will  become  in  all  their  workings  exactly  like  specie, 
except  that  they  are  much  more  convenient.  In  fact, 
they  are  very  much  like  specie  now.  They  serve 
along  with  gold  in  bank  reserves.  They  pass  with 
the  banks  and  money-changers  of  Europe.  In  the 
panic  of  1893,  they  actually  went  to  a  premium  and 


»3*  APPENDIX, 

were  hoarded  like  gold.  When  the  redeemed  notes 
are  held  and  reissued  only  in  exchange  for  gold,  the 
convertible  legal  tenders  will  become  precisely  like 
specie,  and  will  obey  the  laws  of  specie  in  every  par- 
ticular. 

As  soon  as  we  grasp  clearly  the  idea  that  the  con- 
vertible legal  tenders  act  just  like  specie,  we  see  that 
the  arguments  against  them  are  deprived  of  their  ef- 
fect. For  instance,  our  opponents  have  said  that  an 
arbitrary  sum  of  government  notes  is  now  held  in  cir- 
culation, causing  a  redundancy  in  the  currency.  But 
suppose  the  currency  consisted  entirely  of  specie: 
what  would  be  the  natural  remedy  for  redundancy? 
Clearly,  the  flow  of  gold  out  of  the  country.  Pre- 
cisely the  same  thing  will  happen  when  the  currency 
consists  partly  of  gold  and  partly  of  convertible  legal 
tenders;  only  first  there  will  be  a  movement  of  legal 
tenders  into  the  redemption  department  of  the  Treas- 
ury, releasing  an  equal  amount  of  gold.  This  gold 
will  go  abroad,  and,  as  soon  as  the  redundancy  is  re- 
moved, the  flow  of  legal  tenders  into  the  Treasury  will 
stop. 

Another  objection,  urged  by  the  first  speaker  on  the 
affirmative,  was  that  a  legal-tender  currency  is  in- 
elastic; that  it  does  not  respond  to  expansions  and 
contractions  of  business,  as  a  bank-note  currency 
should  do.  Very  true;  it  does  not.  But  here  again  we 
must  look  at  convertible  legal  tenders  as  if  they  were 
specie.  They  take  the  place  of  just  so  much  gold  in 
circulation  and  in  bank  reserves.  It  is  not  in  this  foun- 
dation for  business  that  we  expect  elasticity,  but  in 
the  superstructure  of  bank  notes  and  bank  credit  built 


ARGUMENTS.  «33 

Upon  it.  Do  the  gentlemen  on  the  affirmative  expect 
specie  to  vanish,  like  bank  notes  when  they  are  re- 
deemed and  bank  checks  when  they  are  cashed?  It 
is  just  as  unreasonable  to  expect  such  behavior  from 
convertible  government  notes.  They  are  not  bank 
notes ;  they  are  not  mercantile  credit ;  they  are  per- 
manent currency.  It  is  true  that  we  lack  flexibility  in 
our  money  system ;  but  that  is  the  fault  of  the  national 
bank  system,  which  must  be  reformed  in  any  event, 
before  we  can  have  an  elastic  currency. 

But  the  argument  which  the  last  speaker  urged  as 
a  decisive  objection  to  convertible  government  notes 
•ii  that  the  government  has  no  power  to  protect  its  re- 
serve against  exporters  of  gold  by  raising  the  rate  of 
discount.  The  banks,  being  in  the  business  of  lending 
•money,  can  always  use  this  device  to  protect  their  re- 
nerves,  and  so  he  urges  that  all  paper  money  be  issued 
by  the  banks. 

Now  of  course  the  government  does  not  use  the  rate 
of  discount;  but  I  shall  show  that  when  the  simple 
thanges  we  propose  have  been  introduced,  the  banks 
m  protecting  their  own  reserves  will  also  protect  the 
government  reserve.  Why  do  they  not  protect  the 
government  reserve  now?  Because  of  the  redundancy. 
When  there  is  too  much  money  in  circulation  it  flows 
into  the  banks;  their  reserves  become  excessive,  and 
they  have  no  motive  for  raising  the  rate  of  discount, 
— that  is,  increasing  the  charge  for  loans.  Their  ten- 
dency is  just  the  opposite.  They  try  to  lend  all  they 
can  at  as  cheap  rates  as  bring  any  profit.  The  result 
is  that  legal  tenders,  which  form  over  half  of  the 
money  in  bank  reserves,  are  freely  paid  out,  and  are 


234  APPENDIX, 

used  by  gold  exporters  to  deplete  the  Treasury;  and 
then — this  is  the  great  vice  in  the  present  system,  which 
we  propose  to  remove — the  Treasury  pays  them  out 
again,  thereby  preventing  the  export  of  gold  from  re- 
ducing the  redundancy.  So  they  find  their  way  back 
to  the  banks,  and  are  used  over  and  over  to  repeat  the 
depletion. 

Now,  what  changes  will  the  necessary  reform  in- 
troduce? In  the  first  place,  the  notes  redeemed  at 
the  Treasury  will  be  held  and  not  reissued.  This  will 
soon  carry  off  the  redundancy.  When  the  redundancy 
is  gone,  the  bank  reserves  will  soon  come  down  to  the 
lawful  minimum  which  must  be  kept  up  if  the  banks 
would  continue  sound.  So  the  rate  of  discount  must 
go  up,  and  when  the  rate  of  discount  goes  up  it  will 
protect  that  part  of  the  bank  reserve  that  consists  of 
legal  tenders  just  as  surely  as  that  part  which  consists 
of  gold.  In  'Other  words,  the  banks,  in  protecting  their 
own  reserves,  will  hold  back  the  convertible  legal  ten- 
ders, which  are  the  only  means  of  depleting  the  gov- 
ernment's reserve.  The  rest  of  the  legal  tenders  are 
in  the  pockets  of  Jones  and  Smith,  all  over  the  coun- 
try. They  are  doing  business  as  usual,  and  not  expKDrt- 
ing  specie.  Furthermore,  when  the  rate  of  discount 
has  gone  up,  the  whole  train  of  results  from  a  rise  in 
the  price  of  gold  will  be  set  in  motion, — the  level  of 
prices  will  fall,  exports  will  be  stimulated,  gold  will 
flow  our  way,  and  the  very  motive  for  a  drain  on  the 
Treasury  will  be  done  away. 

Now  what  have  we  accomplished  so  far  in  this  de- 
bate? We  have  argued  for  certain  simple  changes. 
We  have  shown  that,  if  these  changes  are  but  made, 


ARGUMENTS.  235 

the  convertible  legal  tenders  will  become  in  all  respects 
like  specie.  What  reasons  have  we  heard  for  sweeping 
all  the  notes  away?  Our  opponents  have  said  much 
against  badly  managed  legal  tenders :  can  they  dis- 
credit convertible  legal  tenders  in  themselves  ?  On  the 
contrary,  they  cannot  refute  the  reasoning  of  Ricardo. 
They  cannot  ignore  the  examples  of  England,  Ger- 
many, and  Canada.  They  cannot  deny  that  from  1879  to 
1890  the  legal  tenders  were  the  best  money  the  people 
ever  hand.  They  cannot  deny  that  simple  changes 
would  restore  them  to  that  position,  and  make  them 
everywhere  as  good  as  gold.  They  cannot  deny  that 
the  banks  would  guard  the  government  reserves  as 
•zealously  as  their  own  financial  soundness.  Unless 
ihey  meet  and  overthrow  these  arguments,  I  claim  that 
Their  case  for  the  retirement  of  the  notes  cannot  be 
made  out. 


THE  VENEZUELAN  MESSAGE. 

(A  speech  delivered  in  a  debate  between  the  Harvard 
Union  and  the  Trinity  Club  of  Boston,  February,  1896,  on 
the  affirmative  of  the  question:  "Resolved,  That  we  endorse 
President  Qeveland's  message  relating  to  the  Venezuelan 
boundary.") 

A  PEACEABLE  d'tizen  once  saw  a  man  apparently 
breaking  into  his  neighbor's  house.  On  observing- 
that  the  premises  were  sufficiently  guarded,  he  sum- 
moned assistance,  and  himself  demanded  of  the  in- 
truder that  he  either  stop  his  advance  or  show  his 
right  to  the  entrance.  "  But,"  said  the  thief,  "  this  h 
not  your  house."  "  Very  true,"  replied  the  citizein, 
"  but  you  might  break  into  my  house  to-morrow,  iif 
successful  in  this  adventure  to-day."  "  But,"  urged 
the  thief  further,  "  this  man  owes  me  some  money." 
"  It  may  be  so,"  said  the  citizen,  "  but  the  justice  of 
your  claim  will  not  justify  the  injustice  of  your 
method."  "  Who  are  you?  "  said  the  thief,  then,  "  to 
interfere  with  the  actions  of  another  as  good  as  you?  " 
"I  am  my  neighbor's  neighbor,"  said  the  citizen,  "and 
the  security  of  this  highway  is  a  part  of  my  respon- 
sibility." "  Do  you  not  know,"  asked  the  thief  finally, 
"  that  if  you  persist  in  this  outcry  you  may  stir  up 
violence,  and  blood  may  be  spilled  between  us,  who 
are  in  fact  brothers,  speaking  the  same  language  ?  " 

236 


ARGUMENTS,  237 

**  I  know,"  said  the  citizen,  "  that  my  blood  is  not  yet 

so  thin  as  to  save  itself  at  the  expense  of  my  duty." 
But  before  the  dialogue  proceeded  further,  the  patrol 
wagon  appeared,  and  bloodshed  was  averted  by  the 
officers  of  justice. 

No  illustration  really  illustrates  more  than  one  or 
two  jxDints,  and  I  want  every  one  saved  the  trouble 
of  showing  that  this  little  fable  is  not  a  complete  alle- 
gory of  the  Venezuelan  dispute.  It  is  intended,  how- 
ever, to  illustrate  three  things.  First,  that  there  are 
wider  interests  than  those  of  a  given  moment.  Second, 
that  if  justice  and  public  interest  reside  in  a  given  law 
or  principle,  they  are  at  stake  in  every  instance  coming 
under  that  principle; — ^in  other  words,  if  burglary  in 
the  state  is  contrary  to  the  public  weal,  every  burglary 
is  contrary  to  the  public  weal,  no  matter  how  insignifi- 
cant the  premises  entered  nor  how  respectable  the 
robber.  Third,  that  what  is  the  interest  of  one  to-day 
may  be  that  of  another  to-morrow. 

It  will  be  seen  that  I  am  chiefly  directing  myself 
against  the  claim  that  the  Venezuelan  boundary  is 
not  a  matter  which  legitimately  concerns  the  United 
States.  It  is  claimed  that  it  is  not  enough  to  show 
that  our  government  has  acted  the  part  of  a  strong 
friend  to  a  weaker  republic;  individuals,  it  is  said, 
may  be  bound  by  some  ties  of  solidarity  to  their  neigh- 
bors, but  governments  exist  solely  for  the  promotion 
of  the  interests  of  their  own  people.  There  might  be 
some  doubt  about  this,  in  this  year  of  our  Lord  1896; 
but  we  are  content  to  rest  the  question  on  that  basis. 
We  are  not  content,  however,  to  have  it  demanded 
that  we  must  show  that  the  actual  territory  under 


«3^  APPENDIX, 

dispute  in  Venezuela  is  directly  connected  with  the 
material  interests  of  the  United  States.  Even  if  this 
were  a  just  demand,  we  might  recall  that  the  disputed 
territory  includes  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  River,  a 
point  of  no  little  commercial  and  strategic  importance 
for  the  whole  hemisphere,  and  that  it  also  has  a  near 
relation  to  the  proposed  site  of  the  interoceanic  canal. 
But  all  this  seems  so  trivial,  compared  with  the  larger 
interests  at  stake,  that  we  do  not  feel  that  our  time 
should  be  spent  upon  it. 

The  larger  principles  may  be  briefly  stated  thus:  it 
is  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  that 
the  territory  of  either  American  continent  should  be 
subject  to  the  imperial  advances  of  European  powers; 
that  advantage  should  be  taken  of  points  weak  in  self- 
defence  for  the  territorial  aggrandizement  of  those 
powers;  or  that  questions  of  dispute  between  Ameri- 
can and  European  powers  should  be  settled  by  the 
assertion  of  authority  and  physical  force.  I  cannot 
see  how  any  thoughtful  man  can  object  to  this 
statement  of  the  large  interests  of  the  United  States  as 
the  power  chiefly  concerned  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. And  if  these  are  our  large  interests,  it  does 
not  matter  whether  it  is  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  or 
a  puddle  on  the  Patagonian  coast  that  is  the  object  of 
the  imperial  grab. 

The  present  case  comes  directly  under  these  prin- 
ciples. England  has  demanded  certain  territory  on 
the  American  continent;  she  has  proposed  to  enforce 
her  claim  against  a  weak  American  republic;  and  has 
declined  to  submit  the  whole  question,  as  it  stands  be- 
tween the  strong  and  the  weak,  to  impartial  arbitration. 


ARGUMBUTS.  839 

Let  it  not  be  understood  that  we  raise  any  frantic  cry 
of  warning  against  Great  Britain,  as  though  this  en- 
croachment were  the  beginning  of  a  general  attack  on 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  It  is  quite  unHkely  that  any 
wider  purpose  is  in  the  minds  of  British  officials  than 
the  peaceable  occupation  of  a  convenient  and  com- 
manding piece  of  territory,  under  color  of  a  boundary 
dispute; — peaceable y  be  it  understood,  only  because  of 
the  superior  strength  of  the  aggressor. 

But,  it  is  said,  how  can  we  assume  that  England 
is  doing  more  than  maintaining  a  just  boundary  claim? 
We  reply,  we  can  not  assume  that  England  is  in  the 
wrong  on  the  merits  of  the  dispute;  the  merits  are 
in  doubt,  and  it  is  the  object  of  the  President's  mes- 
sage to  find  them  out.  Much  breath  has  been  wasted 
on  the  ground  that  Mr.  Cleveland  has  declared  war 
on  a  question  which  he  had  decided  with  insufficient 
evidence.  There  are  but  two  difficulties  with  that :  Mr. 
Qeveland  has  made  no  attempt  to  declare  war,  and 
he  has  not  claimed  to  settle  the  original  question  on 
any  evidence  whatever.  If  the  proposed  Commission 
should  sustain  the  claims  of  England,  I  do  not  know 
that  any  one  should  be  better  pleased  than  he.  In 
such  a  case  the  British  government  would  have  been 
shown  to  have  uselessly  maintained  a  proper  claim  by 
improper  methods;  our  government  would  simply 
have  insisted  that  the  whole  truth  should  be  known. 

So  far  as  the  boundary  matter  is  concerned,  it  is 
to  be  admitted  that  when  a  greater  power,  bordering 
upon  a  lesser,  extends  its  boundary  four  times  in 
eighty  years,  and  by  so  doing  increases  its  colony  nine- 
fold without  addition  by  war,  purchase,  or  treaty— sim- 


240  APPENDIX, 

ply  by  pushing  along  the  boundary,  like  a  movable 
fence;  when  it  is  known  to  have  a  keen  appetite  for 
western  territory;  and  when  the  lesser  power  submits 
its  claim  to  the  judgment  of  the  world,  but  the  greater 
to  its  own  judgment  alone; — in  such  a  case,  I  say, 
an  impartial  observer  is  not  unwarranted  in  suspecting 
that  something  more  or  less  than  abstract  justice  is  at 
the  bottom  of  the  claims  of  the  stronger  power.  If 
those  claims  are  just,  we  have  a  right  to  know  it;  if 
they  are  unjust,  the  dignity  of  Venezuela  herself  is  but 
little  more  attacked  than  ours. 

This  seems  the  place  to  refer  to  the  late  lamented 
Monroe  Doctrine,  which  on  yesterday  we  supposed 
to  be  one  of  our  national  pillars,  but  which  to-day, 
having  been  subjected  to  the  scrutiny  of  some,  is  dis- 
covered to  be  a  mere  apparition.  I  cannot  feel  that 
the  detailed  discussion  of  this  Doctrine  is  of  value 
for  OUT  present  purpose.  We  admit  that  it  has  no 
standing  in  international  law,  any  more  than  the 
Declaration  of  Independence.  Both  have  just  as  much 
value  as  we  wish  to  give  them  and  are  able  to  main- 
tain. Nor  does  the  President's  message  depend  for 
vindication  upon  this  doctrine ;  for  we  have  shown  that 
the  issue  may  be  decided  upon  our  present  interests 
alone.  The  fact  is,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  largely  a 
traditional  name  for  our  principle  of  national  leader- 
ship among  the  republics  of  this  hemisphere.  What 
President  Monroe  applied  it  to  may  be  historically  in- 
teresting, but  is  not  of  great  importance.  The  signifi- 
cant thing  about  it  was  its  declaration  that  the  United 
States  had  an  interest  in  the  condition  of  American  ter- 
ritory, and  would  maintain  that  interest.    The  Holy 


ARGUMENTS,  241 

Alliance,  in  the  face  of  which  it  was  first  enunciated, 
is  gone  forever;  efforts  to  plant  new  colonies  on 
American  soil  are  as  obsolete  as  slavery  or  piracy;  the 
original  occasion  of  the  Doctrine  cannot  recur;  but 
its  significant  principle — American  rights  on  Ameri- 
can territory — ^is  alive  to-day  if  never  before.  .  .  . 

I  cannot  close  without  a  reference  to  the  loud  talk 
of  war  which  has  been  strangely  aroused  by  this  mes- 
sage of  the  President.  At  its  appearance  the  news- 
papers seized  upon  a  single  phrase,  and  transmuted  it 
— after  their  ingenious  manner — into  headlines  of 
starthng  import ;  and  ever  since  we  have  been  hearing 
martial  music  from  Kentucky  and  other  belligerent 
districts,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  protests  of  the 
lovers  of  peace.  What  did  the  President  say  in  his 
closing  paragraph?  That  if  his  position  on  the  matter 
of  the  Venezuelan  dispute  is  correct,  we  should  be 
ready  to  stand  by  it  to  the  limit  of  our  abilities;  that 
he  is  not  ignorant  that,  if  England  is  as  much  in 
earnest  as  we,  serious  differences  might  result;  but 
that  even  our  friendly  relations  with  Great  Britain  are 
not  so  important  as  self-respect  and  justice.  Doubt- 
less he  should  have  said  that,  although  he  bdieved 
the  American  people  support  his  position,  yet  if  Great 
Britain  should  object  we  would  of  course  submit;  and 
that  no  serious  consequences  could  possibly  occur, 
since  no  consideration  of  our  own  rights  could  com- 
pare with  the  evil  of  having  to  fight  for  them.  We 
are  not  in  the  habit,  however,  of  electing  Presidents 
who  talk  in  that  way. 

To  speak  more  seriously,  the  closing  paragraphs 
of  the  message  depend  for  their  defensibility  upon  all 


t4a  APPENDIX. 

that  precedes.  If  the  general  position  of  our  govern- 
ment is  wrong,  we  should  naturally  be  disturbed  at 
any  prospect  of  its  becoming  a  disturber  of  interna- 
tional peace.  If  it  is  right,  while  we  should  all  deplore 
any  interruption  of  peace,  we  should  not  consider  that 
peace  is  to  be  secured  by  retraction.  As  a  matter  of 
fact, — and  on  this  I  want  to  lay  the  greatest  possible 
emphasis, — Mr.  Cleveland's  message  represents  him 
as  the  firmest  friend  for  peace.  What  is  the  great 
modern  enemy  of  war  but  Arbitration?  Between  the 
two  methods  choice  must  constantly  be  made.  Eng- 
land has  sought  to  avoid  either;  our  government  de- 
mands the  method  for  which  all  that  is  best  in  modern 
civilization  stands.  The  President  can  say  in  all  seri- 
ousness that  he  loves  peace  so  well  that  he  is  willing 
to  fight  for  it.  He  has  re-announced  the  leadership  of 
the  United  States  in  the  American  continents;  he  has 
brought  that  doctrine  to  the  support  of  the  rights  of 
the  weak  and  of  our  own  interests;  he  has  taken  a 
signal  stand  for  the  only  just  and  peaceable  method  of 
adjudging  international  disputes, — and  we  will  stand 
by  him. 


II.    BRIEFS. 

BRIEF  OF  A  LEGAL  ARGUMENT.* 

(Outline  of  the  Brief  of  Argument  for  Plaintiff,  in  the 
case  of  Phoebe  W.  Hoffman  (Plaintiff)  vs.  The  Delaware 
Coal  Co.,  and  The  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Coal  and  Iron 
Co.  (Defendants).  In  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  No.  4 
for  the  County  of  Philadelphia.  In  this  case  suit  was 
brought  to  secure  the  payment  of  a  royalty  on  coal  mined 
from  a  certain  tract  of  land,  which  had  been  leased  with 
the  provision  that  the  rent  should  take  the  form  of  such 
royalty.) 

OUTLINE   OF   FACTS. 

Analysis  of  the  Lease.  The  lease  of  Dec.  12,  1876, 
granted  to  the  defendants  the  exclusive  right  and 
privilege  of  mining  anthracite  coal  from  all  the  veins 
in  and  under  certain  tracts  of  land. 

There  was  a  covenant  by  the  lessee  to  pay  20  cents 
per  ton  for  all  coal  mined  from  the  tract,  as  rent  for 
the  same.  The  lessees  further  covenanted  to  mine  at 
least  25,000  tons  of  coal  a  year  until  Dec.  31,  1878, 

*  An  abstract  of  a  brief  used  by  courtesy  of  Mr.  George 
Wharton  Pepper.  A  sufficient  part  is  given  to  indicate  the 
analysis  of  the  case  and  the  structure  of  the  argument. 

343 


244  APPENDIX. 

unless  prevented  from  doing  so  by  accidents  or  occur- 
rences beyond  their  control,  and  after  that  date  to 
mine  at  least  50,000  tons  per  year,  unless  prevented  as 
above. 

The  Defendants'  Breach.  The  Reading  Company 
conducted  limited  operations  in  the  shafts  until  the 
end  of  1884,  and  in  the  seven  years  thus  elapsing  they 
mined  58,900  tons  of  coal — about  one-fourteenth  of 
the  minimum  quantity  covenanted  for.  Then  they 
stopped  work. 

The  question  in  this  case  therefore  is :  Has  the  Phila- 
delphia &  Reading  Coal  and  Iron  Co.  the  right  to  sus- 
pend operations,  and,  in  violation  of  its  covenant,  to  cease 
paying  rent  until  such  time  as  it  sees  fit  to  resume  f 

The  Defendants'  Answer.  The  covenant  to  mine 
50,000  tons  a  year  being  absolute,  the  defendants  are 
driven  to  the  contention  that  their  suspension  was  due 
to  "  accidents  and  occurrences  beyond  their  control." 
Their  answer  alleges  that  faults  were  encountered  in 
mining  which  entailed  so  great  an  expense  in  obtain- 
ing the  small  amount  of  merchantable  coal  contained 
in  the  veins,  that  it  became  impracticable  and  impossible 
to  mine  therefrom  the  minimum  annual  tonnage. 
"  All  the  available  coal  was  mined  out."  These,  the 
defendants  aver,  were  accidents  and  occurrences 
wholly  beyond  their  control,  which  excused  perform- 
ance of  the  covenant. 

The  Plaintiff*s  Propositions.  The  plaintiffs  accord- 
ingly advance  the  following  propositions,  which  they 
will  maintain  by  principle  and  precedent : 

I.  The  evidence  shows  that  it  was  at  all  times 
and  is  now  physically  possible  to  mine  50,000 


BRIEFS.  «45 

tons  of  coal  annually  from  the  Delaware  tract. 

II.  The  possibility  of  mining  the  minimum 
quantity  being  established,  it  is  no  defence  to  this 
suit  to  allege  that  it  is  impracticable  or  unprofitable 
to  mine  that  amount. 

III.  Moreover,  the  evidence  shows  that  it  was 
at  all  times,  and  is  now,  practicable  to  mine  that 
amount,  and  that  the  coal  can  be  obtained  profit- 
ably and  advantageously. 

IV.  Faults  in  veins  and  a  disturbed  condition 
of  strata  are  not  "  accidents  and  occurrences " 
within  the  meaning  of  the  lease. 

I.  The  possibility  of  mining  the  minimum  quan- 
tity of  co^l  has 

A.  Been  proved  by  testimony  of  plaintiff's 
witnesses.       (Testimony  cited.) 

B.  Been  proved  by  admissions  of  defendants' 
witnesses.     (Testimony  cited.) 

C.  Not  been  denied  in  the  defendants'  answer. 

II.  The  possibility  being  estabHshed,   "imprac- 
ticability "  is  no  defence. 

A.  The  fact  that  a  mine  is  not  "  workable  to 
profit "  is  no  defence  to  an  action  for  rent. 

Judge  Hare,  in  his  work  on  contracts,  ob- 
serves that  as  the  tenant  under  a  lease 
"will  reap  the  benefit,  should  the  bar- 
gain prove  advantageous,  so  he  should 
bear  the  loss  if  his  expectations  are  dis- 
appointed by  the  event." 

In  Haywood  vs.  Cope,  where  a  leased  col- 
liery turned  out  to  be  worthless.  Lord 
Romilly  delivered  an  opinion  decreeing 


24^  APPENDIX. 

specific  performance,  pointing  out  that 
the  lease  of  a  mine  "  is  always,  in  some 
degree,  a  speculation ;  .  .  .  and  it  is  well 
known  that  leases  and  sales  are  always 
made  with  reference  to  this  circum- 
stance." 

To  the  same  efifect  is  the  decision  of  the 
House  of  Lords  in  Gowan  vs.  Christie. 
B.  When  rent  is  reserved  by  way  of  royalty,  the 
same  principles  apply. 

In  The  Marquis  of  Bute  vs.  Thompson,  it 
was  held  that  the  efifect  of  the  lease  was 
to  make  the  sum  payable,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  mine  was  exhausted. 

The  same  is  the  rule  in  equity.  Ridgway 
vs.  Sneyd;  Jervis  vs.  Tomkinson;  Bam^ 
ford  vs.  Lehigh  Zinc  Co.;  McDowell  vs. 
Hendrix. 

The  case  in  hand  differs  from  Marquis  of 
Bute  vs.  Thompson,  inasmuch  as  no  fixed 
rent  is  reserved,  but  only  a  royalty  rent 
with  a  covenant  to  mine  a  certain  mini- 
mum amount.  The  result  is  that  the 
parties  will  be  taken  to  have  contracted 
upon  the  assumption  that  enough  coal  to 
yield  50,000  tons  per  annum  exists  under 
the  tract.  //,  therefore,  that  amount  of 
coal  does  not  exist,  the  lessee  is  excused 
from  paying  the  rent;  but  not  otherwise. 

In  GUmore  vs.  Ontario  Iron  Co.,  where  a 
lease  reserved  a  royalty  rent,  the  court 
held  that  the  defendant  was  bound  to 


BRIEFS,  147 

pay  the   minimum   royalty   as   long  as 
there  was  the  corresponding  quantity  of 
ore  in  the  land. 
fn  Walker  vs.  Tucker,  where  a  lease  con- 
tained an  undertaking  on  the  part  of  the 
lessee  to  mine  at  least  30,000  tons  a  year 
and  to  pay  a  fixed  royalty,  and  where 
the  plea  alleged  that  the  mines  became 
"  incapable  of  yielding,  when  worked  in 
a  good  and  workmanlike  manner,  .  .  . 
sufficient  coal  to  pay  for  working  said 
mines,"  the  court  held  that  the  plea  was 
insufficient ;    "  there  is  nothing  in  this 
instrument,"  it  was  said,  "  which  author- 
izes  a   suspension   or   abandonment   of 
mining  because  it  has  become  unprofit- 
able." 
III.  The  evidence  shows  that  it  was  and  is  prac- 
ticable to  mine  the  minimum  amount,  and  that  the 
coal  can  be  obtained  profitably  and  advantageously. 
This  is  shown  by 

A.  The  plaintiff's  evidence  in  chief.  (Testimony 
cited.) 

B.  The  defendants'  cross-examination  of  plain- 
tiff's witnesses.     (Testimony  cited.) 

C.  The     defendants'     evidence.       (Testimony 
cited.) 

It  will  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  in  dis- 
cussing this  subject  we  are  doing  so  much  in  ex- 
cess of  our  strict  duty ;  for  strictly,  the  plaintiff  is 
entitled  to  a  decree  upon  the  basis  of  the  first, 
second,  and  fourth  propositions. 


«48  APPENDIX. 

IV.  Faults  in  veins  and  a  disturbed  condition  of 
the  strata  are  not  "  accidents  and  occurrences " 
within  the  meaning  of  the  lease. 

The  truth  of  this  proposition  is  admitted  by  the 

defendants'  principal  witness. 
It  is  well  settled  that  such  a  term  as  "  act  of 
God,"    or    inevitable,    unavoidable   accident, 
does  not  extend  to  ordinary  risks. 

In  Oakley  vs.  Packet  Co.,  "  head  winds " 
were  held  not  to  fall  within  an  exception 
of  this  kind. 
Lord  Romilly  has  already  been  cited  to 
the  effect  that  a  mine  is  always  in  some 
degree  a  speculation,  and  that  "  leases 
and  sales  are  always  made  with  reference 
to  this  circumstance." 
In  Morris  vs.  Smith  the  meaning  of  the 
term  "  accident  beyond  control  "  was  de- 
termined once  for  all.  Mines  were  un- 
expectedly flooded,  so  that  they  could 
only  be  mined  at  a  loss;  yet  Lord  Mans- 
field held  that  the  lessee  was  bound  by 
his  covenant  on  the  ground  that  unavoid- 
able meant  physically  unavoidable. 


BRIEF  OF  MACAULAY^S  SPEECH  ON 
COPYRIGHT. 

(This  speech  was  delivered  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
February  5,  1841,  in  opposition  to  a  bill  extending  the  term 
of  copyright  to  sixty  years  from  the  death  of  the  writer. 
The  speech  may  be  found  in  Baker's  "  Specimens  of  Argu- 
mentation," pp.   181-203.) 

INTRODUCTION. 

I.  It  is  painful  to  take  a  course  which  may  be 
thought  unfriendly  to  literature;  but  it  is  a  duty  to 
oppose  the  pending-  bill. 

II.  It  must  first  be  decided  whether  the  question 
is  one  of  natural  right,  or  one  of  expediency  on  which 
the  House  is  free  to  legislate. 

III.  It  is  purely  a  matter  of  expediency. 

Property  is  the  creature  of  law. 
Even  if  it  is  a  natural  right,  it  cannot  sur- 
vive the  original  proprietor. 

This  is  shown  by  the  various  modes  of 
succession  which  are  provided  for  by 
law. 

IV.  Since  the  existing  law,  then,  gives  an  author 
copyright  during  his  natural  life,  the  only  point  at 
issue  is,  how  long  after  his  death  the  state  shall  recog- 
nize a  copyright  for  his  heirs. 

S49 


250  APPENDIX, 


ARGUMENT. 

I.  The  system  of  copyright  should  be  an  arrangement 
such  as  to  effect  a  compromise  between  the  ad- 
vantages and  the  disadvantages  of  such  a  law. 
For  copyright  has  essential  advantages. 

We  cannot  have  a  supply  of  good  books  unless 

men  of  letters  are  liberally  remunerated,  since 

Works  of  great  merit  can  be  expected  only 

from  persons  who  make  literature  the 

business  of  their  lives. 

And  copyright  is  the  least  objectionable  way  of 

remunerating  them,  since 

They  can  be  remunerated  only  by  patron- 
age or  copyright;  and 
Patronage  as  a  system  is  fatal  to  the  in- 
tegrity and  independence  of  literary  men. 
Copyright  has,  nevertheless,  marked  disadvan- 
tages. 
It  is  monopoly,  and 
Monopoly  always  makes  things  dear. 

(The  claim  that  the  real  effect  is  to  make 
things  cheap  is  absurd,  for 

If  this  were  so,  there  would  be  no 
need  to  limit  the  period  of  monop- 
oly; there  would  be  no  compromise 
between  principle  and  expediency; 
and  all  the  old  unpopular  monopo- 
lies should  be  revived.) 
n.  The  proposed  law  is  further  from  the  point  of  just 
compromise    between    advantages    and    disadvan- 
tages than  the  existing  law. 


BRIEFS.  951 

The  evil  effects  of  monopoly  are  proportioned  to 
its  duration,  for 

They  continue  indefinitely  to  affect  purchas- 
ers. 
But  the  advantages  of  a  posthumous  monopoly  are 
not  so  proportioned,  for 

Distant  advantages  affect  men  but  faintly 
(Example  of  Dr.  Johnson's  copyright  in 
the  hands  of  a  modern  bookseller). 
The  proposed  law  really  multiplies  the  tax  on 

readers  without  additional  bounty  to  authors. 
The  plea  made  for  the  claim  of  the  descendants 
of  great  writers  is  not  valid; 

For  it  is  highly  improbable  that  a  copyright 
will  descend  for  many  years  from  parent 
to  child. 

No  one  proposes  to  entail  it. 
It  will  in  all  probability  be  sold  by  heirs 
to  booksellers. 
In  case  of  sale  the  family  would  not  be  paid 
in  proportion  to  the  term  of  copyright, 
since 

Distant  advantages  have  slight  present 
value. 
Literary  fashions   change   so   rapidly 
that  no  one  can  predict  future  sales. 
The  case  of  Milton's  granddaughter,  cited  by 
the  other  side,  is  quite  in  point ;   for  when 
she  was  in  need,  Milton's  copyright  had  al- 
ready passed  into  the  hands  of  a  book- 
seller. 
Moreover,  the  proposed  law  would  probably 


as*  APPENDIX, 

lead  to  the  suppression  or  mutilation  of 
many  valuable  works. 

Conscientious  scruples,  family  pride,  or 
bigotry,  would  lead  the  inheritors  of 
copyright  to  withhold  books  which 
they  might  not  approve 

(Examples  from  the  works  of  Rich- 
ardson, Boswell,  Wesley). 

CONCLUSION. 

The  effects  of  the  proposed  law  would  altogether  be 
so  evil  that  they  would  be  evaded  by  piracy,  and 
this  would  lose  its  disreputable  character  through 
popular  approval. 

All  copyright  would  become  unpopular,  through  the 
lack  of  discrimination  between  just  and  unjust 
forms. 

As  the  bill  cannot  be  satisfactorily  amended,  let  it  be 
laid  aside. 


BRIEF  ON  THE  RETIREMENT  OF  THE 
GREENBACKS. 

(Brief  of  the  speech  of  Mr.  J.  P.  Warren,  reproduced  on 
pp.  230-235.  In  this  case  the  argument  is  supposed  to  be 
attached  directly  to  those  of  the  preceding  speakers,  and  the 
first  main  heading  is  not  developed,  but  is  merely  a  recapitu- 
lation of  the  material  of  the  first  speech  on  the  negative.) 

Congress  should  take  immediate  steps  towards  the 
retirement  of  all  the  legal  tender  notes. 

NEGATIVE. 

The  maintenance  of  a  limited  number  of  notes  converti- 
ble into  gold  is,  under  proper  conditions,  a  safe  and  con- 
venient policy. 

I.  Such  a  policy  is  approved  by  good  economic 
authority,  and  is  suggested  by  the  example  of  three 
of  the  soundest  financial  systems  of  the  world : 

England, 

Germany, 

Canada. 

II.  Elxisting  evils  in  our  present  system  can  be  met 
in  other  ways  than  by  the  retirement  of  the  legal 
tenders. 

They  are  due  chiefly  to  the  mandatory  provision 
for  the  reissue  of  redeemed  legal  tenders. 

253 


«54  APPENDIX, 

They  can  be  removed  by 

a)  establishing  an  adequate  gold  reserve; 

b)  separating  the   revenue   and   issue   depart' 
ments  of  the  Treasury; 

c)  holding    redeemed    legal    tenders    in    the 
Treasury,  except  in  exchange  for  gold. 

These  changes  have  been  recommended  by 

the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  by  Hon, 

Thomas  B.  Reed,  and  by  Senator  Sher 

man. 

They  did  not  exist,  it  is  admitted,  between  1879 

and  1890,  when  the  existence  of  a  surplus  in  the 

revenue  rendered  the  reissue  of  redeemed  notes 

unnecessary. 

III.  With  these  changes  accomplished,  legal  tenders 
will  be  exactly  like  specie. 

They  are  already  very  Hke  specie : 
They  serve  in  bank  reserves ; 
They  pass  with  European  bankers ; 
They  went  to  a  premium  in  the  panic  of  1893. 

When  they  are  reissued  only  in  exchange  for 
gold,  the  only  existing  difference  will  disap- 
pear. 

IV.  When  legal  tenders  are  seen  to  act  Hke  specie,  the 
objections  made  against  them  lose  their  effect. 

The  objection  that  they  cause  redundancy  in  the 
currency  is  met ;  for 

Just  as  redundancy  of  specie  is  relieved  by 
the  export  of  gold,  so  redundancy  of  legal 
tenders,  when  these  have  been  redeemed  at 
the  Treasury,  will  be  relieved  by  the  export 
of  an  equal  amount  of  gold. 


BRIEFS,  255 

The  objection  to  the  inelasticity  of  legal  tender 
currency  is  no  more  applicable  to  it  than  to 
specie. 
Like  specie,  legal  tenders  cannot  be  expected 

absolutely  to  disappear. 
The  inelasticity  of  the  currency  is  due  simply 
to  the  lack  of  flexibility  in  our  general 
monetary  system. 
The  objection  that  the  government  has  no  power 
to  protect  its  reserve  against  the  export  of  gold 
by  raising  the  rate  of  discount,  ignores  the  fact 
that  the  banks,  in  protecting  their  own  reserve, 
will  protect  that  of  the  government. 

They  do  not  do  so  now  only  because  of  the 
system  of  reissue,  which,  by  maintaining 
redundancy,  takes  away  from  the  banks 
any  motive  for  raising  the  rate  of  discount. 
When  the  redundancy  disappears,  bank  re- 
serves will  fall  to  the  lawful  minimum,  and 
the  rate  of  discount  will  be  raised. 
At  the  same  time  prices  will  fall,  gold  will 
be  reimported,  and  the  motive  for  drain- 
ing the  Treasury  will  disappear. 


CONCLUSION. 

The  remedy  is  not  to  do  away  with  legal  tenders, 
but  to  institute  the  proposed  reforms,  by  which  legal 
tenders  will  become  precisely  like  specie. 

Objections  raised  against  legal  tenders  are  only  to 
badly  managed  legal  tenders. 


256  APPENDIX, 

The  doctrines  of  economists,  the  experience  of 
other  countries,  our  own  experience  in  1879-1890,  all 
indicate  that  under  right  conditions  legal  tenders  are 
money  of  the  first  order. 


BRIEF   ON   THE    RESTRICTION    OF 
TRUSTS.* 

Question:    Resolved,  That  the  formation  of  trusts  should 
be  opposed  by  legislation. 


INTRODUCTION. 

I.  A  trust  is  a  combination  of  business  interests  to 
control  or  regulate  the  production  or  distribution 
of  articles  of  commerce. 

II.  The  recent  history  of  combination. 

A.  Ante-bellum  period  characterized  by 

1.  Free  and  unlimited  competition  generally. 

2.  Combination  of  capital  rare ;  but  existing  in 

a)  Railroads; 

b)  Telegraph ; 

c)  Coal  mining. 

B.  Period  between  the  war  and  the  crisis  of  1873 
one  of  business  revival,  characterized  by 

1.  Enormous  increase  in  production. 

2.  Overproduction,  culminating  in  the  crisis  of 

1873. 

*The  work  of  Mr.  Stanley  Folz,  of  the  University  of 
Pennsylvania,  Class  of  1900,  to  whom  I  am  indebted  for  the 
use  of  it.— R.  M.  A. 

257 


158  APPENDIX. 

C.  Period  between  crisis  of  1 873-1 877  and  the  pres- 
ent time,  one  of  combination. 

1.  Unrestricted  combination  to  1889. 

a)  Formation  of  "  trusts,"  in  which  stock 
was  surrendered  to  a  central  board  of  trus- 
tees, who  in  turn  issued  certificates  and 
collected  and  distributed  dividends. 

b)  Investigations  of  Trusts  by 

U.  S.  House  of  Rep.,  authorized  Jan.  25, 

^88; 
N.  Y.  Senate,  authorized  Feb.  16,  '88; 
(Canadian  House  of  Commons,  Feb.  29, 

'88.) 

2.  Restricted  combination,  1889  to  date,  char- 

acterized by 

a)  Alteration  of  trust  form;  central  board 
of  trustees  abolished,  certificates  ex- 
changed for  stock,  and  new  trusts  organ- 
ized by  purchase  of  old  concerns,  in  conse- 
quence of 

Anti-Trust  laws  of  1889,  1890,  etc. ; 
Judicial  decisions,  in  Sugar  Trust  case, 
etc. 

b)  Crisis  of  1893. 

c)  Increase  in  number  of  combinations: 
by  end  of  1898,  200; 

by  end  of  Feb.,  1899,  353. 
III.  Trie  trust  question  commands  attention,  because 

A.  Enormous  capital  is  already  invested  in  combi- 
nations. 

B.  Combination  is  apparently  supplanting  competi- 
tion. 


BRIEFS,  259 

The  formation  of  trusts  should  not  he  opposed  by 
legislation. 


ARGUMENT. 

I.  Combination  of  industry  and  capital  is  an  economic 

development. 

A.  Free  competition  led  to  certain  evils : 

1.  Overproduction. 

a)  Industrial  plants  were  multiplied  during 
periods  of  prosperity  without  reference  to  the 
demand;   e.g.,  whiskey  distilleries. 

b)  Capacity  of  old  plants  was  increased  in  a 
similar  fashion. 

2.  Periodical  depression  of  business,  caused  by 
low  prices,  resulting  from  overproduction  and 
the  cheapening  of  products. 

3.  Annihilation  of  weaker  competitors  by  the 
stronger,  due  to  the  ability  of  strong  concerns 
to  undersell  weak  ones. 

(Cf.  testimony  of  Spreckels  and  Havemcyer 
before  Senate  Committee;  and  von  Halle 
on  Trusts,  pp.  61,  62.) 

B.  Capital  combined  to  protect  itself  against  the 
evils  of  free  competition. 

I.  By  combination  it  is  designed  to  avoid  the 
evils  just  enumerated. 

II.  Combination  of  capital  is  productive  of  good. 
A.  It  cheapens  production. 

1.  Great  economy  is  possible  in  the  purchase  and 
use  of  raw  materials. 

2.  Improved  methods  of  production  are  used. 


9to  APPENDIX, 

a)  An  improved  system  used  in  one  plant 
inures  to  the  benefit  of  all. 

b)  Patented  machinery  owned  by  one  plant  is 
extended  to  the  use  of  all. 

c)  Experimental  stations  are  maintained,  where 
better  methods  are  being  constantly  sought ; 

e.g.,  Whiskey  Trust  and  Cotton  Oil  Trust. 

3.  Trusts  manufacture  casing  and  packing,  and 
material  used  in  process  of  production ; 

e.g.,  Standard  Oil  Trust  saves  upwards  of 
$6,000,000  annually  by  making  its  own 
barrels  and  tin-cans. 

4.  By-products  are  utilized; 

e.g.,  Standard  Oil  Trust  manufactures  over 
300  by-products. 

5.  Trusts  produce  in  bulk,  thus  reducing  cost  of 
production  per  unit  of  capital. 

B.  It  lessens  waste. 

1.  It  prevents  unnecessary  duplication. 

2.  It  prevents  unnecessary  advertising,  for 

a)  Advertising  does  not  so  much  increase  the 
total  volume  of  business  as  it  shifts  it  from 
one  concern  to  another. 

3.  It  reduces  the  number  of  traveling  salesmen. 

C.  It  facilitates  distribution. 

I.  The  market  is  supplied  from  the  nearest  plant. 

D.  It  regulates  the  supply  according  to  the  demand. 
I.  Overproduction  is  prevented. 

Thus  68  out  of  80  distilleries  in  the  Trust  for  a 
time  supplied  the  entire  market. 
±.  Provision   is   made   for   keeping   the    supply 
equal  to  the  demand. 


BRIEFS.  261 

Thus  the  Sugar  Trust  has  built  a  refinery  to 
serve  as  a  safeguard  in  case  of  breakdown  or 
of  increased  demand. 
E.  It  secures  the  necessary  outlet  for  our  vast  pro- 
ducing capacity. 

1.  The  producing  capacity  of  our  manufactures 
is  $150,000,000,  while  our  consuming  power  is 
but  $75,000,000  (testimony  of  T.  B.  Thurber 
before  U.  S.  Industrial  Commission). 

2.  Trusts  are  enlarging  our  foreign  commerce, 
keeping  "  capital  and  labor  continuously  and 
remuneratively  employed  by  preserving  our 
home  market  and  reaching  out  for  a  place  to 
dispose  of  our  surplus."  (See  E.  W.  Bemis  on 
The  Trust  Problem,  Forum,  Dec.  1899.) 

III.  The  reasons  urged  for  the  opposing  of  trusts  by 
legislation  are  insufficient. 
A.  The  claim  that  trusts  maintain  excessive  prices 
is  insufficient. 
I.  The  maintenance   of  excessive   prices   would 
lead  of  itself  to  the  destruction  of  the  trust  or 
the  reduction  of  prices. 

a)  To  keep  prices  at  a  level  higher  than  the 
market  will  bear  leads  to  underconsump- 
tion ;   and 

b)  Underconsumption  leads  to  the  fall  of  the 
trust. 

Thus  the  French  Copper  Trust,  in  1888, 
having  raised  the  price  of  copper  from 
40  to  80  pounds,  was  unable  to  obtain 
a  market,  and  failed.  (Quarterly  Jour^ 
nal  of  Econ.,  1889,  p.  508.) 


a62  APPENDIX, 

c)  Excessive  profits  attract  capital  into  the 
industry  concerned,  thus  leading  to  com- 
petition and  a  decline  in  prices; — the  fac- 
tor known  as  "  potential  competition." 
Thus- 
Capital  has  formed  several  companies  as 

rivals  to  the  Sugar  Trust. 
When  steel  rail  manufacturers  in  Eng- 
land   combined    and    raised    prices, 
American  manufacturers  for  the  first 
time  sold  rails  in  Canada.     (See  An- 
drew Carnegie  in  North  Amer.  Rev., 
148:  141.) 
In  1894,  when  the  Standard  and  Rus- 
sian Oil  Companies  met  to  divide  the 
world  between  them,  it  was  found  that 
the  Standard  Oil  Company  could  not 
guarantee  the  absolute  control  of  the 
American  market,  owing  to  the  stand- 
ing of  the   Columbia   Oil   Company. 
(See  von  Halle  on  Trusts,  pp.  74  f.) 
2.  Present  high  prices  in  many  industries  can  be 
otherwise  accounted  for. 

a.  Supply  cannot  meet  the  demand. 

x)  No  surplus  accumulated  during  the 
period  of  depression  after  1893,  with 
which  to  supply  the  demand  that  fol- 
lowed the  revival  of  business. 

b.  Raw  material  is  high  owing  to  the  in- 
creased demand  for  it. 

c.  High  prices  immediately  after  the  forma- 
tion of  a  trust  are  often  merely  the  return 


BRIEFS,  263 

to  a  fair  level,  the  margin  of  profits  having 
been  wholly  or  nearly  wiped  out  before 
combination  occurred. 

B.  The  claim  that  trusts  as  such  reduce  the  price  of 

raw  materials  is  insufficient. 

1.  The  ability  to  purchase  raw  material  at  the 
lowest  possible  prices  is  not  confined  to  combi- 
nations. 

a.  In  ordinary  competition  the  largest  pur- 
chaser obtains  the  best  rates. 

2.  Where  trusts  do  purchase  the  raw  material 
more  cheaply  than  before  combination,  the 
producer  suffers  no  hardship. 

a.  Though  the  percentage  of  profits  is 
smaller,  the  net  profits  are  larger,  owing 
to  the  great  bulk  of  the  purchases. 

3.  It  is  not  the  tendency  of  all  trusts  to  reduce 
the  price  of  raw  materials ;  e.g., 

The  Tin  Plate  Trust  pays  increased  prices  for 

tin  and  steel. 
The  Cotton  Oil  Trust  pays  increased  prices 

for  cotton  seed.    (See  von  Halle  on  Trusts, 

p.  71.) 

C.  The  claim  that  the  trust  prevents  the  old  form 

of  competition  is  insufficient. 

1.  The  trusts  are  the  result  of  reckless  and  cut- 
throat competition. 

2.  Trusts  raise  the  level  of  competition. 

a.  Competition  between  trusts   is   possible; 
e.g., 
Sugar  wars  between  the  Trust,  Arbuckle, 
and  Doescher. 


2^4  APPENDIX, 

Standard  and  Columbia  Oil  Companies,  as 
noted  above. 

3.  By  analogous  reasoning  steam  and  machinery 
should  never  have  been  permitted  to  compete 
with  hand  labor. 

a.  Competition  between  combinations  is  on  a 
high  level,  like  that  between  machine- 
made  products. 

4.  Free  and  unrestricted  competition  is  an  evil. 
(See  I.  above.) 

D.  The  claim  that  trusts  crush  the  middle  class  of 

producers  is  insufficient. 

1.  Under  a  trust  the  small  producer  becomes  a 
manager. 

a.  Trusts  endeavor  to  include  all  producers 
or  manufacturers  in  their  own  line  of  busi- 
ness. 

2.  A  trust  is  often  formed  to  prevent  the  crush- 
ing of  the  small  producer  by  competition ; 

e.g.,  the  Whiskey  Trust. 

3.  The  trust  is  economically  superior  to  the  small 
producer.     (See  II.  above.) 

E.  The  claim  that  trusts  are  oppressive  to  labor  is 

insufficient. 

1.  Labor  was  never  before  in  such  great  demand. 
(See  report  of  Factory  Inspector  of  Pennsyl- 
vania for  1899,  in  which  it  is  said  that  in  Penn- 
sylvania alone  181,000  more  factory  hands  are 
employed  than  in  the  preceding  year.) 

2.  Organized  labor  is  not  opposed  to  the  combi- 
nation of  capital. 


BRIEFS,  265 

a.  It  can  make  long-term  agreements  with 
trusts. 

b.  It  secures  steady  wages  from  trusts. 
(See  testimony  before  the  Industrial  Com- 
mission of  President  Gompers  of  the  Fed- 
eration of  Labor.) 

IV.  The  defects  of  the  trust  system  can  be  remedied 
by  legislation  corrective  rather  than  prohibitive. 

A.  The    prohibition    of    discrimination    in    prices 

would  be  such  a  remedy. 
I.  A  trust  could  not  then  undersell  a  competitor 
in   one   locality,   while   reimbursing   itself   for 
losses  thus   sustained   by   raising  prices   else- 
where. 

B.  The  requirement  of  increased  publicity  in  man- 

agement, and  of  responsibility  on  the  part  of  di- 
rectors, would  be  such  a  remedy. 

1.  The  public  would  then  know  the  true  worth  of 
a  plant. 

2.  Directors  could  be  held  liable  for  losses. 

C.  The    permitting   of   associated    railroad    action 

would  be  such  a  remedy. 
I.  A  trust  could  not  then  force  one  railroad  to 
give  it  advantageous  rates  of  transportation,  on 
the  threat  of  withdrawing  its  trade. 

D.  Increased  care  in  the  imposition  of  high  import 

duties  would  be  such  a  remedy. 
I.  Foreign  competition  would  then  remove  the 
possibility    of    the    maintenance    of    excessive 
prices  by  a  few  trusts. 


366  APPENDIX, 


CONCLUSION. 

I.  Trusts  are  a  natural  economic  growth. 
II.  They  are  capable  of  working  much  benefit  for  the 

community. 
III.  The  institution  should  therefore  be  preserved,  its 
defects  being  remedied  by  corrective,  not  pro- 
hibitive, legislation. 


III.   PROPOSITIONS  FOR  DEBATE 

POLITICAL. 

1.  United  States  Senators  should  be  elected  by  di- 
rect vote  of  the  people. 

2.  The  President  should  be  elected  by  the  direct 
vote  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

3.  The  policy  of  excluding  the  Chinese  from  all  ter- 
ritory over  which  the  United  States  may  exercise 
jurisdiction,  should  be  rigidly  maintained. 

4.  The  white  citizens  of  the  Southern  States  are  jus- 
tified in  taking  all  peaceable  measures  to  insure  theif 
poHtical  supremacy. 

5.  Ex-Presidents  of  the  United  States  should  have 
seats  for  life  in  the  Senate. 

6.  The  members  of  the  President's  cabinet  should 
be  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

7.  The  legislative  referendum  should  be  introduced 
by  our  State  governments. 

8.  The  United  States  army  should  be  permanently 
enlarged. 

9.  The  United  States  should  reaffirm  and  maintain 
the  doctrine  that  governments  derive  their  just  powers 
from  the  consent  of  the  governed. 

10.  The  "  Record  system "  of  nomination  should 

267 


a68  APPENDIX, 

be  adopted  by  our  State  and  municipal  governments. 

11.  Proportional  representation  should  be  intro- 
duced by  our  State  governments. 

12.  The  United  States  should  institute  a  system  of 
responsible  cabinet  government. 

13.  The  States  should  limit  the  right  of  suffrage  to 
persons  who  can  read  and  write. 

14.  National  party  lines  should  be  discarded  in 
municipal  elections. 

15.  The  President  of  the  United  States  should  be 
elected  for  a  term  of  six  years,  and  be  ineligible  to  re- 
election. 

16.  Women  who  pay  taxes  should  have  the  right  to 
vote  at  municipal  elections. 

17.  The  Prohibitionists,  Populists,  and  similar  agi- 
tators, are  justified  in  forming  new  parties  for  the  pro- 
motion of  reforms. 

18.  Compulsory  voting  should  be  introduced  by  the 
various  State  governments. 

19.  The  present  powers  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  are  dangerously  great. 

20.  Independent  political  action  is  preferable  to 
party  loyalty,  as  a  means  of  securing  reform. 

21.  A  nation  advanced  in  civilization  is  justified,  in 
the  interests  of  humanity  at  large,  in  enforcing  its  au- 
thority upon  an  inferior  people. 

22.  The  United  States  government  is  unsuited  to 
the  administration  of  colonial  dependencies. 

23.  The  Indian  Agency  system  of  the  Federal  gov- 
ernment, as  carried  on  since  its  establishment,  is  de- 
serving of  condemnation. 

24.  Municipal  offices  should  be  largely  appointive. 


PROPOSITIONS  FOR  DEBATE  269 

as  in  Germany,  instead  of  elective,  as  usually  in  the 
United  States. 

25.  The  membership  of  the  national  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives should  be  considerably  reduced  in  size. 

26.  The  United  States  government  is  justified  in 
continuing  the  practice  of  choosing  untrained  private 
citizens  for  the  diplomatic  and  consular  service. 

27.  Any  further  centralization  of  power  in  the  Fed- 
eral government  of  the  United  States  should  be  op- 
posed by  all  citizens. 

FOREIGN  AND    INTERNATIONAL. 

28.  The  disarmament  of  the  European  powers,  to 
the  minimum  strength  necessary  for  the  maintenance 
of  domestic  police,  is  desirable. 

29.  A  formal  alHance  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain,  for  the  protection  and  advancement 
of  their  common  interests,  would  be  expedient. 

30.  England's  aggressions  in  Africa  are  justifiable. 

31.  The  United  States  government  should  exert  it- 
self to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

32.  England  should  retain  control  of  Egypt. 

33.  The  treaty  signed  at  The  Hague  gives  promise 
of  practical  promotion  of  international  peace. 

34.  The  United  States  should  insist  on  the  absolute 
ownership  of  the  proposed  inter-oceanic  canal. 

ECONOMIC. 

35.  The  United  States  should  maintain  a  system  of 
bounties  and  subsidies  for  the  protection  of  the  Ameri- 
can merchant  marine. 


«70  APPENDIX. 

36.  The  United  States  should  establish  commercial 
reciprocity  with  Canada. 

37.  Legislation  directed  against  trusts  is  unwise. 

38.  The  United  States  should  continue  to  attempt 
the  promotion  of  international  bimetallism. 

39.  The  tariff  on  goods  imported  into  the  United 
States  should  be  fixed  by  a  bi-partisan  commission. 

40.  The  United  States  should  adopt  the  "  Baltimore 
plan  "  of  bank-note  circulation. 

41.  The  tax  on  the  issues  of  State  banks  should  be 
repealed. 

42.  It  is  economically  disadvantageous  to  the 
United  States  to  own  territory  in  the  tropics. 

43.  Granted  that  it  is  constitutional,  the  United 
States  should  impose  a  tariff  on  its  tropical  and  semi- 
tropical  dependencies. 

44.  The  time  has  now  come  when  the  purely  pro- 
tective tariff  should  be  withdrawn  from  goods  the 
manufacture  of  which  has  been  established  in  the 
United  States. 

45.  The  single-tax  system  would  have  advantages 
over  the  present  systems  of  taxation. 

46.  The  United  States  government  should  promptly 
retire  all  the  outstanding  legal  tender  notes. 

47.  Foreign-built  ships,  owned  by  American  citi- 
zens, should  be  granted  American  register. 

48.  Reciprocity  is  a  wise  and  practicable  measure 
for  encouraging  American  trade. 

49.  The  growth  of  large  fortunes  should  be  checked 
by  a  graduated  income  tax  and  an  inheritance  tax. 


PROPOSITIONS  FOR  DEBATE,  2^1 

SOCIAL  AND  INDUSTRIAL. 

50.  Department  stores  have  proved  a  benefit  to 
municipal  communities. 

51.  Employers  are  justified  in  refusing  recognition 
to  Labor  Unions. 

52.  The  United  States  government  should  take 
steps  looking  toward  the  purchase  and  control  of  all 
inter-State  railways. 

53.  American  cities  should  own  and  operate  all  sur- 
face-car lines  within  their  limits. 

54.  State  boards  of  arbitration,  with  compulsory 
powers,  should  be  appointed  to  settle  disputes  between 
employers  and  employees. 

55.  Congress  should  prohibit  the  immigration  into 
the  United  States  of  all  persons  who  cannot  read  and 
write  some  language,  dependents  on  qualified  immi- 
grants being  excepted. 

56.  The  elimination  of  private  profits  offers  the  best 
solution  of  the  problem  of  the  liquor  traffic. 

57.  The  States  should  prohibit  the  sale  of  all  in- 
toxicating liquors  to  be  drunk  on  the  premises,  except 
with  meals  at  boiva  fide  hotels. 

58.  The  United  States  government  should  grant 
uniform  pensions  to  all  citizens  of  the  age  of  sixty  and 
over. 

59.  Interference  with  strikes  by  judicial  injunction 
is  a  menace  to  the  liberties  of  the  working  classes. 

60.  State  laws  prohibiting  all  secular  employment 
on  Sunday  should  be  repealed. 

61.  Permanent  copyright  should  be  granted  by  the 
United  States. 


272  APPENDIX. 

62.  Municipalities  should  own  and  operate  public 
plants  for  the  furnishing  of  light. 

63.  Vivisection  should  be  prohibited. 

64.  Railway  pooling  should  be  permitted  in  the 
United  States. 

65.  In  times  of  depression  either  States  or  munici- 
palities should  furnish  employment  to  the  unem- 
ployed. 

66.  The  boycott  is  a  legitimate  means  of  securing 
concessions  from  employers. 

67.  The  prohibition  of  the  liquor  traffic  is  preferable 
to  any  system  of  Hcense,  wherever  pubHc  opinion  will 
sanction  the  passage  of  such  a  law. 

68.  Social  entertainments  given  by  individuals,  in- 
volving lavish  expense,  are  unjustifiable. 

69.  Profit-sharing,  and  cooperative  methods  gen- 
erally, afford  the  most  promising  solution  of  the  labor 
problem. 

70.  Public  libraries,  museums,  and  art  galleries 
should  be  open  on  Sunday. 

71.  The  prison  system  in  the  United  States  should 
be  revised  so  as  to  be  largely  reformatory  rather  than 
punitive. 


LEGAL  AND   CONSTITUTIONAL. 

y2.  Three-fourths  of  a  jury  should  be  competent  to 
render  a  verdict  in  all  criminal  cases. 

73.  Congress  should  submit  a  Constitutional 
amendment  providing  for  uniform  Federal  legislation 
regarding  marriage  and  divorce. 

74.  All  the  guarantees  and  restrictions  of  the  Con- 


PROPOSITIONS  FOR  DEBATE,  a 73 

stitution  apply  to  all  territory  which  may  be  perma- 
nently controlled  by  the  United  States. 

75.  The  annexation  of  territory  to  the  United 
States  by  Joint  Resolution  of  Congress,  without  a 
treaty,  is  unconstitutional. 

76.  The  Supreme  Court  should  reverse  its  decision 
of  1895,  declaring  an  unapportioned  direct  tax  on  the 
income  derived  from  real  estate  to  be  unconstitutional. 

y/.  A  seat  should  be  granted  to  any  Senator  ap- 
pointed by  the  Governor  of  a  State,  when  the  Legis- 
lature adjourned  without  filling  the  vacancy. 

78.  Legislation  should  be  adopted  looking  toward 
greater  difficulty  in  the  invalidation  of  wills,  and 
greater  security  in  bequests. 

79.  An  easier  method  of  amending  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  should  be  proposed  by  Congress 
and  adopted  by  the  States. 

80.  The  Constitution  should  be  so  amended  as  to 
grant  Congress  the  general  power  to  regulate  manu- 
factures and  industry. 

81.  Life  imprisonment,  with  a  restricted  power  of 
pardon  on  the  part  of  the  executive,  should  be  substi- 
tuted for  capital  punishment. 

82.  The  law  governing  judicial  process  should  be  so 
amended  as  to  provide  for  the  more  speedy  conduct 
of  criminal  cases,  and  fewer  opportunities  for  delay  in 
the  execution  of  sentences  imposed. 

83.  All  judges  of  State  courts,  like  those  of  the  Fed- 
eral courts,  should  be  appointed  by  the  executive,  and 
hold  office  during  life  or  good  behavior. 

84.  The  Constitution  should  be  so  amended  as  to 
permit  the  trial  in  the  courts  of  contested  election 


a  74  APPENDIX. 

cases  involving  membership  in  the  United  States  Sen- 
ate or  House  of  Representatives. 

EDUCATIONAL. 

85.  Women  should  be  admitted  to  all  American 
universities  on  equal  terms  with  men. 

86.  The  fully  elective  system  of  studies  should  be 
introduced  into  all  our  colleges. 

87.  Compulsory  manual  training  should  be  intro- 
duced into  all  grammar  and  high  schools. 

88.  A  city  is  the  best  location  for  a  college. 

89.  The  college  course,  leading  to  the  degree  of 
Bachelor  of  Arts,  should  be  reduced  to  three  years. 

90.  The  reading  of  the  Bible  in  the  public  schools 
should  be  prohibited. 

91.  Athletics  have  been  excessively  developed  in 
American  universities. 

92.  The  regular  college  course  should  be  further 
modified  in  the  interest  of  those  desiring  to  fit  them- 
selves for  practical  business  careers. 

93.  A  national  University  should  be  established  at 
Washington. 

94.  The  "  honor  system  "  should  prevail  in  all  col- 
lege examinations. 

95.  Roman  Catholics,  and  members  of  other  relig- 
ious sects,  are  justified  in  establishing  parochial 
schools  in  opposition  to  those  maintained  by  the  State. 

96.  Freshmen  should  be  excluded  from  all  univer- 
sity athletic  teams. 

97.  The  education  of  the  American  negro  should  be 
industrial  rather  than  liberal. 


PROPOSITIONS  FOR  DEBATE,  275 

98.  Education  should  be  compulsory  to  the  age  of 
sixteen. 

99.  Military  tactics  should  be  taught  in  the  public 
schools. 

100.  Religious  denominations  are  justified  in  estab- 
lishing colleges  in  the  vicinity  of  State  universities. 


INDEX. 


Afl&rmative,  duty  of,  74 
Analogy,  argument  from,  90 
Analysis  of  debatable  questions, 

Antecedent  probability,  argument 

from,  70  ff.,  87 
A  posteriori  evidence,  94 

refutation  of,  114 
A  priori  evidence,  87 

refutation  of.  III 

Arbitration  question,  113 
Artistic  qualities  in  debate,  184 
Audience,  relation  of  speaker  to, 

135,  182,  210,  215 
Authority,  argument  from,  46,  83, 

no 
Authority,  legal,  26,  27 

Begging  the  question,  21,  79,  118, 

181 
Bentham,  J.,  118 
Bowen,  Justice,  quoted,  62 
Briefs,  50  ff. 

legal,  58 

specimen,  243  ff. 

Bright,  J.,  quoted,  172 
Burden  of  proof,  61  ff. 

Carter,  J.  C,  quoted,  144 
Cause  and  effect,  proof  from,  96, 

"5 
Chatham,  Lord,  quoted,  150 
Choate,  J.  H.,  quoted,  144 
Church,  C.  J.,  quoted,  65 
Cicero,  cited,  138 
Clearness,  in  delivery,  205 
in  s^le,  165 


Climax,  181 
Conclusions,  145 
Concreteness  of  style,  174 
Condensation,  art  of,  167 

limitations  of,  164 

Conviction  and  persuasion,  4 
Copyright  question,  36 
Currency  question,  36,  119,  136  n. 

argument  on,  230 

brief  on,  253 

Debate,  nature  of,  i  ff. 
Deduction  and  induction,  77 
Defining  questions,  32  ff. 
Delivery,  preparation  for,  189 

problems  of,  203  ff. 

training  for,  214 

Dilemma,  the,  122,  126 

Elegance,  in  delivery,  212 

in  style,  18 1 

Eliot,  George,  quoted,  92 
Enunciation,  206 
Erskine,  Lord,  cited,  109  n. 
Evidence,  circumstantial,  95,  114 

a  posteriori^  94,  114 

a  priori^  87,  in 

Example,  argument  from,  90 
Expansion  question,  71 

argument  on,  221 

Extemporaneous  refutation,  197 
Extemporization,  how  far  safe,  192 

Facts,  attacking,  107 

establishing  of,  79 

mastery  of,  127,  198 

Fallacies,  117  ff. 

27;^ 


278 


INDEX. 


Federal    government,    centraliza- 
tion in,  70 
Figurative  language,  176 
Fluency,  cultivation  of,  195,  203 
Folz,  S.,  brief  of,  257 
Force,  in  delivery,  209 

in  style,  173 

Formal  debates,  22 
Fowler,  T.,  cited,  117  n. 

Gesture,  213 
Gladstone,  W.  E.,  196 

Hoar,  G.  F.,  quoted,  125 
Holyoake,  G.  J.,  quoted,  193,  196 
Honesty  in  proof,  105 

"Ignoring  the  Question,"  120 
Illustrations,  use  of,  177 
Income-tax  question,  38,  143,  169 
Induction  and  deduction,  77 
Inference,  proof  a  matter  of,  78 
Introductions,  138 

Jury  question,  35 

Legal  argument,  23  fF. 
Legal  brief,  243 
Legal  questions,  analysis  of,  38 
Lincoln,  A.,  108,  123 
Liquor  question,  93,  115 
Logic  and  argumentation,  8 

Macaulay  on  copyright,  36,  123 

brief  of,  249 

Macaulay,    T.    B.,    quoted,    124, 

177,  201 
Mansfield,  Lord,  quoted,  126,  148 
Meade,  E.  S.,  speech  of,  221 
Memorized  speeches,  dangers  of, 

194 

Negative,  duty  of,  75 
JVon  sequitur,  12 1 

Opponent,  attitude  toward  an,  134 


Outline  of  argument,  50  ff. 

as  basis  of  finished  structure, 

137 

Paragraphs,   use   in   structure  of 

argument,  152 
Persuasiveness,  4  ff.,  182,  212 

in  peroration,  147 

in  refutation,  136 

Petitio  prindpii,  1 1 8 
Pitt,  W.,  quoted,  178,  200 
Policy,  questions  of,  29,  98 
Post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc,  79,  116 
Posture,  213 

Preliminary  work  of  debater,  31  ff. 
Presumptions,  63 
Proof,  methods  of,  77  ff. 

order  of,  141 

schemes  of,  100 

Propositions  as  subjects  of  debat»e, 

10 

"Question-begging  epithets,"  118 
Questions,  debatable,  10  ff. 

Reductio  ad  absurdum,  122 
Refutation,  extemporaneous,  197 

inverted,  143 

methods  of,  106  ff.,  128 

principle  of,  130 

Roebuck,  J.  A.,  116 
Rogers,  quoted,  116 

Sidgwick,  H.,  cited,  79  r. 
Sidney,  Sir  P.,  quoted,  92 
"Sign,"  argument  from,  94 
Spoken   discourse,  characteristic* 

of,  165,  187 
Statistics,  use  of,  115,  175 
Stephen,  quoted,  63 
Structure  of  argument,  137  ff. 
Style,  laws  of,  in  argument,  i64ff. 

relation  to  structure,  151 

Subjects  for  debate,  10  ff. 
list  of,  267 


INDEX. 


279 


Suffrage  question,  53,  7a,  119 
Summaries,  use  of,  146 
Syllogistic  reasoning,  98 

Testimony,  79  ff. 

how  attacked,  108 

Thayer,  J.  B.,  quoted,  25  n.,  65 
Time,  economy  of,  166 
Transitions  in  argument,  154 
Trust  question,  brief  on,  257 


Venezuelan  question,  40,  125 

argument  on,  236 

Voice,  use  of,  205,  211 

Warren,  J.  P.,  speech  of,  230 
Webster,  D.,  quoted,  149 
Wendell,  B.,  quoted,  49 
Witnesses,  credibility  of,  80,  108 
Wording   of  propositions  for   de- 
bate, 18  flf. 
Written  speeches,  use  of,  187 


Alden's  SPECIMENS  OF  ENGLISH  VERSE. 

By  Raymond  M.  Alden,  Associate  Profeisor  in  Leland  Stanford  Uni- 
versity,   xiv-f  459  PP>    xzmo.    |x.a5. 

This  book  is  well  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  beginner  because  it  treats  of 
the  rhetorical  effectiveness  of  g'iven  forms  for  given  purix>se8  and  because  it 
furnishes,  in  convenient  arrangement,  an  unusual  quantity  of  material.  This 
material  consists  of  illustrative  passages,  arranged  for  each  point  in  chrono- 
logical order,  and,  in  addition,  a  large  number  of  brief  comments  by  various 
critics. 

C.  T.  Winchester,  Professor  in  Wesleyan  University^  Middletotvn^  Ct.: — 
I  think  it  certainly  the  most  useful  manual  upon  the  subject  that  I  have 
recently  seen.  The  examples  are  copious  and  admirably  selected,  and  the 
principles  drawn  from  them  clearly  stated. 

Dr.  Henry  Van  Dyke,  Professor  in  Princeton  University:— It  seems  to  me 
an  excellent  book,  much  needed  and  thoroughly  well  made.  I  venture  to 
predict  for  it  large  usefulness. 

Bliss  Perry,  Editor  of  the  Atlantic  Monthly:— It  is  a  skilfully  planned 
and  admirably  compact  handbook.  I  know  of  no  treatise  on  versification 
which  is  so  well  adapted  for  practical  use  in  the  classroom. 


Lewis's  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  ENGLISH  VERSE. 

By  Charlton  M.  Lbwis,  Professor  in  Yale  University.    143  pp.     i6mo. 
I1.25. 

To  such  persons  as  enjoy  poetry,  but  think  they  might  enjoy  it  more  if  they 
found  its  metrical  structure  less  bewildering,  this  little  book  offers  material 
assistance.  The  sutement  of  principles  will  also  be  of  interest  to  scholars 
and  pi^ofessional  metrists. 

Outlook:— It  ought  to  be  in  the  hands  of  lovers  of  poetry  who  are  not 
entirely  familiar  with  the  technical  forms  of  the  different  kinds  of  verse  which 
give  them  pleasure.  ...  In  this  compact  and  easily  read  volume,  in  untech- 
nical  language,  the  various  kinds  of  meter  are  described  with  sufficient  fulness 
and  illustration  to  give  the  intelligent  lover  of  poetry  all  the  information  he 
needs  and  to  furnish  also  an  excellent  text-book. 


Hart's  STANDARD  ENGLISH  SPEECH. 

The  Development  of  Standard  English  Speech  in  Outline.    By  J.  M. 
Hart,  Professor  in  Cornell  University.    x+93PP<     i6mo.    $1.00. 

An  attempt  to  show  how  the  Englishman  or  American  of  tonlay  has  come 
by  his  pronunciation.  The  treatment  is  technical  and  presuppoces  somt 
knowledge  of  Old  English. 


Pancoast's  Introduction  to 
English  Literature 

By  Henry  S.  Pancoast.  Third  Edition^  Revised  and 
Enlarged,     ix  +  656  pp.     i2mo,     $1.35. 

This  edition  has  been  entirely  rewritten  and 
printed  from  new  plates  on  a  larger  page.  Greater 
space  has  been  given  to  the  Early  and  the  Middle 
English  periods  and  to  the  literature  of  the  Queen 
Anne  and  Victorian  periods.  Lives  of  Bunyan, 
Dryden,  Steele,  Cowper,  and  others  have  been  added. 

C.  G.  Child,  Professor  in  the  University  of  Pennsyl- 
vania:— It  is  far  and  away  the  best  elementary  text-book 
of  English  Literature  in  existence. 

William  Lyon  Phelps,  Professor  in  Yale  University: — 
This  is  an  exceedingly  valuable  book,  in  fact  one  of  the 
best  summaries  of  English  Literature  that  has  ever  been 
written. 

James  Hugh  Moffatt,  Central  Hi^h  School,  Phila- 
delphia, Pa.: — I  have  always  liked  this  book  because  it 
shows  so  clearly  that  English  Literature  is  an  expression  of 
national  life,  and  because  it  is  not  only  about  literature 
but  is  literature  itself. 

Dr.  Albert  Leonard,  Superintendent  of  Schools,  New 
Rochelle,  N.  F.;— The  book  has  been  made  even  better 
than  it  was  before  the  revision.  There  is  no  better  text- 
book for  High  School  work  in  English  Literature  than  this 
book,  and  I  am  sure  that  this  revised  edition  will  win  a 
still  larger  number  of  friends. 

Pancoast' s  Introduction  to 
American  Literature 

By  Henry  S.  Pancoast.     xii  +  393  pp.     i6mo.     |i.n. 

The  Nation; — Quite  the  best  brief  manual  of  the  subject 
we  kn6w.  .  .  .  National  traits  are  well  brought  out  with- 
out neglecting  organic  connections  with  the  mother 
country.  Forces  and  movements  are  as  well  handled  as 
personalities,  the  influence  of  writers  hardly  less  than 
their  individuality. 

HENRY    HOLT    AND    COMPANY 
NEW  YORK  CHICAGO 


Pancoast's  Standard  English  Poems 

Spenser  to  Tennyson.  Selected  and  edited  by  Henry 
S.  rANCoAST.    xxiii  +  749pp.     i2mo.     $1.50, 

Henry  A.  Beers,  Professor  in  Yale  University:— ''l):!.^ 
collection  seems  to  me,  in  general,  made  with  excellent 
judgment  and  the  notes  are  sensible,  helpful,  and  not  too 
weitlaufig. 

Fred  Lewis  Pattee,  Professor  in  State  College,  Pa,: — 
An  ideal  selection  from  every  standpoint. 

Samuel  Thurber,  Girls'  High  School,  Boston:— VLr.  Pan- 
coast  had  in  view  the  teacher  who  means  to  give  the  best 
possible  conspectus  of  English  poems,  rather  than  the 
searcher  for  gems  to  make  a  golden  treasury.  Yet  the 
book  is  a  treasury,  for  all  that.  .  .  .  Challenging  compari- 
son as  [a  text-book],  it  easily  takes  first  rank.  .  .  .  Surely 
nobody  is  using  a  book  of  this  scope  quite  so  good  as  this. 

Pancoast's  Standard  English  Prose 

From  Bacon  to  Stevenson.  Selected  and  edited  by 
Henry  S.  Pancoast.    ix  +  676pp.     i2mo.     $1.50. 

About  one  hundred  selections  (most  of  them  com- 
plete in  themselves)  from  Bacon,  Walton,  Sir 
Thomas  Browne,  Fuller,  Milton,  Jeremy  Taylor, 
Cowley,  Bunyan,  Dryden,  Defoe,  Swift,  Addison, 
Steele,  Johnson,  Goldsmith,  Burke,  Coleridge, 
Southey,  Lamb,  Landor,  Hazlitt,  De  Quincey, 
Carlyle,  Macaulay,  Newman,  Froude,  Ruskin, 
Thackeray,  Matthew  Arnold,  Pater,  and  Stevenson. 

R.  K.  Root,  Princeton  University: — The  list  of 
authors  represented  is  thoroughly  comprehensive  and  the 
selections  themselves  are  chosen  with  excellent  taste.  I 
am  specially  pleased  that  Mr.  Pancoast  has  giv^n  complete 
essays,  rather  than  mere  fragments. 

F.  B.  White,  St.  Paul's  School,  Concord,  N.  H.:—lt  is 
an  admirable  collection.  I  have  seen  almost  no  book  of 
selections  from  literature  which  seems  to  me  so  satisfacto- 
rily complete. 

HENRY    HOLT    AND    COMPANY 
NEW  YORK  CHICAGO 


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